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ABSTRACT
  This dissertation investigates relationships among financial institutions. I examine 
relationships from three different perspectives: relationships among affiliated banks and 
life insurers, correlated trading among life insurers, and relationships between insurers and 
bond dealers in the over-the-counter markets. The primary purpose of my research is to 
examine the benefits and drawbacks of relationships among financial institutions. The main 
findings are as follows. First, life insurers with bank affiliates had higher growth rates 
relative to other life insurers during the 2008 financial crisis. However, these Bank-Life 
Financial Holding Companies performed worse than Non-Bank-Life Financial Holding 
Companies during the same period. It indicates that the cross-selling effect is not large 
enough to increase firm’s performance. Second, U.S. life insurers’ investment decisions in 
corporate bonds are correlated across companies.  However, the evidence in this 
dissertation is mixed as to whether insurers’ investment behavior has the potential to 
disrupt financial markets.  Little evidence shows that this herding pushes prices away from 
fundamental values. Third, we find that there is variation in the impact of trading 
relationships on execution costs. The variation is related to the variation in a customer’s 
market power in the dealer relationship.  In addition, the outsourcing of investment services 
to an affiliate of a dealer help customers with the weak market power to decrease bond 
execution costs. These findings of three essays add to the financial institution and 
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     This dissertation is composed of three essays on relationships among financial 
institutions. I examine relationships from different perspectives: relationships among 
affiliated banks and life insurers, correlated trading among life insurers, and relationships 
between insurers and bond dealers in the over-the-counter markets. 
The first essay in Chapter 2 analyzes whether bank affiliate relationships affect life 
insurers’ growth rates, excess return on asset, and scope economies. I find that life insurers 
with bank affiliates had higher growth rates relative to other life insurers during the 2008 
financial crisis. The higher growth is derived mainly from annuity products (deposit-type 
insurance products), which are often viewed as substitutes for bank Certificates of Deposit 
(CD). In addition, return on assets before claim payments, operating cost scope economies, 
and revenue scope economies all improved during the same period. Meanwhile, return on 
assets after claim payments, claim cost scope economies and profit scope economies 
deteriorated. This growth effect is consistent with cross-selling between banks and life 
insurers. However, the cross-selling effect was not sufficiently large to cover the 
underwriting loss.  Overall, my results suggest that the Bank-Life Financial Holding 
Companies performed worse than Non-Bank-Life Financial Holding Companies during the 
2008 financial crisis. 
     The second essay (co-authored with Greg Niehaus) in Chapter 3 studies the impacts of 
correlated trading among life insurers on bond prices. Our evidence indicates that U.S. life 
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insurers’ investment decisions in corporate bonds are correlated across companies within 
the life insurance industry.  On average, sell-side herding is greater in smaller bonds, bonds 
with lower ratings, and bonds that have been downgraded.  Moreover, herding is more 
pronounced when insurers that are part of a group that has been designated as a SIFI trade 
the bond.  Sell-side herding tends to follow negative abnormal returns.  Also, bond returns 
are abnormally low during the quarter when insurers exhibit high sell side 
herding.  However, we do not find that these price effects are subsequently reversed, which 
is what one would expect if the selling pressure pushed prices away from fundamental 
values. 
     The third essay (co-authored with Greg Niehaus) in Chapter 4 examines the impacts of 
relationships between customers and dealers on bond execution costs, where a relationship 
is defined to exist if the customer and dealer traded in the previous quarter.  Unlike Di 
Maggio et al. (2017), we find that previous trading with a dealer is associated with higher 
execution costs for the customer, on average.  Further investigation reveals that there is 
variation in the impact of trading relationships on execution costs and that the variation is 
explained by variation in a customer’s market power in the dealer relationship.  In addition, 
the outsourcing of investment services to an affiliate of a dealer improves bond execution 
costs for customers with weak market power when they trade with a relationship dealer. 
     Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of Chapters 2, 3, and 4 and discusses the implications 




DOES AN AFFILIATED BANK IMPROVE LIFE INSURER 
PERFORMANCE DURING THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS?1 
2.1 Introduction 
Diversification creates several internal markets among different types of entities, 
such as internal capital markets, internal labor markets, and internal sales channels (Berger, 
Demsetz and Strahan, 1999; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Tate and Yang, 2015). Different 
theories suggest conflicting predictions regarding the impact of internal markets on firm 
performance. Stein (1997) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) assume that top managers 
have access to better information, which allows them to allocate resources based on the 
relative profitability of growth opportunities and to increase firm value as a result. On the 
other hand, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argue that agency problems cause top managers 
to misallocate resources. Thus, firm value might be jeopardized when stronger divisions 
subsidize weaker divisions, leading to so-called “socialism” in internal capital allocation. 
The empirical evidence from the literature is mixed.2 However, diversification discounts 
and the drawbacks of cross-subsidization by internal capital markets are frequently 
highlighted in the financial industry literature (Campello, 2002; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; 
Laeven and Levine, 2007; Holod and Peek, 2010). 
                                                          
1 Chia-Chun Chiang. To be submitted to Journal of Risk and Insurance.   
2 Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2015) support the efficiencies of internal capital markets. However, other 




The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence on internal markets and scope 
economies in financial companies.  I investigate whether life insurers with bank affiliates 
grow faster relative to life insurers without bank affiliates during the 2008 financial crisis. 
Furthermore, I examine whether the scope economies of Bank-Life financial holding 
companies (BLFHCs) changed during the 2008 financial crisis. I define a BLFHC as a 
holding company that includes a life insurance company and a bank. I find that BLFHC 
life insurers enjoyed higher premium growth rates relative to non-BLFHC life insurers 
during the financial crisis.  I also find that BLFHCs enjoyed greater excess ROA before 
claim payments, operating cost scope economies and revenue scope economies during the 
2008 financial crisis than during normal times.  In contrast, excess ROA after claim 
payments, underwriting cost scope economies and profit scope economies worsened during 
the same period. 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) allowed U.S. financial 
conglomerates to engage in both banking and insurance under one roof, similar to universal 
banks in Europe (Carow, 2000; Morrison, 2015).3 However, regulators from both the 
banking and insurance industries have remained concerned about the potential negative 
effects involved in combining banking and insurance, particularly those effects related to 
cross-subsidization, which might drag down the financial health of the other financial 
entities in a group. Consequently, although regulations allow combinations, resource 
transfers are constrained within financial conglomerates by restrictions on internal 
                                                          
3 Prior to 1999, national banks could sell insurance products only under certain specific situations under the 
National Banking Act of 1918. However, banks were prohibited from underwriting insurance contracts based 
on the Bank Holding Company (BHC) Act of 1956. The Citicorp-Travelers group merger in 1998 is often 
understood as the catalyst for the GLBA (Carow 2000).  
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transactions, such as firewalls (Houston, James and Marcus 1997; Omarova 2011; Koijen 
and Yogo 2015).4   
     To identify the internal market activities between banks and life insurance companies, 
I examine U.S. life insurers’ growth rates from 2004 to 2011. In particular, I focus on the 
2008 financial crisis because it is the first banking-related financial crisis following passage 
of the GLBA. Moreover, although internal market functions are expected to be most 
valuable in a turbulent market, regulators’ concerns – such as those involving over-
subsidization among financial groups – are also likely to be heightened during a financial 
crisis (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015; Harrington, 2009).  
     I hypothesize as follows: If internal markets transfer resources to units in need in a 
financial crisis, then BLFHC life insurers should experience higher growth rates than non-
BLFHC insurers during a financial crisis relative to non-crisis periods. Banks with excess 
funding from potential depositors can transfer these potential depositors to their affiliated 
life insurers that sell fixed annuity products, which are typically viewed as substitutes for 
bank certificates of deposit (CDs). Affiliated life insurers suffering operating and 
investment losses can thus obtain funding to maintain their risk-based capital ratios. I focus 
on cross-selling, an internal transfer channel that has received little attention in the 
academic literature.5 According to a 2009 LIMRA report, the bank sales channel had the 
second highest total annuity market share with fixed annuity sales improving 94% in 2008. 
6 Given that banks and insurers offer products that are close substitutes, e.g., bank CDs and 
                                                          
4 With regard to banking regulation, section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act limits the extent to which a bank 
or its subsidiaries can engage in lending with and/or purchasing equity or assets from any affiliate. With 
regard to insurance regulation, many states also set restrictions on non-insurance subsidiary investments. 
5 Previous studies focus on the impacts of cross-selling on firm value but do not discuss how cross-selling 
helps during a financial crisis. 
6 LIMARA is a worldwide research organization that provides insight and analysis on retirement, insurance 
and distribution. The related article is titled “FA Sales Skyrocketed In '08 While VA Sales Plunged: LIMRA”. 
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fixed annuities, banks can transfer customers to their affiliated life insurers.7 By contrast, 
non-BLFHC life insurers must pay higher costs (such as higher commissions) to sell 
products through non-affiliated banks (external markets). In other words, cross-selling 
might be an efficient means of transferring resources. 
     To investigate whether an internal bank channel helped the growth of life insurers 
during the 2008 financial crisis, I use company-level data from the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), representing 460 life insurers from 261 financial 
conglomerates over the 2004-2011 period. I find that BLFHC life insurers enjoyed greater 
growth rates relative to non-BLFHC insurers during the financial crisis compared to non-
crisis periods even after controlling for other potential internal capital transfer channels 
(such as capital transfers and reinsurance change).  
     A key concern for any analysis of the effects of internal markets is the endogeneity of 
BLFHC formation. In particular, life insurance growth may induce conglomerates to 
incorporate both banks and life insurers, i.e. the causality is reversed. In light of this issue, 
I use three econometric techniques in the analysis of my BLFHC internal markets results. 
First, I lag all the financial variables because lagged financial variables and current growth 
are less likely to be jointly determined (Berger and Bouwman, 2013). Second, I incorporate 
group fixed effects into the regression models to control for a wide range of group-specific 
characteristics (outside of BLFHCs) that might be driving the results (Laeven and Levine, 
2007; Cremers, Huang and Sautner, 2011). Third, I employ propensity score matching for 
BLFHC and non-BLFHC life insurers based on firm fundamentals to allow for various 
                                                          
7 See Waggoner, J. (2011, December 13). What to ask before you buy an annuity; Fixed rate or variable? What are the 
costs? USA TODAY. Retrieved from FACTIVA.  
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functional forms of the relation between insurer characteristics and revenue growth 
(Duchin and Sosyura, 2014). 
     If the marginal return on added capital in life insurers is greater than a bank in the group, 
then transferring resources from banks to insurance companies is good for the entire 
conglomerate because it improves resource reallocation, which increases conglomerate 
value (Stein, 1997; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Niehaus, 2017). However, if the 
opposite situation holds, then transferring resources is likely to reduce conglomerate value. 
Previous studies show that inefficient transfers may happen as the result of agency 
problems. Managers’ rent-seeking behavior and the portion of manager ownership can 
result in agency problems and inefficient transfers (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Ozbas and 
Scharfstein, 2010; and Glaser, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Sautner, 2013).     
     To examine the performance of BLFHCs, I compare excess ROA and scope economies 
during the financial crisis to those of non-crisis times. I use bank data from the Research 
Information System (RIS) database of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
and follow similar methodologies to those employed by Laeven and Levine (2007), Berger 
and Mester (1997), Berger, Cummins, Weiss and Zi (2000), Cummins and Weiss (2013), 
and Yuan and Phillips (2008). In this manner, I find that BLFHCs enjoyed greater excess 
ROA before claim payments, operating cost scope economies and revenue scope 
economies during the 2008 financial crisis than during normal times.  However, excess 
ROA after claim payments, underwriting cost scope economies and profit scope economies 
worsened. These results are consistent with the inefficiency hypothesis. 
     My paper contributes to the literature on internal markets and corporate diversification. 
Whereas previous studies focus on internal markets in the same financial industry, I 
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examine the operation of internal markets across financial industries through cross-selling 
during the 2008 financial crisis. My analysis reveals new evidence regarding how 
BLFHCs’ excess ROA and scope economies change with market conditions. The evidence 
suggests that diversified conglomerates performed worse during the financial crisis, which 
is not consistent with the results of Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2015).  More 
importantly, the reason for the poorer performance is from the underwriting loss, which 
echoes the concerns of selling long-term policies at deep discounts by life insurers (Koijen 
and Yogo, 2015) 
     My findings also enhance our understanding of the resource transfer channel. A number 
of commonly used methods of transferring resources, including capital injection (Powell, 
Sommer and Eckles, 2008; Holod and Peek, 2010; Cremers, Huang and Sautner, 2011), 
loan sales (Holod and Peek, 2010), shareholder dividends deduction (Powell, Sommer and 
Eckles, 2008; Niehaus, 2015) and reinsurance contract usage (Powell, Sommer and Eckles, 
2008), have been examined in the literature. However, the role of cross-selling in internal 
markets is overlooked. BLFHCs are expected to use the cross-selling channel to move their 
resources because of regulatory constraints. 
     My paper examines similar issues as those investigated by Kuppuswamy and Villalonga 
(2015), who aim to determine whether diversification created value during the 2008 
financial crisis. Those authors use Compustat segment data to investigate general 
conglomerate value changes during the financial crisis and also find that the efficiency of 
internal capital allocation increased significantly during the crisis. My paper differs from 
theirs in two ways. First, I use regulatory reporting data, and I thus avoid the self-reporting 
issue in Compustat’s segment data. Second, I focus on financial institutions instead of 
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general institutions. The failure of a financial institution due to cross-subsidization during 
a financial crisis is of great concern to regulators. The finding of this paper is consistent 
with the hypothesis that customer transfers did occur among BLFHCs during the 2008 
financial crisis. However, the effect of cross-selling was not sufficiently large to cover the 
underwriting loss. My findings are not consistent with Kuppuswamy and Villalonga 
(2015). BLFHCs perform worse than non-BLFHCs during a financial crisis. 
     This remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the 
development of the empirical hypotheses. Section 2.3 contains the data and sample 
selection processes. Section 2.4 presents the empirical results, while Section 2.5 contains 
additional evidence and robustness checks.  Section 2.6 examines the efficiency of resource 
transfers, and Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 Development of Empirical Hypotheses 
     In this section, I review existing theory and the current empirical literature to formulate 
my empirical hypotheses regarding resource transfers and changes in scope economies. 
2.2.1 Resource Transfers Hypothesis:  
     Hypothesis 1: During the financial crisis, the growth rates of BLFHC life insurers 
are higher than those of non-BLFHC life insurers compared to non-crisis periods. 
     Information problems can create a wedge between internal and external financing 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). Internal capital markets are assumed to mitigate asymmetric 
information problems because headquarters has more information about its subsidiaries 
than outsiders. Thus, headquarters can shift funds among its subsidiaries and avoid 
underinvestment problems (Stein, 1997). The function of the internal markets is likely to 
be more important during financial crises because corporate headquarters adds more value 
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when it reallocates funds across projects in a credit-constrained environment 
(Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015).  
     Nonetheless, some previous studies find that headquarters may attempt to shift capital 
to those subsidiaries within the conglomerates that have a greater need for capital (Holod 
and Peek, 2010; Cremers, Huang and Sautner, 2011). During the 2008 financial crisis, 
many life insurers appear to have been financially constrained (Koijen and Yogo, 2015). If 
internal markets are operational during the same period, life insurers with bank affiliates 
are expected to obtain resources from affiliates and therefore grow faster than insurers 
without such affiliates. 
     Standard resource transfers, including capital injections (Powell, Sommer and Eckles, 
2008; Holod and Peek, 2010; Cremers, Huang and Sautner, 2011; Niehaus, 2017), loan 
sales (Holod and Peek, 2010), shareholder dividends reduction (Powell, Sommer and 
Eckles, 2008; Niehaus, 2017) and reinsurance contract usage (Powell, Sommer and Eckles, 
2008), have been examined in the finance literature. However, the role of cross-selling in 
internal markets remains overlooked, and I hypothesize that BLFHCs use the cross-selling 
channel to move their resources and avoid regulatory constraints. 
     It is important to consider customer transfers for two reasons. First, one of the main 
benefits of BLFHCs is that the affiliated parties can share customer bases and sell their 
products to the other client bases (Berger, Cummins, Weiss and Zi, 2000). However, there 
is limited research on customer transfer channels. Second, there are several regulatory 
impediments involved in the internal capital markets of BLFHCs (Houston, James and 
Marcus, 1997; Koijen and Yogo, 2015). BLFHCs face several constraints when seeking to 
transfer capital to subsidiaries. For example, subsidiary lending and capital transfer are 
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both closely regulated by section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act and the Insurance 
Holding Company Act (Omarova, 2011; Koijen and Yogo, 2015). By contrast, customer 
transfers are more flexible because of fewer constraints. Thus, life insurers with bank 
affiliates are expected to grow faster than those without bank affiliates during the 2008 
financial crisis even after controlling for traditional resource transfer channels because of 
cross-selling effects. 
     Cross-selling is expected to be particularly useful during financial crises because 
annuity products issued by life insurers are often understood as substitutes for bank CDs 
(Scism, 2013). During the 2008 financial crisis, many individuals sought a safe haven in 
which to keep their cash. The headquarters of BLHCs had the option to allocate these 
potential customers to either fixed annuities or bank CDs in two different affiliated entities 
(Waggoner, 2009; Beatrice and Montminy, 2009). Transferring customers from banks to 
life insurers not only helps the constrained life insurers but also the banks. Life insurers 
could record their liabilities below their intrinsic values during the financial crisis based on 
the Standard Valuation Law, such that additional insurance revenues (increasing capital) 
partially solved the problems of financially constrained life insurers (Koijen and Yogo, 
2015). After the crash of the mortgage loan markets, banks also became more conservative 
about making loans, partly because of increases in loan losses and/or other liquidity issues 
(Gan, 2007; Santos, 2011). In addition, low loan demand during the financial crisis also 
made it practically difficult for banks to make more loans. Thus, the headquarters of 
financial conglomerates were incentivized to transfer customers from banks to life insurers. 
     Previous studies show that constrained life insurance companies responded during the 
financial crisis by selling downgraded bonds to avoid higher risk-based capital 
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requirements (Merrill, Nadauld, Stulz and Sherlund, 2014) and by selling bonds with 
embedded capital gains (Ellul, Jotikasthira, Lundblad and Wang, 2015), seeking 
government bailouts (Massad, 2012; GAO, 2013; Koijen and Yogo, 2015), raising funds 
in the external capital markets (Berry-Stolzle, Nini, and Wende, 2014), receiving capital 
from affiliated entities in their group (Niehaus, 2017), and lowering product prices to sell 
more policies, all with the aim of reporting higher capital (Koijen and Yogo, 2015). 
However, the effects of cross-selling by affiliated banks through their internal markets have 
not yet been investigated. This paper fills this research gap. 
2.2.2 Efficiency Hypothesis  
Hypothesis 2.a: Resources transferred from its bank affiliates to BLFHC’s life 
insurers add to a BLFHC’s scope economies and excess ROA (efficiency hypothesis) 
Hypothesis 2.b: Resources transferred from its bank affiliates to BLFHC’s life 
insurers decrease a BLFHC’s scope economies and excess ROA (inefficiency 
hypothesis) 
On the one hand, the efficiency hypothesis assumes that top managers make 
investment decisions to increase conglomerates’ values. Thus, they will allocate resources 
to firms with better investment opportunities (Stein, 1997; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002). 
On the other hand, under the inefficiency hypothesis, top managers allocate resources to 
subsidiaries with worse investments because of agency problems (Scharfstein and Stein, 
2000; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010; Glaser, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Sautner, 2013). 
Previous studies show that the evidence on this topic is mixed (Glaser, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
and Sautner, 2013; Duchin and Sosyura, 2013; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015).   
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     If resource transfers are found within BLFHCs, then efficient and inefficient resource 
transfers might simultaneously exist, based on the arguments discussed above. In the case 
of banks and insurers combined in a conglomerate, banks might be willing to transfer 
resources to affiliated insurance companies because they might then shift their potential 
liabilities to the insurers and earn fee income (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). Moreover, deposit 
insurance and the too-big-to-fail concerns of authorities increase banks’ moral hazard 
problem (Eisenbeis and Kaufman 2010; Morrison 2010). Insurance companies might thus 
be willing to accept the transfer because life insurers’ manager compensation is linked to 
insurance revenues, and these transfers increase insurance revenues and thus increase 
executive compensation as well (Mayers and Smith, 1992). Moreover, statutory reserve 
regulations, which allow life insurers to record far less than a dollar of reserve per dollar 
of future insurance liability, further increase incentives to transfer resources to insurance    
companies (Koijen and Yogo, 2015).  
     Because of the special transfer channel, we cannot directly measure the impacts of 
internal banking channel on confluent’s performance. Thus, we measure the change in 
conglomerate’s performance. If the conglomerate’s performance worsened during the 2008 
financial crisis, it indicates that the cross-selling effects are not large enough to improve 
group’s performance. I examine both the changes in excess ROA and scope economies 
during non-crisis times and the 2008 financial crisis. 
2.3 Data and Methodologies 
2.3.1 Data      
          To compare growth for insurers belonging to BLFHCs with those not belonging to 
BLFHCs, I employ company-level data on premiums and other financial information from 
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the annual statements of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) 
covering from 2004 to 2011. My initial sample consists of all insurer groups and stand-
alone insurers. I first exclude stand-alone insurers (those without other affiliated 
companies) and reinsurers because stand-alone insurers and reinsurers have very different 
firm organizations and operations than financial conglomerates. I drop insurer-year 
observations with negative or zero surplus, total assets, total expenses and new direct 
premiums. The reason for these deletions is that firms with negative or zero values for these 
key variables cannot be considered as normal operating entities.8 Furthermore, I exclude 
inactive firms. I also delete life insurers that issue no annuity products during the sample 
period because my hypothesis is based on the assumption that annuities are substitutes for 
bank CDs. If life insurers do not sell annuity products, banks would have difficulty 
transferring potential customers to life insurers. Because I use 1-year lagged versions of 
most variables, I exclude those firm-year observations for which the preceding year of data 
are unavailable, which results in a sample of 2,757 insurer-year observations for 460 
insurers (261 financial conglomerates) from 2004 through 2011. 
           A life insurer is considered a member of a BLFHC if it is either a subsidiary of a 
bank holding company or has a bank affiliate(s)9. A life insurer is considered a member of 
a non-BLFHC if it does not have any bank affiliates but has other life insurer affiliates. 
There are 168 unique BLFHC life insurers (72 BLFHC groups) and 292 non-BLFHC life 
insurers (189 non-BLFHC groups) in my sample. The data’s summary statistics are 
                                                          
8 Insurance companies are highly regulated and subject to numerous legal requirements. Thus, for insurers 
that cannot operate normally, insurance commissioners will intervene in their operations. I omit these 
abnormal firms to exclude the effects of government. 
9 The NAIC requires life insurers to report whether they have bank affiliates in annual reports. In my 
analysis, non-depository trusts are not considered bank affiliated companies. Non-depository trusts cannot 
accept deposits from individuals, so they cannot transfer potential depositors to life insurers. 
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presented in Table 2.1, Panel A. On average, BLFHC life insurers are older companies 
with greater assets, higher reinsurance amounts, lower state concentration index and higher 
efficiency. In addition, a higher proportion (29%) of BLFHC life insurers is focused on 
annuity products, i.e., these insurers derive at least 75% of their premiums from annuity 
products. 
         Bank characteristic data are from the Research Information System (RIS) of the 
FDIC. Summary statistics for the data are presented in Table 2.1, Panel B. On average, 
BLFHC banks have higher deposit growth rates, take greater risks and are involved in more 
mergers and acquisitions. BLFHC banks are younger, larger, and more liquid. In addition, 
BLFHC banks have higher capital ratios.  
2.3.2 Methodologies 
     Following Epermanis and Harrington (2006) and Cole, Fier, Carson and Andrews 
(2015), I analyze both direct (“written”) new premium growth and net new premium 
growth (direct premiums plus premiums for reinsurance assumed minus premiums ceded 
to reinsurers). I define premium growth as ∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1 , where 𝑃𝑡  represents log 
premiums in year t for direct and net premiums and truncated growth at -1 and 1. I 
separately calculate the growth rate by each line of business and calculate the weighted 
growth rate based on the proportion of each business to total business premiums. Unlike 
previous papers, this paper does not use industry-adjusted premium growth because year 
fixed effects capturing industry-wide effects are already included in the regressions. 
     The empirical model used to test my first hypothesis is specified for insurer i at time t 
as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝛼𝑖 + β𝑡 + 𝛾BLFHC𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝐶×BLFHCs 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡, 
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     where yit is the premium weighted gross (net) new premium growth rate. The 
independent variables of interest are BLFHC and FC×BLFHC. BLFHC equals one if an 
insurer belongs to a BLFHC and zero otherwise. FC is a dummy variable that is equal to 
one in 2008 and zero otherwise. The interaction term FC×BLFHC equals one if an insurer 
belonged to a BLFHC in 2008 and zero otherwise. αi represents group fixed effects, and βt 
represents time fixed effects. I include group fixed effects to control time-invariant group 
level variables. 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is a vector of firm characteristics. If cross-selling helped the growth 
of life insurers during the financial crisis, then δ should be positive. I estimate the 
regression model using an ordinary least squares (OLS) method, and I cluster standard 
errors by financial group to allow for within-group correlation of residuals in premium 
growth. In addition, I lag financial variables one period (except for M&A, see below for 
the definition) relative to premium growth to mitigate the potential endogeneity problem. 
The control variables include the following firm characteristic control variables and 
premium-related control variables: 
Firm Characteristic Control Variables: 
     Capital. In theory, financial institutions with more capital enjoy a competitive 
advantage and thus should be able to earn greater market share (Berger and Bouwman, 
2013). Capital represents the insurer’s capacity and ability to write additional premiums 
(Powell, Sommer and Eckles, 2008). More capital is expected to support a larger business. 
However, Lyandres (2006) proposes that capital and market share can be negatively 
correlated because firms that are more highly leveraged tend to aggressively expand their 
market shares. In addition, capital is considered the ratio to measure firm-level risk. 
Insurers with lower capital ratio have greater desire for risk-taking (Downs and Sommer, 
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1999; Cummins and Doherty, 2002). Life insurers with higher risk levels might find it more 
difficult to improve their premium growth because of customers’ concerns. Thus, I include 
capital, which is defined as the ratio of the sum of total capital and surplus, the asset 
valuation reserve, and the interest maintenance reserve to total general account assets, 
measured as of year-end t-1 (Berry-Sto¨lzle, Nini and Wende, 2014).  
     Size. Smaller firms may have more capacity to grow, suggesting an inverse relation 
between size and premium growth. However, large firms typically have greater financial 
capacity to enter into new markets and launch new products (Berger and Bouwman, 2013). 
Following Cole, Fier, Carson and Andrews (2015), I control for size, which I measure as 
the natural logarithm of total insurer assets at year-end t-1.  
     Mutual. Previous studies suggest that a different ownership structure can affect 
insurers’ operation decisions and premium growth as a result (Powell, Sommer and Eckles, 
2008; Cole, Fier, Carson and Andrews, 2015). All else equal, mutual insurers may grow 
more slowly than stock insurers because of limited access to external capital (Powell, 
Sommer and Eckles, 2008).  
     Age. Choi (2010) shows an inverse relation between growth and the age of an 
organization. Thus, organizational age is included. 
     Liquidity. Liquidity measures a firm’s ability to meet its immediate financial 
obligations. Higher liquidity might help life insurers survive, resulting in better financial 
strength. However, higher liquidity can also be related to agency problems (Jensen, 1986). 
Liquidity is defined as the ratio of total cash and investment securities to total assets. 
     Efficiency. Efficiency is defined as the income-expense ratio. More efficient life 
insurers are expected to generate more premiums. However, less efficient life insurers 
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might also be associated with higher premium growth rates. Faster growth of less efficient 
life insurers via subsidies from headquarters might highlight one of the drawbacks of cross-
subsidization (Holod and Peek 2011). Efficiency is included to control for investment 
opportunities at the life insurer level (Cremers, Huang and Sautner 2011). 
     Capital Issuance and Surplus Note Issuance. Stolzle, Nini and Wende (2014) find that 
life insurers will issue external capital to support new business and to replace capital 
exhausted by operating losses. Thus, I include both capital issuance and surplus note 
issuance; capital issuance is defined as the sum of capital changes paid in and surplus 
adjustments paid in minus changes in treasury stock divided by general account asset at 
year end t-1, asset and surplus note issuance consists of the net change of surplus note 
divided by general account asset at year end t-1.  
     M&A. Life insurers can grow via mergers and acquisitions (Berger, Demsetz and 
Strahan, 1999). Thus, life insurers involved in mergers and acquisitions are expected to 
have higher premium growth rates. To control for the effect of mergers and acquisitions, I 
include an M&A dummy variable. M&A equals one if an insurer belongs to a different 
group than it did in a previous year. 
     A&H focus. Annuity focus and Life focus. A life insurer is viewed as an A&H focus 
insurer if it earns 75 percent of its premium revenue from accident and health insurance. 
The same rules are applied to Annuity focus insurers and Life focus insurers. 
Premium-Related Control Variables: 
     Reinsurance and Reinsurance Change. Reinsurance can be ceded by the insurer to 
other members of the group or ceded to external reinsurers. Both types of reinsurance can 
help an insurer write more insurance without increasing its surplus (Powell, Sommer and 
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Eckles, 2008; Cole, Fier, Carson and Andrews, 2015). I control for the insurer’s 
reinsurance by incorporating a net reinsurance variable, measured as total reinsurance 
assumed minus total reinsurance ceded, divided by total assets at year end t-1 (Cole, Fier, 
Carson and Andrews, 2015). Reinsurance change is measured by the difference in net 
ceded reinsurance premiums divided by total assets at year end t-1.   
     Business Concentration and State Concentration. It is more difficult for financial 
institutions with riskier product portfolios to increase their market shares because 
customers have greater concerns about the failure of these firms (Berger and Bouwman, 
2013). Like Powell, Sommer and Eckles, 2008, I include Herfindahl-Hirschman indices 
(HHIs) of premiums written by line of business and by state to proxy for underwriting 
exposure. The larger the HHIs, the more concentrated (and potentially risky) the insurance 
product portfolios. 
2.4 Empirical Results 
2. 4.1 Baseline Results 
     Insurance premium growth rate results are reported in Table 2.2. Panel A contains direct 
new premium growth rate results. Some control variables may be simultaneously 
determined together with premium growth rates, so I separately estimate the effects based 
on different sets of controls and different fixed effects to reduce endogeneity concerns. 
Columns (1) to (10) in Panel A present the results based on different specifications. 
     The coefficients on the interaction term FC×BLFHC in columns (1) – (10) are all 
positive and statistically significant, which indicates that during the 2008 financial crisis 
BLFHCs had higher growth rates, which is consistent with the internal market channel 
increasing premium growth rates. The results are consistent with the transfer hypothesis. 
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In addition, the BLFHC channel increased the premium growth rates by approximately 
16%-19%, which is economically significant.  
     Table 2.2, Panel B presents net new premium growth rate results. To some extent, net 
new premium growth rates better reflect the true growth rates of insurance companies 
because they reflect the true risk exposure owned by insurance companies. The results are 
consistent with the results in Panel A. The magnitude of the coefficient estimates is smaller 
but remains substantial as the BLFHC channel helped insurance premium growth by 
approximately 13–16% during the financial crisis and had a negative impact on premium 
growth by approximately 7% during non-crisis times.  
2.4.2 Premium and Deposit Growth Rate among BLFHCs 
If banks transfer customers to affiliated life insurers, we would expect a negative correlation 
between insurance premium growth rates and deposit growth rates for these BLFHCs.  To examine 
this issue, I present two types of evidence.  First, I examine growth rates of deposits and of 
premiums for BLFHCs at the aggregate level in Figure 1. The figure indicates that aggregate growth 
rates of premiums and deposits are inversely related for BLFHCs from 2004 to 2011, consistent 
with BLFHCs transferring customers between banks and life insurers.  
     I further formalize my analysis by running OLS regressions using data at the group level. I add 
affiliated banks’ deposit growth rate weighted by deposit amount to the baseline regressions 
presented above. If premium growth and deposit growth are negatively correlated, the coefficients 
on deposit growth are expected to be negative. Since FDIC insurance coverage for demand deposits 
increased during the financial crisis, presumably increasing the desirability of such deposits relative 
to uninsured deposits and annuities.  Therefore, I also consider noninsured deposit growth rates 
which can better capture the customer transfer effect.  I present the results in Table 3, Panel D.  
     The coefficients on deposit growth rates in columns 1–8 are all negative and statistically 
significant except for columns 1-2. On average, as deposit growth rate increases 10%, the insurance 
 
21 
net premium growth rate decreases about 1%, and vice versa.  Moreover, the results are stronger 
among uninsured deposit growth rates. The negative relation between deposits and premiums is 
consistent with the customer transfer hypothesis within financial conglomerates (Billett and Mauer, 
2003; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015).  
2.4.3 Matched Sample Analysis 
     In section 2.4.1, I assume a linear relation between life insurer characteristics and certain 
measures of growth. Thus, I have used control variables to separate the effects of internal bank 
channel from other insurer characteristics. In this section, I relax this assumption by constructing 
matched BLFHC and non-BLFHC samples. 
      I use a one-to-one matching method with and without replacement. A probit model is estimated 
on a 2004 cross section of 116 BLFHC life insurers and 219 non-BLFHC life insurers. The 
matching life insurer selected is the life insurer with the closest propensity score based on firm age, 
size, capital level, reinsurance level, liquidity, business concentration, state concentration, 
efficiency, capital issuance and debt issuance. For a one-to-one with replacement approach, all 
variables except for reinsurance level are statistically indistinguishable between these two groups 
(columns 1-4 of Table 2.3, Panel A). For a one-to-one without replacement approach, all variables 
except for liquidity are statistically indistinguishable between these two groups (columns 5-7 of 
Table 3, Panel A). 
     In columns 1-4 of Table 2.3, Panel B, I estimate regressions of premium growth using matched 
samples of BLFHC life insurers and non-BLFHC life insurers with replacement (columns 1-2) and 
without replacement (columns 3-4). The results are similar to those in baseline tests. The BLFHC 
channel is associated with higher insurance premium growth by approximately 13–18 percent 
during the financial crisis. Overall, my main finding is that during the financial crisis life insurers 




2.5. Additional Evidence and Robustness 
2.5.1 Cross-Selling 
     The transfer hypothesis is based on the argument that annuity products are similar to 
bank CDs, such that banks can easily promote annuities to potential depositors as a 
replacement. I separately examine the insurance premium growth rates by product to 
examine the substitution effects. If customers consider annuity products as substitutes for 
bank CDs, then the main premium growth effects should be related to annuity products 
instead of to life or accident and health insurance products. Table2.4 presents the premium 
growth rate findings for annuity products, life insurance products, and accident and health 
products. The principal result is that the internal bank channel during the 2008 financial 
crisis FC×BLFHC has positive and significant effects only on the annuity product premium 
growth. Economically, the internal bank channel increases the direct new premium growth 
from annuities by as much as 31% (t-value=2.29) and the net new premium growth from 
annuities by as much as 30% (t-value=1.95). An internal bank channel does not have 
statistically significant effects on either life or accident and health products. In summary, 
these results are consistent with the customer transfer hypothesis. 
2.5.2 Cross-Sectional Evidence 
     The transfer hypothesis assumes that having affiliated banks helps financially 
constrained life insurers during the financial crisis. In this section, I further analyze what 
types of life insurers benefit most from the internal banking channel and what types of 
banks contribute the most premium growth. 
     Prior research finds that headquarters tend to use internal capital markets to subsidize 
financially constrained segments (Cremers, Huang, and Sautner, 2011; Billett, and Mauer, 
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2003, Holod and Peek, 2010). In Table 2.2, Panel C, I reestimate the baseline regression of 
premium growth in the subsamples of life insurers partitioned by financial constraint level. 
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.2, Panel C, I split my sample at the median value of 
percentage change of the RBC ratio (2.1%) in whole sample and reestimate my main model 
of premium growth. For direct and net premium growth, internal banking channel effects 
hold for weakened life insurers but not for strengthened life insurers. The results reported 
in Table 2.2, Panel C show that the effects of the internal banking channel are stronger for 
financially constrained life insurers. 
2.5.3 Different Financial Crisis Definition      
     To further examine the cross-selling effect in 2008, I redefine the financial crisis 
indicator in several ways and estimate the effects by using the same difference-in-
difference framework. Most academic papers define the 2008 financial crisis from 2007 to 
2008 or from 2007 to 2009 (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Cornett, McNutt, Strahan and 
Tehranian, 2011; Santos, 2011; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015). In my analysis, the 
financial crisis indicator equals one in 2008 only. The reasoning behind this is that the 
meltdown of asset-backed commercial paper and mortgage-backed securities in the 
summer of 2007 led to massive bank losses (Cornett, McNutt, Strahan and Tehranian, 
2011; Santos, 2011). However, during the same period, the stock market continued to 
perform very well. For example, the return of the S&P 500 Index is approximately 5.5% 
in 2007. Consequently, investors did not have strong incentives to put their money in banks 
in 2007. Similarly, the stock market rebounded in 2009 after crashing in 2008 (-43%). The 
return on the S&P 500 in 2009 is about 26%, and investors are more willing to move into 
stock markets than to stay in banks. 
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     Table 2.5 presents the results under a different definition of financial crisis. In Columns 
(2)–(4), the dependent variable is the direct premium growth rate, and the financial crisis 
indicator equals one in 2007–2008, 2008–2009, and 2007–2009, separately. The 
coefficients on interaction terms FC×BLHC are not statistically different from zero. These 
results are consistent with the value of cross-selling only in 2008. The same results are 
found in the net premium growth rate. My findings are consistent with my hypothesis that 
the banking channel helped life insurers grow faster in 2008. 
2.5.4 Controlling for Lapse Effects 
    The policy replacement effect can bias the insurance premium growth results. In other 
words, insurance premium growth could stem from the agents who persuade policyholders 
to surrender old policies and buy new ones. Previous studies show that reasons to lapse 
also include needing emergency funds or failing to pay because of personal financial 
distress (Kuo, Tsai and Chen, 2003). Thus, lapse effects contain more than policy 
replacement effects. If we find that the BLFHC channel has a positive correlation with the 
growth rates of the new premium after deducting the surrender amount, we can conclude 
that the BLFHC channel does help affiliated life insurers. However, if we do not find a 
positive association, we cannot conclude that the BLFHC channel helps affiliated life 
insurers through policy replacement.  
     I redefine the insurance premium growth rate as ∆𝐿𝑃𝑡 = 𝐿𝑃𝑡 − 𝐿𝑃𝑡−1 , where 𝐿𝑃𝑡 
represents log (premiums minus surrender amounts) in year t for direct and net premiums 
and truncated growth at -1 and 1. In an unreported table, I find that the BLFHC channel 
continues to help BLFHC insurers. The coefficients are positive and significant for direct 
new premium growth rates of approximately10.7% (t-value=1.66) and for net new 
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premium growth rates of approximately 10.7% (t-value=1.88). In short, BLFHC life 
insurer enjoyed higher premium growth which deducts lapse amount. The results are 
consistent with the transfer hypothesis. 
2.6. Efficiency Analysis 
     The evidence thus far indicates that life insurers with bank affiliates enjoyed higher 
annuity premium growth rates during the 2008 financial crisis. These findings are 
consistent with the customer transfer hypothesis. In this section, I examine whether their 
resource transfers are efficient by analyzing excess ROA and changes in scope economies. 
2.6.1 Excess ROA Analysis 
    I first examine the excess ROA of BLFHCs to confirm the efficiency transfer. Following 
Laeven and Levine (2007), I examine whether a BLFHC has a ROA(x) more or less than 
the ROA(x) it would have had if the BLFHC had been broken down into a portfolio of two 
entities, each of which specializes in banking or insurance activities of the BLFHC group. 
In other words, let rL equal the median ROA of financial institutions that specialized in life 
insurance activity (a pure-life insurer) and let rB  equal the median ROA of financial 
institutions that specialized in banking activity (a pure bank). Then activity-adjusted ROA 
for group j is rj= (αjLr
L + αjBr
B), where 
αjL equals the share of the life insurance activity out of the total activity of the BLFHC 
group j, measured by total assets and , αjB equals the share of the banking activity in total 
activity of BLFHC j, measured by total assets. The sum of αjL and αjB equals one. Excess 
ROA is the difference between a BLFHC’s actual ROA and its activity-adjusted ROA. 
Actual ROA is measured as the BLFHC’s asset-weighted average ROA.  





     I consider three different definitions of ROA. ROA (1) is defined as the ratio of earnings 
before claim payments and taxes to total assets; ROA (2) is defined as the ratio of earnings 
before taxes to total assets; and ROA (3) is defined as the ratio of net income to total assets. 
     The first two columns of Table 2.6, Panel A show the median Excess ROA of BLFHCs 
during non-crisis times and during the financial crisis. During the financial crisis, the 
median of Excess ROA (1) increased from -0.53% to -0.07%. The difference is 
significantly different from zero, and the economic change is substantial. The changes in 
excess ROA (1) support the efficiency hypothesis. However, the other two measures of 
Excess ROA, which incorporate claim payments, yield a different result.  Excess ROA (2) 
and Excess ROA (3) indicate that BLFHCs performed worse during the financial crisis.  
For example, the Excess net income to total assets ROA (3), fell from -0.10% during the 
non-crisis period to -0.47 percent during the financial crisis.  Thus, the improvement from 
the operating side did not outweigh the realized losses and claim payment effects.    Overall, 
BLFHLs performed worse during the 2008 financial crisis. 
2.6.2 Scope Economies 
     If cost, revenue, and profit scope economies for the BLFHCs improved during the 2008 
financial crisis, then the results are consistent with the efficiency hypothesis. By contrast, 
if scope economies for BLFHCs deteriorated, then the results would support the inefficient 
internal market hypothesis. The data sources for scope economies are from the NAIC and 
the RIS database of the FDIC. I adopt an approach similar to that taken by Berger, 
Cummins, Weiss and Zi (2000), Yuan and Phillips (2008) and Berger, Hasan, and Zhou 
(2010) to measure scope economies.  The technique can be decomposed into two stages: 
(1) the estimation of an appropriate function for a cost, revenue, and profit function by 
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using nonlinear least squares regressions, and (2) measure scope economies at 25th, 50th, 
and 75th percentiles of the data for each output, netput, and input price during normal times 
and during the financial crisis. In this section, all financial variables are aggregated at the 
group level. 
Let: 
𝐶𝐵1(𝑦1; 𝑧1; 𝑤1) be the operating cost function for banks specializing in 𝑦1 and 𝑧1, 
𝐶𝐿1(𝑦2; 𝑧2; 𝑤2) be the operating cost function for life insurers specializing in 𝑦2 and 𝑧2, 
𝐶𝐽𝐼(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤1) be the operating cost function for the bank component of BLFHCs, 
and 𝐶𝐽2(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤2) be the operating cost function for the life insurance component 
of BLFHCs, 
where 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 are the vectors of input prices relevant to non-BLFHCs. The cost 
functions of banks specializing 𝐶𝐵1(•) and life insurers specializing 𝐶𝐿1(•) firms only 
include the outputs, fixed netputs and input prices relevant to a specialist. The cost 
functions for each of the divisions of the BLFHCs, 𝐶𝐽𝐼 (•) and 𝐶𝐽2 (•), incorporate all the 
outputs and fixed netputs to allow for interaction effects but exclude the irrelevant prices. 
The measure of operating cost scope economies is given by 
𝑆𝑐(1,2)
=
𝐶𝐵1(𝑦1; 𝑧1; 𝑤1) + 𝐶𝐿1(𝑦2; 𝑧2; 𝑤2) − 𝐶𝐽𝐼(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤1) − 𝐶𝐽2(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤2)
𝐶𝐽𝐼(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤1) + 𝐶𝐽2(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤2)
 
If 𝑆𝑐(1,2) is greater than zero, it indicates that cost scope economies exist. The claim 
cost, revenue, and profit scope economies are defined similarly to the operating cost 
scope economies, i.e., they are given by: 
   𝑆𝑈(1,2) =
𝑈𝐿1(𝑦2; 𝑧2; 𝑤2) − 𝑈𝐽2(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤2)






𝑅𝐽𝐼(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤1) + 𝑅𝐽2(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤2)−𝑅𝐵1(𝑦1; 𝑧1; 𝑤1) − 𝑅𝐼1(𝑦2; 𝑧2; 𝑤2)




𝜋𝐽𝐼(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤1) + 𝜋𝐽2(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤2)−𝜋𝐵1(𝑦1; 𝑧1; 𝑤1) − 𝜋𝐼1(𝑦2; 𝑧2; 𝑤2)
𝜋𝐽𝐼(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤1) + 𝜋(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤2)
 
where U (•) the claim cost function, the revenue function 𝑅 (•) and profit function 𝜋 (•) 
are derived in a similar manner as the 𝐶 (•) function is derived. If 𝑆𝑈(1,2) >0, then claim 
cost scope economies exist. Otherwise, claim cost scope diseconomies hold.  If 𝑆𝑅(1,2) 
>0, then revenue scope economies exist. Otherwise, revenue scope diseconomies exist. 
Similarly, profit scope economies are found if 𝑆𝜋(1,2)> 0, and profit scope diseconomies 
are found if 𝑆𝜋(1,2)<0. 
Operating cost, claim cost, revenue and profit functions for BLFHCs and non-BLFHCs are 
separately estimated with the composite functional form. The composite functional form is 
a quadratic structure for outputs and fixed netputs with a log-quadratic component for input 
prices, and interaction terms such that separability is not imposed (Berger, Cummins, 
Weiss and Zi, 2000). This form allows for the possibility that the BLFHCs and non-
BLFHCs use different technologies. In addition, the composite production function setting 
for cost, revenue and profit functions allows zero output for some products and allows 
negative values for the dependent variables.  
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where c = operating cost, 𝐷𝑡 = dummy for financial crisis (year= 2008); 𝑞𝑖=𝑦𝑖/𝑧𝑟=the ith 
output divided by the last fixed netput, i=1,…,n; 𝑞𝑖=𝑧𝑖−𝑛/𝑧𝑟=first r-1 fixed netputs 
divided by the last fixed netput, i=n+1,…,n+r-1; 𝑣𝑘=ln(𝑤𝑘/𝑤𝑚)=natural log of first m-1 
input prices divided by the last input price, k=1,…,m-1; 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿, 𝛾,𝜃 are estimated 
coefficient vectors; and  is an error term. 
     The revenue (profit) function is identical to the cost function except that the dependent 
variable is replaced by claim cost ( 
𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑧𝑟𝑤𝑚
)   revenue (
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑧𝑟𝑤𝑚




composite cost and profit functions are estimated by non-linear least squares.  
     The dependent variables of the operating cost, claim cost, revenue and profit functions 
are normalized by the quantity of the last fixed netput (𝑧𝑟) and the price of the last input 
(𝑤𝑚). All the output terms and the first r-1 fixed netput terms are normalized by 𝑤𝑚. 𝑧𝑟 is 
equity capital, and 𝑤𝑚  is the price of business services and the labor price of banks. 
Insurance Operating costs are defined as insurers’ operating expenses, including 
commissions, administrative expenses, licenses, fees, etc. Bank operating costs includes 
costs of purchased funds, deposits, and labor. Claim costs include all benefits paid by life 
insurers. Insurance revenues include premium and net investment income10. Bank revenue 
contains interest income and non-interest income. Insurance profits are equal to insurance 
                                                          
10 In the NAIC life insurer annual statements, cost is line 28 minus line 20 in the “summary of operations” 
sheet and revenue is line 9 in the “summary of operations” sheet. 
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revenues minus insurance operating and claim costs. Bank profits are the bank revenues 
minus bank costs. 
     The definitions of outputs, inputs and prices are similar to those used in Berger and 
Mester (1997), Berger, Cummins, Weiss and Zi (2000), Cummis and Weiss, (2001), Yuan 
and Phillips (2009).  
     Insurance Outputs, Netputs, and Input prices. I use the sum of incurred benefits plus 
additions to reserves as a proxy for the first insurance output (proxies for risk-pooling/risk-
bearing function and intermediation function). Invested assets (excluding accounts 
receivable) are employed as the second insurance output, which indicates that insurers 
provide services in connection with funds by receiving premiums in previous years 
(intermediation function)11.  Both outputs are deflated to the base year 2002 using the 
Consumer Price Index. Reserve and capital are viewed as the fixed netputs. Labor, business 
services and financial equity capital are three principal groups of insurer inputs. The prices 
of labor are derived from indices for weekly wages for financial activities from the U.S. 
Department of Labor (NAICS=5241). The Finance and Insurance Index (2002=1) is from 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
     Bank Outputs, Netputs, and Input Prices. The following three types of outputs 
frequently used in the banking literature are adopted: consumer loans, business loans and 
securities. Consumer loans are the sum of the dollar value of residential loans, credit card 
loans, and other installment loans. Business loans represent all other loans, and securities 
are GTA minus consumer loans and business loans. Physical capital and financial equity 
capital are considered bank fixed netputs. The price of deposits is measured as the total 
                                                          
11 Accounts receivable are excluded because the insurer does not have possession of the funds to perform any 
intermediation function (Berger et al. 2000). 
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interest expense on the deposits divided by the dollar value of the deposits. The price of 
labor is calculated as wage per employee. The price of purchased funds is obtained as 
interest paid on these funds divided by the total dollar value of these funds. Purchased 
funds include federal funds purchased and other liabilities for borrowed money. Finally, I 
delete those inputs and outputs with negative values.  
     Scope Economies Results. Estimates of scope economies are presented in Table 2.7 
Panel A. Estimates for operating cost, claim payment, revenue and profit scope economies 
are evaluated at the first quartile (P25), median (P50) and the third quartile (P75) to avoid 
the scale-product mix problem (Berger, Cummins, Weiss and Zi, 2000). I find that 
operating cost scope economies exist at all valuation points but smaller firms are more 
likely to benefit more from the combination. At the first quartile level of output and input 
prices, the data reveal that costs economies increased from 13% to 21% during the financial 
crisis. In addition, at the median and the third quartile levels of output and input prices, 
cost economies increased from 11% to 21% and from 2% to 11% during the financial crisis, 
respectively. Similar results are found in revenue scope economies. During the financial 
crisis, revenue scope economies become even stronger at each valuation point.  
     However, for the claim payment scope economies, at the first quartile level of output 
and input prices, the data reveal that claim payment economies decreased from -4.5% to -
9.2% during the financial crisis. In addition, at the median and the third quartile levels of 
output and input prices, cost economies decreased from -4.8% to -10% and from 8.6% to -
12.1% during the financial crisis, respectively. The profit scope economies also deteriorate 
during a financial crisis. Overall, these scope economies results show that BLFHCs enjoy 
higher operating scope economies and revenue scope economies during the financial crisis 
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than during non-crisis times. However, BKFHCs suffers claim payment and profit scope 
diseconomies during the same period, these results are more consistent with the inefficient 
transfer hypothesis. 
2.6.3 Regression Analysis 
               I now address the question of what characteristics of BLFHCs are correlated with 
the changes in scope economies. I use regression analysis, where the dependent variables 
are the predicted scope economies for the BLFHCs in the sample and the explanatory 
variables are the business focus of a bank and its affiliated life insurer.  The predicted scope 
economies are derived from the functions estimated in the previous section for the 
insurance part of the business and for the banking part of the business. For example, the 
predicted insurance operating scope economies is defined as  
𝑆𝑐(1) =
𝐶𝐿1(𝑦2; 𝑧2; 𝑤2) − 𝐶𝐽2(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤2)
𝐶𝐽2(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤2)
 
where 𝐶𝐿1(𝑦2; 𝑧2; 𝑤2) is the estimated operating cost function for life insurers 
specializing in 𝑦2 𝑧2,  𝐶𝐽2(𝑦1, 𝑦2; 𝑧1, 𝑧2; 𝑤2) is the estimated operating cost function for 
the life insurance part of BLFHCs, and 𝑤2 is the vector of input prices.   There are 
potentially 298 BLFHC observations for which I can calculate predicted scope 
economies.  After adding group fixed effects and excluding singleton observations, there 
are 285 BLFHC observations in my sample. 
     If a bank more focuses on generating fee income than loan income and its affiliated life 
insurer is an annuity writer, then it indicates that the bank is more likely to sell annuity 
products, i.e. the substitutes of bank CDs. In addition, the affiliate life insurer is more likely 
to enjoy the growth of annuity sales during the financial crisis. In this case, the bank shares 
its customer base with its affiliated life insurer but does not have access to the life insurer’s 
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customer base. Thus, I would expect that life insurer revenue scope economies increase 
with the bank’s fee income proportion.  In addition, whether insurance profit scope 
economies grow with these annuity sales depends on whether the annuity sales are 
profitable products. 
     Moreover, whether bank revenue and profit scope economies increase depends on the 
profit margin of fee income. If the profit margin of the annuity fee income is higher than 
loan income, then the bank revenue and profit scope economies would increase. Otherwise, 
scope economies decrease because of lower profit margin. The primary independent 
variables I use to measure fee income activities are Noni and Noni_FC. Noni is the ratio of 
bank non-interest income to bank total income. Noni_FC equals to Noni times financial 
crisis dummy (FC). If customer transfers from banks to life insurers occur during a 
financial crisis, I would expect that the coefficient on Noni_FC should be positive for 
insurance revenue scope economies. In addition, the coefficient on Noni_FC should be 
positive for insurance profit scope economies if annuity products contain higher profit 
margin.  
       I use Annu_ratio and Annu_ratio_FC to measure the impact of annuity sales on the 
bank revenue and profit scope economies. Annu_ratio is the ratio of insurance annuity 
premium to total premium. Annu_ratio_FC equals to Annu_ratio times financial crisis 
dummy (FC). If a bank’s customer transfers are efficient, I would expect a positive 
coefficient on bank profit scope economies. In contrast, if customer transfers are 
inefficient, I would expect a negative coefficient on bank profit scope economies. The same 
expectations apply to the bank revenue scope economies. 
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     I truncate scope economies at -1 and 1. Regression results are presented in Table 2.8 
Panel B and Panel C. Consistent with the previous analysis, banks generating higher fee 
income have positive impacts on insurance revenue and profit scope economies during a 
financial crisis (Panel B, Column 3 and Column 4). The result is consistent with customer 
transfers helping life insurers to grow during a financial crisis. Nevertheless, the annuity 
focus insurance has a negative effect on bank revenue and profit scope economies (Panel 
C, Column 2 and Column 3), which indicates that the customer transfer in not efficient. 
The evidence indicates that customer transfers decrease revenue and profit scope 
economies. 
2.7. Conclusion 
     Previous studies have examined the internal capital markets of financial institutions in 
the same financial industries (Campello, 2002; Powell, Sommer and Eckles, 2008; 
Cremers, Huang and Sautner, 2011; Holod and Peek, 2010; Niehaus, 2017). However, 
internal capital market activities across banks and life insurers have not been previously 
investigated. I compare the premium growth of BLFHCs and non-BLHCs during the 2008 
financial crisis to provide evidence related to the activities of internal capital markets, and 
I find that during the financial crisis, BLHC life insurers experienced higher premium 
growth than non-BLHC life insurers, mainly from annuity products. This growth can be 
attributed to the internal bank channel, i.e., the effects of cross-selling. However, the excess 
ROA after claim payments and profit scope economies worsen during the financial crisis. 
It indicates that the marginal return on added capital in life insurers is worse than a bank in 
the group. In addition, scope economies performed worse for BLFHCs during the 2008 
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financial crisis. Transferring resources from banks to insurance companies is not efficient 






         
   Figure 2.1 Inverse Relationship among Deposit Amounts and Insurance Premiums  
   
This figure presents the relationships among changes in deposit amounts, changes in 
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Table 2.1 Definition and Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics for my sample, which consists of 168 BLFHC life insurers (72 BLFHCs) and 292 non-BLFHC 
life insurers (189 non-BLFHCs). The sample period covers 2004-2011. The Panel A reported figures describe firm-years. The data are 
from NAIC annual reports. The panel B of this table reports summary statistics for banking sample, which consists of 110 BLFHC 
banks (72 BLFHCs) and 7,103 non-BLFHC banks (5,921 non-BLFHCs). The sample period covers 2004-2011. The reported figures 
describe firm-years. The data are from RIS reports. 
 




Non-BLFHC life insurers  BLFHC life insurers Difference 






Growth rate ∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1, where 𝑃𝑡 
represents log premiums in year t for direct 
premiums and truncated growth at -1 and 1; the 
growth rates by each line of business are 
calculated and weighted by the proportion of 
each business to total business premiums. 1,989 0.030 0.444  768 0.008 0.421 1.19 




Growth rate ∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1, where 𝑃𝑡 
represents log premiums in year t for net 
premiums and truncated growth at -1 and 1; the 
growth rates by each line of business are 
calculated and weighted by the proportion of 
each business to total business premiums 1,989 0.034 0.449  768 0.006 0.430 1.5 
Lnage The log value of age (in years) of the life insurer  1,989 3.789 0.706  768 3.863 0.715 -2.44 
Size The log value of total insurer assets 1,989 20.083 2.368  768 21.863 2.397 -17.63 
Capital 
The ratio of the sum of total capital and surplus, 
asset valuation reserve, and interest maintenance 
reserve to total general account assets 1,989 0.198 0.168  768 0.227 0.222 -3.69 
Capital Issuance 
The sum of capital changes paid in and surplus 
adjustments paid in minus changes in treasury 
stock divided by general account assets at year 









Non-BLFHC life insurers  BLFHC life insurers Difference 
(t-Value) N Mean STD  N Mean STD 
Debt Issuance 
The net change of the surplus note divided by 
general account asset on year end t-1 1,989 0.000 0.013  768 0.000 0.003 0.84 
Reins 
The log value of the total reinsurance assumed 
minus total reinsurance ceded 1,989 0.076 0.353  768 0.034 0.161 3.19 
Reinsurance 
Change 
The difference in net reinsurance premiums 
ceded divided by total assets on year end t-1   1,989 -0.004 0.146  768 0.002 0.080 -1.18 
Liquidity 
The ratio of total cash and investment securities 
to total assets 1,989 0.838 0.190  768 0.688 0.287 15.98 
Bus_con 
A measure of product concentration, measured 
by the Herfindahl Index; higher values show 
greater product concentration 1,989 0.737 0.220  768 0.737 0.223 -0.05 
State_hhi 
A measure of state premium concentration, 
measured by the Herfindahl Index; higher values 
show greater state concentration 1,989 0.316 0.353  768 0.263 0.313 3.65 
Efficiency 
The ratio of total operating incomes to total 
costs 1,989 1.151 0.887  768 2.540 16.444 -3.75 
M&A 
A dummy variable that equals one if mergers 
and acquisitions happened and zero otherwise 1,989 0.060 0.237  768 0.065 0.247 -0.52 
Mutual 
A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
life insurer is a mutual company 1,989 0.080 0.272  768 0.077 0.266 0.31 
A&H_focus 
A dummy variable that equals one if the life 
insurer earns 75% of its premiums from 
Accident & Health insurance 1,989 0.170 0.376  768 0.060 0.237 7.58 
Annuity_focus 
A dummy variable that equals one if the life 
insurer earns 75% of its premiums from Annuity 
products 1,989 0.161 0.368  768 0.289 0.454 -7.63 
Life_focus 
A dummy variable that equals one if the life 
insurer earns 75% of its premiums from life 











Non-BLFHC banks  BLFHC banks Difference 
(t-Value) N Mean STD  N Mean STD 
Deposit Growth Rate  
 
 
Growth rate ∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1, where 
𝑃𝑡 represents log deposit in year t 
and truncated growth at -1 and 1 46,411 0.072 0.155  474 0.099 0.157 -3.67 
Lnage 
The log value of age (in years) of 
the bank 46,411 4.160 0.755  474 3.482 0.758 19.42 
Size The log value of GTA  46,411 11.979 1.313  474 13.989 1.353 -32.55 
Capital 
The capitalization ratio, defined as 
equity capital divided by total asset.  46,411 0.106 0.046  474 0.230 0.055 -50.7 
Change in Capital 
Capital changes divided by total 
asset on year end t-1  46,411 0.008 0.066  474 0.516 1.043 -10.55 
Efficiency 
The ratio of total operating incomes 
to total costs 46,411 1.312 0.256  474 1.329 0.260 -1.46 
Liquidity 
Cash divided by deposit interest 
expenses. 46,411 19.307 932.999  474 96.212 932.812 -1.79 
Risk 
Non-performing loan divided by 
total loans including unearned 
income 46,411 0.015 0.024  474 0.022 0.026 -5.98 
M&A Index 
A dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 from the time that the bank 
acquired another institution and 0 
otherwise 46,411 0.037 0.188  474 0.108 0.190 -8.08 








Table 2.2 Panel Regression For Direct (Net) New Premium Growth Rate 
 
OLS regressions with Direct New Premium Growth Rate and Net New Premium Growth Rate as the dependent variables. BLFHC 
equals one if an insurer belongs to a BLFHC and zero otherwise. FC is a dummy variable, equal to one in 2008 and zero otherwise. The 
interaction term FC× BLFHC equals one if an insurer belonged to a BLFHC in 2008 and zero otherwise. Firm characteristic control 
variables include capital, capital issuance, debt issuance, size, mutual, age, liquidity, efficiency, M&A, A&H focus, Annuity focus and 
Life focus. Premium-related control variables include reinsurance level, reinsurance change, business concentration and state 
concentration. All control variables are defined in Table 1. Panel A. Regressions with year fixed effects exclude the FC dummy variable. 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Singleton observations are 
dropped if fixed effects are added. 
 
Panel A: Direct New Premium Growth Rate 
 Direct New Premium Growth Rate 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
BLFHC -0.022 -0.047** -0.046* -0.035 -0.051** -0.051** -0.055** -0.053** -0.044 -0.041 
 (-1.005) (-1.990) (-1.943) (-0.931) (-2.218) (-2.187) (-2.359) (-2.254) (-1.151) (-1.045) 
FC  -0.031  -0.022 -0.033 -0.029 -0.031  -0.020  
  (-0.977)  (-0.699) (-1.058) (-0.899) (-0.993)  (-0.638)  
FC× BLFHC  0.191*** 0.190*** 0.178*** 0.193*** 0.185*** 0.186*** 0.185*** 0.166*** 0.164*** 
  (3.579) (3.552) (3.266) (3.613) (3.484) (3.505) (3.466) (3.067) (3.032) 
Capital issuance     0.106  0.108 0.104 0.074 0.069 
     (1.059)  (1.101) (1.098) (1.005) (0.991) 
Debt issuance     0.908  0.203 0.172 -0.001 -0.047 
     (1.262)  (0.184) (0.155) (-0.001) (-0.043) 
Capital_lag1     -0.005  0.038 0.035 0.048 0.044 
     (-0.070)  (0.498) (0.450) (0.415) (0.374) 
Size_lag1     0.006  0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.006 
     (1.010)  (0.180) (0.173) (-0.400) (-0.415) 






     (0.965)  (0.710) (0.812) (-0.344) (-0.307) 
Lnage_lag1     -0.018  -0.015 -0.017 -0.006 -0.009 
     (-1.072)  (-0.892) (-0.997) (-0.232) (-0.340) 
Liquidity_lag1     -0.001  -0.023 -0.018 -0.049 -0.040 
     (-0.025)  (-0.458) (-0.368) (-0.641) (-0.536) 
Efficiency_lag1     -0.001**  -0.001*** -0.001** 0.000 0.000 
     (-2.108)  (-2.748) (-2.531) (0.105) (0.261) 
M&A     -0.008  -0.009 0.000 -0.006 0.004 
     (-0.195)  (-0.218) (0.001) (-0.150) (0.101) 
A&H_focus_lag1     -0.029  -0.007 -0.008 -0.014 -0.016 
     (-0.932)  (-0.232) (-0.262) (-0.306) (-0.367) 
Annuity_focus_lag1     -0.061**  -0.013 -0.013 -0.016 -0.016 
     (-2.119)  (-0.403) (-0.400) (-0.408) (-0.409) 
Life_focus_lag1     -0.007  0.020 0.017 0.046 0.041 
     (-0.302)  (0.862) (0.717) (1.265) (1.120) 
Change_reinsurance      0.527*** 0.522*** 0.517*** 0.570*** 0.561*** 
      (6.355) (6.304) (6.334) (6.483) (6.462) 
Reins_lag1      -0.032 -0.037 -0.036 0.003 0.005 
      (-0.941) (-1.038) (-1.016) (0.076) (0.139) 
Bus_con_lag1      -0.188*** -0.198*** -0.197*** -0.324*** -0.324*** 
      (-4.725) (-4.492) (-4.460) (-5.292) (-5.298) 
State_hhi_lag1      0.007 -0.004 -0.005 -0.036 -0.037 
      (0.318) (-0.157) (-0.210) (-0.932) (-0.973) 
           
Year Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES NO YES 
Group Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Clustering by Group YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 






Observations 2,757 2,757 2,757 2,728 2,757 2,757 2,757 2,757 2,728 2,728 








Panel B: Net New Premium Growth Rate 
 Net New Premium Growth Rate 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
BLFHC -0.028 -0.050** -0.049** -0.063** -0.055** -0.049** -0.054** -0.052** -0.066** -0.066* 
 (-1.369) (-2.256) (-2.219) (-1.977) (-2.494) (-2.143) (-2.352) (-2.279) (-1.991) (-1.926) 
FC  -0.025  -0.020 -0.026 -0.024 -0.025  -0.018  
  (-0.758)  (-0.586) (-0.768) (-0.707) (-0.734)  (-0.518)  
FC× BLFHC  0.164*** 0.163*** 0.147*** 0.164*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.159*** 0.137** 0.136** 
  (2.987) (2.968) (2.616) (2.955) (2.914) (2.896) (2.868) (2.425) (2.406) 
Capital issuance     0.110  0.115 0.111 0.083 0.077 
     (0.964)  (1.013) (1.007) (0.962) (0.946) 
Debt issuance     1.162  1.027 0.991 0.770 0.707 
     (1.287)  (1.074) (1.022) (0.864) (0.791) 
Capital_lag1     0.066  0.082 0.081 0.056 0.055 
     (0.883)  (1.078) (1.048) (0.529) (0.513) 
Size_lag1     0.002  -0.002 -0.002 -0.012 -0.012 
     (0.293)  (-0.391) (-0.354) (-1.024) (-0.995) 
Mutual_lag1     0.035  0.029 0.030 0.006 0.007 
     (1.438)  (1.167) (1.227) (0.132) (0.137) 
Lnage_lag1     -0.009  -0.010 -0.011 0.015 0.013 
     (-0.589)  (-0.592) (-0.653) (0.570) (0.504) 
Liquidity_lag1     -0.002  -0.013 -0.008 -0.085 -0.076 
     (-0.033)  (-0.248) (-0.149) (-1.200) (-1.095) 
Efficiency_lag1     -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 
     (-0.413)  (-0.585) (-0.406) (2.833) (2.865) 
M&A     0.024  0.026 0.035 0.025 0.030 
     (0.623)  (0.666) (0.856) (0.700) (0.777) 






     (-1.622)  (-0.953) (-0.986) (-0.665) (-0.720) 
Annuity_focus_lag1     -0.052  -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 
     (-1.636)  (-0.143) (-0.156) (-0.061) (-0.066) 
Life_focus_lag1     -0.028  0.002 -0.002 0.029 0.023 
     (-1.189)  (0.087) (-0.084) (0.795) (0.641) 
Change_reinsurance      0.073 0.060 0.055 0.063 0.056 
      (0.711) (0.578) (0.527) (0.560) (0.499) 
Reins_lag1      0.002 -0.011 -0.009 0.003 0.007 
      (0.055) (-0.335) (-0.265) (0.074) (0.191) 
Bus_con_lag1      -0.174*** -0.185*** -0.183*** -0.301*** -0.299*** 
      (-4.282) (-4.035) (-3.991) (-4.742) (-4.759) 
State_hhi_lag1      0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.036 -0.035 
      (0.633) (-0.432) (-0.453) (-0.965) (-0.948) 
           
Year Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES NO YES 
Group Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Clustering by Group YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
           
Observations 2,757 2,757 2,757 2,728 2,757 2,757 2,757 2,757 2,728 2,728 









Panel C: Cross-Sectional Evidence 
Sort criterion _____ Change in Risk Based Capital Ratio ____ 
Dependent Variable 
 
Gross New Premium Growth Rate 
 
Net New Premium Growth Rate 
Change in RBC ratio Weakened Strengthened Weakened Strengthened 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BLFHC 0.052 -0.024 0.031 -0.061 
 (1.061) (-0.350) (0.490) (-0.908) 
BLFHC×FC 0.184*** 0.079 0.172** 0.032 
 (2.803) (0.768) (2.563) (0.348) 
     
Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Group Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Clustering by Group YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 765 1,992 765 1,992 








         Panel D: Relationship between Insurance Premium Growth Rate and Deposit Growth Rate 
 
 
      
 Direct New Premium Growth rate Net New Premium Growth rate 
 All Deposit Non-insured Deposit  All Deposit Non-insured Deposit  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Deposit Growth Rate -0.043 -0.057 -0.077** -0.077** -0.090* -0.102** -0.109** -0.115*** 
 (-0.900) (-1.248) (-2.362) (-2.479) (-1.883) (-2.233) (-2.632) (-2.900) 
         
Control Variables YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustering by Group YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 
R-squared 0.181 0.121 0.184 0.124 0.136 0.117 0.140 0.122 
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Table 2.3 Panel Regression for Matched Sample and Results 
 
This Table, Panel A provides details on matched samples in my study. I match the closest 
BLFHC based on propensity scores estimated from a probit model. Panel B shows OLS 
regression results with Direct New Premium Growth Rate and Net New Premium Growth 
Rate as the dependent variables. BLFHC equals one if an insurer belongs to a BLFHC and 
zero otherwise. FC is a dummy variable, equal to one in 2008 and zero otherwise. The 
interaction term FC× BLFHC equals one if an insurer belonged to a BLFHC in 2008 and 
zero otherwise. Firm characteristic control variables include capital, capital issuance, debt 
issuance, size, mutual, age, liquidity, efficiency, M&A, A&H focus, Annuity focus and 
Life focus. Premium-related control variables include reinsurance level, reinsurance 
change, business concentration and state concentration. All control variables are defined in 
Table 1. Regressions with year fixed effects exclude the FC dummy variable. Robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. 
 
Panel A: Propensity Score Matching Diagnostics  
                      _____With replacement_    __                Without replacement_____     
 BLFHC 
non-
BLFHC Diff t-value 
non-
BLFHC Diff t-value 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lnage 3.864 3.918 -0.079 -0.81 3.873 -0.008 -0.09 
Size 21.752 21.848 -0.212 -0.72 21.283 0.469 1.71 
Capital 0.226 0.205 0.020 0.75 0.191 0.035 1.43 
Reins 0.045 -0.001 0.045 2.45 0.037 0.009 0.4 
Liquidity 0.688 0.637 0.063 1.59 0.807 -0.118 -3.64 
Bus_con 0.716 0.710 0.015 0.55 0.714 0.002 0.09 
State_hhi 0.255 0.245 0.038 0.9 0.255 0.000 0.00 
Efficiency 2.349 1.101 1.306 1.04 1.248 1.101 0.94 
Capital issuance 0.023 0.015 0.010 0.5 0.013 0.009 0.54 


















Replacement Yes Yes No No 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FC×BLFHC 0.157** 0.179** 0.134* 0.153** 
 (2.046) (2.323) (1.882) (2.080) 
BLFHC -0.023 -0.045 -0.004 -0.030 
 (-0.452) (-1.047) (-0.082) (-0.689) 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Group Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Clustering by Group YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,299 1,299 1,646 1,646 





Table 2.4: Regression for Direct New Premium Growth Rate and Net New Premium 
Growth Rate by Product Line 
 
OLS regressions with Direct New Premium Growth Rate and Net New Premium Growth 
Rate as the dependent variables. BLFHC equals one if an insurer belongs to a BLFHC and 
zero otherwise. FC is a dummy variable, equal to one in 2008 and zero otherwise. The 
interaction term FC× BLFHC equals one if an insurer belonged to a BLFHC in 2008 and 
zero otherwise. Firm characteristic control variables include capital, capital issuance, debt 
issuance, size, mutual, age, liquidity, efficiency, M&A, A&H focus, Annuity focus and 
Life focus. Premium-related control variables include reinsurance level, reinsurance 
change, business concentration and state concentration. All control variables are defined in 
Table 1. Regressions with year fixed effects exclude the FC dummy variable. Singleton 
observations are removed if fixed effects are added. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
  
Direct New Premium Growth 
Rate 
Net New Premium Growth 
Rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Product Annuity Life 
Accident 
&Health Annuity Life 
Accident 
&Health 
BLFHC -0.092 0.100 -0.030 -0.099 0.038 -0.049 
 (-0.697) (0.930) (-0.259) (-0.806) (0.303) (-0.382) 
FC× BLFHC 0.313** 0.083 -0.250 0.298* -0.104 -0.258 
 (2.289) (0.470) (-1.427) (1.954) (-1.007) (-1.519) 
       
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustering by Group YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 2,000 2,523 1,148 1,902 2,421 1,083 








Table 2.5 Different Financial Crisis Definition 
 
OLS regressions with Direct New Premium Growth Rate and Net New Premium Growth Rate as the dependent variables. BLFHC 
equals one if an insurer belongs to a BLFHC and zero otherwise. FC is a dummy variable, equal to one in 2008 and zero otherwise. In 
Columns (2)–(4), the financial crisis indicator equals one in 2007–2008, 2008–2009, and 2007–2009, separately. All control variables 
are defined in Table 2.1. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
  _______Direct New Premium Growth Rate______ ________Net New Premium Growth Rate_______ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FC×BLFHC 0.164***    0.136**    
 (3.032)    (2.406)    
FC2× BLFHC  0.043    0.015   
  (1.138)    (0.405)   
FC3× BLFHC   0.031    0.029  
   (0.613)    (0.578)  
FC4×BLFHC    -0.021    -0.031 
    (-0.539)    (-0.871) 
BLFHC -0.041 -0.033 -0.030 -0.018 -0.066* -0.056 -0.058* -0.043 
 (-1.045) (-0.850) (-0.759) (-0.448) (-1.926) (-1.612) (-1.660) (-1.230) 
         
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustering by Group YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Observations 2,728 2,728 2,728 2,728 2,728 2,728 2,728 2,728 







Table 2.6 Excess ROA of BLFHCs 
 
Excess ROA examines whether a BLFHC has a ROA more or less than the ROA it would have if the BLFHC were broken into a 
portfolio of two entities, each of which specializes in banking or insurance activities of the BLFHC group. ROA (1) is defined as the 
ratio of earnings before claim payments and taxes to total assets, ROA (2) is defined as the ratio of earnings before taxes to total assets, 
and ROA (3) is defined as a ratio of net incomes to total assets. The definition of excess ROA (1) - (3) for a BLFHC is the difference 
between its actual ROA and its activity-adjusted ROA(1)-(3). All control variables are defined in Table 1, Panel B. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 




Difference (2) – (1) 
(Rank Sum test) 
   
      
Median excess ROA (1) -0.53%*** -0.07% 0.46%** 
(p-value for non-parametric sign test) (0.000) (0.875) (-1.99) 
    
Median excess ROA (2) -0.10% -0.48% -0.38%*** 
(p-value for non-parametric sign test) (0.128) (0.430) (2.35) 
    
Median excess ROA (3) 
-0.10%*** -0.47%** 
-0.37%*** 








Table 2.7 Costs, Revenue and Profit Scope Economy Estimates  
 
Note. The sample size used in estimating the BLFHC cost, revenue and profit function is 298. The sample size used in estimating the 
cost, revenue and profit function for life insurers (non-BLFHC) is 1,205, and the sample size for banks (non-BLFHC) is 39,748. The 
valuation points for the life insurance variables are based on both BLFHCs and non-BLFHCs that write annuity products, and the 
valuation points for the bank variables are based on both FHCs and non-FHCs that operate bank business. A sign test is used to examine 
the statistical difference. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
 
Panel A:  Main Results 
 
.



















    
Q1 13.3% 21.3% 8.0%*** -4. 5% -9.2% -4.8%*** -1.5% 1.9% 3.4%*** -21.1% -53.9% -32.8%*** 
Median 10.6% 20.6% 10.0%*** -4.8% -10.0% -5.2%*** 4.8% 7.6% 2.8%*** 22.3% 1.9% -20.4%*** 
Q3 1.9% 11.0% 9.1%*** 8.6% -12.1% 
-20.7% 
*** 
18.9% 18.7% -0.2%*** 58.9% 44.6% -14.3%*** 
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Panel B Insurance Scope Economies Regression Analysis 
OLS regressions with scope economies as the dependent variables. Regressions with group 
fixed effects. Non-Int is the ratio of non-interest income to total bank income.  Financial 
Crisis is a dummy variable, equal to one in 2008 and zero otherwise. Singleton observations 
are dropped. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
















Financial crisis  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0012 0.0001 
 (-0.372) (-0.372) (-1.374) (0.381) 
Non-Int  0.0006 0.0006 0.0089 0.0022** 
 (1.380) (1.380) (1.215) (2.162) 
Non-Int × Financial crisis  0.0001 0.0001 0.0036* 0.0015*** 
 (0.329) (0.329) (1.804) (2.970) 
Annu_ratio  0.0003 0.0003 -0.0024 -0.0000 
 (0.922) (0.922) (-1.098) (-0.066) 
Annu_ratio × Financial crisis 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0047*** -0.0016*** 
 (0.760) (0.760) (-3.203) (-2.925) 
     
Observations 285 285 285 285 
R-squared 0.377 0.377 0.681 0.545 
 
Panel C Bank Scope Economies Regression Analysis 
OLS regressions with scope economies as the dependent variables. Regressions with group 
fixed effects. Annu_ratio is the ratio of annuity premium to total insurance product 
premiums. Financial Crisis is a dummy variable, equal to one in 2008 and zero otherwise. 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 




Bank Profit Scope 
Economies 
Financial crisis  0.1043*** 0.1758*** 0.1623** 
 (3.016) (2.752) (2.674) 
Non-Int  0.0196 -0.0165 -0.0470 
 (0.114) (-0.091) (-0.245) 
Non-Int × Financial crisis  -0.3379*** -0.1905 -0.2193 
 (-3.687) (-0.948) (-1.255) 
Annu_ratio  -0.2001 -0.1606 -0.1613 
 (-1.585) (-1.267) (-1.296) 
Annu_ratio × Financial crisis -0.1364** -0.2796** -0.2422** 
    
Observations 285 285 285 





CORRELATED TRADING BY LIFE INSURERS AND ITS IMPACT 
ON BOND PRICES12 
3.1 Introduction 
     Academics, insurance professionals, and regulators continue to debate whether 
traditional insurance activities of insurers are a source of systemic risk.13  For example, the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in December of 2014 designated MetLife as 
a systemically important financial institution (SIFI) despite objections from Metlife and 
other commentators (see e.g., Wallison, 2014).  Metlife challenged the ruling, and in March 
2016, a judge rescinded the SIFI designation.  The Department of Justice on behalf of 
FSOC has appealed the decision.14  One argument for why life insurers are a source of 
systemic risk is that life insurers have investments of over $2.5 trillion in bonds and that 
their trading activity is correlated within the industry, i.e., life insurers herd. 15   As a 
consequence, life insurers have the potential to disrupt financial markets by causing or 
exacerbating security price movements away from fundamental values.  Schwarcz and 
Schwarcz (2014) forcefully make this argument and call for greater regulation (also see 
FSOC (2013), Getmansky et al. (2016), and Koijen and Yogo (2016)).16   
                                                          
12 Chia-Chun Chiang and Greg Niehaus. Submitted to Journal of Risk and Insurance 12/2/2016. 
13 Many commentators acknowledge that non-traditional activities, such as trading credit default swaps, could 
cause insurance groups to be systemically important (see e.g., Cummins and Weiss, 2014 and Harrington, 
2009). 
14  MetLife maintains a website containing documents filed related to the debate.  See 
https://www.metlife.com/sifiupdate/index.html.  
15 Data are from the 2015 Life Insurers Fact Book. 
16 Note that there are other arguments for how insurers could contribute to systemic risk, including concerns 
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     On the other side of the spectrum from those who argue that life insurer investment 
herding contributes to systemic risk, Vaughan (2012) argues that the life insurance industry 
provides a stabilizing force in financial markets during times of crisis.  This would occur, 
for example, if during liquidity shocks that induce sales from other institutions, insurers 
maintain their positions and/or even step in on the buy side.  A related point of view is that 
insurer investment decisions are unlikely to influence security prices because, even though 
life insurers’ asset portfolios are large, they are typically buy and hold investors; i.e., their 
trading activity is much lower than their holdings.  Paulson and Rosen (2016) report that 
the annual turnover rate of corporate bonds held by life insurers is about one-fifth that of 
corporate bonds in general.  On the other hand, trading in corporate bonds is relatively thin 
in general, and so even a relatively small amount of trading can potentially impact prices.  
Indeed, recent evidence by Ellul et al. (2011) and Merrill (2014a and 2014b) is consistent 
with life insurer investment behavior impacting security prices. 
     Despite the debate regarding the impact of life insurer investment decisions on financial 
markets, there is little research that focuses on the extent to which life insurers herd, and if 
they do, on whether insurer herding is likely to be disruptive to financial markets.  
Exceptions are Cai et al. (2012 and 2016), who analyze herding in bond markets by mutual 
funds, pension funds, and both property-liability and life insurers. Related studies also 
include Getmanksy, et al. (2016), who examine the interconnectedness of insurance 
companies’ investment decisions using cosine similarity, and Paulson and Rosen (2016), 
                                                          
about an insolvency of one insurer reducing confidence in the ability of other insurers to make good on their 
promises, which in turn could cause policyholder runs and cause insurers to liquidate assets quickly and at 
fire sale prices.  See Foley-Fisher, et al. (2015) and Fenn and Cole (1994).  Cummins and Weiss (2014) focus 
on whether reinsurance activities contribute to systemic risk.  Also see Acharya et al. (2014), Billio et al. 
(2012), Chen et al. (2012), Manconi et al. (2012), Neale, et al. (2012), Weiss and Muhlnickel (2014), and 
Weiss, et al. (2015). 
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who examine the extent to which insurers provide liquidity to the investment grade 
corporate bond market. 
     Conceptually, there are several reasons why one might expect herding behavior to exist 
among life insurers.  First, life insurers face common accounting and regulatory rules.17  
As a result, one might expect insurers to respond in similar ways (buy or sell the same 
securities) to changes in these institutional rules and to changes in how a security is treated 
under these rules.  As an example of the latter situation, if a downgrade of a security 
increases the required risk-based capital that an insurer must hold, then insurers would 
likely have greater incentives to sell the security.  Second, insurers’ financial condition and 
future prospects are likely to be impacted in similar ways by general economic information 
(such as changes in interest rates and credit spreads) and to information about the value of 
specific types of securities.  Consequently, insurers might be expected to adjust their 
portfolios in similar ways in response to economic information.  Third, the information 
cascades theory suggests that company fund managers infer the value of securities from 
the trades of other fund managers, which in turn leads fund managers to mimic other fund 
managers’ trades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992).  Fourth, if the labor market for fund 
managers assesses ability using relative fund performance, then fund managers will be 
concerned about poor performance when other funds have good performance.  To avoid 
this outcome, fund managers might mimic each other (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990).  
Finally, insurers often outsource the management of some of their assets (Kim et al., 2015).  
As a consequence, the trading activity of insurers using the same outside asset manager 
could be correlated.  Our main purpose is not to distinguish among these various 
                                                          
17 It is also worth noting that often these rules differ from those that apply to other financial institutions, 
which makes an analysis of life insurers as a group of interest. 
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explanations for herding; instead we identify bond and insurer characteristics that are 
associated with life insurer herding and examine the impact of life insurer herding on bond 
prices.  
     To investigate whether life insurers’ corporate bond investment decisions exhibit 
herding behavior over the 2002-2011 time period, we utilize two herding measures.  One 
is the classic measure introduced by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992), hereafter, 
the “LSV” measure, which measures the extent to which insurers tend to buy the same 
securities or sell the same securities within a given time interval using the number of buy 
trades relative to total trades.  The other herding measure, introduced by Oehler and Chao 
(1990), equals the absolute value of insurers’ buy volume minus their sell volume divided 
by total insurer volume in the bond. Hereafter, we refer to this measure as the volume-
based herding measure.  As is common in the herding literature, we examine trading 
behavior over quarterly time intervals.   
     It is important to highlight that the LSV herding measure does not incorporate 
information about the volume of trading in a particular bond.  In addition, the LSV measure 
for a particular bond during a given quarter measures whether insurers’ buying or selling 
of that bond differs from the overall buying or selling in all of the bonds in which insurers 
transacted during that quarter.  In other words, by controlling for aggregate trading of life 
insurers, the LSV herding measure indicates whether insurers are trading a particular bond 
differently than insurers are trading bonds in general.  In contrast, the volume herding 
measure for a particular bond simply measures whether insurers as a group are on one side 
of the market (buy or sell side) in that particular bond.  The volume herding measure is 
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therefore analogous to the order imbalance measures used in the literature on the impact of 
equity market herding on stock prices (e.g., Chordia, et al., 2002 and Dorn et al., 2008).   
     Our evidence is strongly consistent with life insurer herding.  The overall average LSV 
herding measure for individual corporate bonds is 10.2 percent, which indicates that on 
average life insurers are about 10.2 percent more likely to be on the same side of the market 
for individual bonds (either on the buy or sell side) than would be expected if their buy 
versus sell decisions were independent and consistent with insurer trading of all bonds.  We 
also calculate the buy LSV herding and sell LSV herding measures, as proposed by 
Wermers (1999).  The overall buy and sell LSV herding measures for individual corporate 
bonds have an average value of 11.1 and 9.4 percent, respectively, indicating that herding 
by life insurers is not concentrated on one side of the market.  The volume based measures 
also indicate that on average life insurers herd.  For example, when insurer buy volume 
exceeds insurer sell volume in a bond, it does so on average by a multiple of 3.6, and when 
insurer sell volume exceeds insurer buy volume in a bond, it does so on average by a 
multiple of 4.5. 
     We also examine how the herding measures vary with bond and insurer characteristics. 
We find that herding by life insurers is greater in smaller bonds and lower rated bonds.  
This evidence is consistent with herding being more likely when there is greater 
asymmetric information about the bond’s value, which is consistent with the information 
cascades theory of herding (Bikhchandani et al., 1992).  We also find that sell-side herding 
is greater in bonds that have been recently downgraded, which is consistent with risk-based 
capital requirements increasing insurers’ cost of holding bonds with greater credit risk. 
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     We also investigate the association between herding and “SIFI insurers,” i.e., insurers 
that are part of a group that has been designated as a systemically important financial 
institution (SIFI).  The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) has designated three 
insurers (AIG, MetLife, and Prudential) as systemically important.18  Our objective is to 
provide evidence on whether SIFI insurers are associated with herding behavior and its 
impact on bond prices.  The evidence indicates that, holding other factors constant, herding 
is on average greater in bonds in which SIFI insurers have a relatively high proportion of 
the trading volume.  Thus, a necessary condition for SIFI insurers to be systemically 
important through the investment herding channel seems to be satisfied – SIFI insurers are 
associated with investment herding. 
     Life insurer herding, of course, does not necessarily imply that the herding behavior of 
life insurers impacts bond prices.  There are, however, conditions under which correlated 
trading is more likely to be stabilizing or destabilizing.  We therefore provide evidence on 
whether these conditions are present when insurers exhibit herding behavior.  Correlated 
trading by life insurers is more likely to be destabilizing if the herding is consistent with 
momentum trading, i.e., if insurers tend to buy when prices are increasing and sell when 
prices are decreasing.  In this case, insurer trading activity can exacerbate price movements 
away from fundamental values (see Bank of England, 2014).   The opposite pattern would 
be consistent with insurers’ correlated trading providing a stabilizing influence on bond 
markets (Vaughn, 2012).   
     We provide two types of evidence on whether insurers’ herding is consistent with 
momentum trading.  In panel regression analysis of herding measures, we find that sell 
                                                          
18 As noted above, MetLife’s SIFI status is being contested in the courts. 
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herding measures increase as negative abnormal returns increase in magnitude and as 
positive abnormal returns increase in magnitude.  Using a different methodology, we 
compare the abnormal returns on portfolios of bonds that have large buy or sell herding 
measures to portfolios that do not have large buy or sell herding measures.  This approach 
reveals that sell-side herding tends to occur following negative abnormal returns.  
Additional analysis suggests that this momentum trading is especially strong during the 
financial crisis.  
     We also examine abnormal returns on the portfolios in the quarter during and the quarter 
subsequent to the herding behavior in an effort to examine whether there is evidence of 
herding impacting bond prices.  The results provide some evidence that abnormal returns 
of portfolios with high sell herding are significantly lower during the herding period than 
the abnormal returns of portfolios of bonds with low sell herding, especially during the 
financial crisis and when insurers that are part of a group that has been designated as a SIFI 
trade the bonds.  However, we do not find that the returns rebound in the subsequent 
quarter, which is what one would expect if the insurer sell herding was temporarily 
distorting prices.  Thus, the evidence is more consistent with insurer sell herding helping 
to impound information into prices. 
     The papers most related to this study are by Cai et al. (2012 and 2016).  As stated earlier, 
Cai et al.’s papers examine mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies (both 
property-liability and life companies); whereas, we provide a more focused investigation 
of herding by life insurers and incorporate insurer characteristics in the analysis.  One of 
the results of the two papers differ: We do not find price reversals following herding; 
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whereas Cai et al. (2016) do find price reversals on average.  As discussed later in the 
paper, we investigate a variety of potential explanations for the different findings.   
     The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we briefly review the literature on 
herding.  The methodology and data are presented in sections 3.3 and 3.4.  We present 
descriptive results on how herding varies with bond characteristics, insurer characteristics, 
and time in Section 3.5.  Panel regression analysis of herding measures are presented in 
Section 3.6, followed by the analysis of portfolio returns in Section 3.7.  We end with a 
summary of the evidence and a discussion of the implications for issues related to the 
systemic risk of life insurers. 
3.2 Background on Herding  
3.2.1 Determinants of Herding 
One explanation for herding among a group of firms in the same industry is that each 
institution is affected in similar ways by economic information and therefore they each 
respond to economic information in the same manner (Froot et al., 1992).  
Correspondingly, insurers that are similar in terms of their products, size, capitalization, 
and profitability are likely to be impacted similarly by economic information.  
Consequently, we examine the extent to which herding is related to these insurer 
characteristics.19   
     According to the information cascade theory, some institutions infer information from 
the trades of other institutions and therefore mimic the trading of other institutions 
                                                          
19 Understanding the types of insurers that herd is relevant to identifying insurers that contribute to and/or 
are exposed to systemic risk.  Evidence from Weiss and Muhlnickel (2013) indicates that an insurer’s 
contribution to systemic risk is largely explained by insurer size; whereas, an insurer’s exposure to systemic 
risk is explained by size, the proportion of net revenue earned from investment activities, and proportion of 
non-policyholder liabilities to total liabilities.  
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(Bikhchandani et al., 1992).  Assuming information about smaller bonds (those with a 
relatively small amount outstanding) and less liquid bonds is more costly to obtain, 
investors would be more likely to infer information from other institutional investors about 
these bonds (see Wermers, 1999 and Sias, 2004).  According to this explanation, herding 
would be greater in smaller bonds and less liquid bonds.20 
     There is a growing literature providing evidence that accounting and risk-based capital 
rules induce insurers to trade in similar ways.  For example, Ambrose, et al. (2008, 2012), 
Ellul et al. (2011), Ellul et al. (2014), and Merrill, et al. (2014b) examine how risk-based 
capital and accounting rules influence insurers’ incentives to sell securities that have been 
downgraded.  Merrill, et al. (2014a) and Becker and Ivashina (2013) examine insurers’ 
incentives to reach for yield within risk-based capital categories.  Becker and Opp (2014) 
and Hanley and Nikolova (2014) respectively examine how insurers’ investment decisions 
changed after the NAIC lowered the risk-based capital requirements for non-agency 
residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) in 2009 and for non-agency commercial 
mortgage backed securities (CMBS) in 2010.  Consistent with this literature, we examine 
whether a bond’s rating and the level of insurers’ risk-based capital is associated with 
herding behavior. 
     Kim et a. (2015) report that outsourcing of investment management services by insurers 
has increased over the past decade and that over 65 percent of the insurers in the highest 
                                                          
20 Another explanation for institutional herding arises from managerial agency problems.  Scharfstein and 
Stein (1990) show that if managers’ performance across firms is influenced by common factors and that 
managers care about their reputations for being a good manager, then the labor market will assess a given 
manager’s performance conditional on the performance of other managers.  This, in turn, induces a fund 
manager to mimic other fund managers so that he/she does not “standout” from the group if performance is 
poor.  Dasgupta et al. (2011a) build on this idea in their model of the price impact of herding.  Cross-sectional 
predictions from this framework relate to portfolio managers’ characteristics, such as manager compensation, 
age, and experience.  Unfortunately, we do not have this type of information. 
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quartile of assets have employed at least one investment advisor.  If different insurers 
employ the same investment advisor, then the investment advice received across these 
insurers will likely be correlated, which in turn will likely lead to correlation in investment 
decisions.  
3.2.2 Empirical Evidence on Institutional Herding 
     The majority of the literature on institutional herding examines equity markets. 21  
Lakonishok, et al. (1992) introduced the herding measures that we use and that most of the 
herding literature uses.  We refer to these measures as LSV herding measures.  They find 
some evidence that pension funds herd over quarterly periods, although the herding is not 
strong.  Wermers (1999) finds essentially the same results using data on mutual funds.  
Instead of looking for herding within a quarter, Sias (2004) examines whether herding 
occurs across quarters.  Consistent with institutional herding, Sias (2004) finds that 
institutional buying in one quarter is correlated with institutional buying in the prior 
quarter, i.e., herding is persistent from one period to the next.  Dasgupta et al. (2011b) also 
document the persistence of herding behavior. 
     A number of papers have examined the relationship between herding and the returns 
earned during the period prior to the herding period, the herding period, and the period 
subsequent to the herding period.  Although there is some variation across the studies, 
Grinblatt et al. (1995), Wermers (1999), and Nofsinger and Sias (1999) find that positive 
(negative) stock returns are associated with institutional buy (sell) herding in the period 
prior, during, and subsequent to when the herding takes place, consistent with momentum 
                                                          
21 In addition to institutional herding, there are also studies examining herding by individual investors.  See 
for example, Dorn et al. (2008), who examine retail clients of a large German discount broker, Barber, et al. 
(2009a, 2009b), who examine clients of two U.S. discount brokers, and Feng and Seasholes (2004), who 
examine Chinese investors. 
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trading.  Sias (2004) finds that herding is not positively associated with prior period returns 
once he controls for prior period herding.  Dasgupta et al. (2011) also show that persistent 
herding is negatively correlated with long horizon returns.  Gutierrez and Kelly (2009) 
document similar results. 
     There are fewer studies that examine herding in bond markets.22  Oehler and Chao 
(2000) examine herding by 57 German mutual funds in bonds grouped by similar 
characteristics and find low LSV herding measures, on average.  They also introduce a 
herding measure based on volume and find greater herding using the volume based measure 
than the LSV measure.  We adopt their volume based measure.   
The papers most similar to this paper are by Cai et al. (2012 and 2016).  Cai et al. (2012 
and 2016) use changes in quarterly holdings to calculate LSV herding measures; whereas, 
we use transaction data to calculate both the LSV herding measures and the volume based 
herding measures introduced by Oehler and Chao.23  Cai et al. (2012) focus on how herding 
is influenced by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s (FINRA) requirement that 
bond market trading information be made public.  Cai et al. (2016) focus on the extent to 
which herding is persistent and whether such persistency is due to institutions following 
themselves or other institutions.  In addition, Cai et al. (2016) examine, as we do, abnormal 
bond price changes around herding.  As discussed more below, we find different results 
than Cai et al. (2016) with regard to the abnormal returns in the post-herding period. 
 
                                                          
22 The Global Financial Stability Report (2015) reports that herding by both bond and equity mutual funds 
increased in 2014 relative to 2009. 
23 Provided Cai et al. (2016) use the face value of holdings changes, as opposed to the market value of 
holdings, the difference between transactions within a quarter (which we use) and changes in holdings over 
a quarter (which they use) should be minimal. 
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3.3 Two Herding Measures 
3.3.1 LSV Measures  
     We begin by describing the herding measure for a group of investors that was originally 
proposed by Lakonishok, et al. (1992).  In the following description, the investor group 
could be the entire group of insurers in our sample or a particular subset of insurers selected 
based on specific characteristics.  Let 
#Bi,t = the number of insurers from the investor group that were net buyers of bond 
i during time period t. 
#Si,t = the number of insurers from the investor group that were net sellers of bond 
i during time period t. 
Of all of the insurers from the investor group that transacted in bond i, the proportion that 
were net buyers is the insurers’ buy ratio for security i during period t:  
(1) pi,t = #Bi,t / (#Bi,t + #Si,t ). 
The idea is to test whether the insurers’ buy ratio for security i is different than what would 
be expected given the purchasing and selling activity of the investor group across a broader 
set of securities.  Thus, pi,t is compared to the overall buy ratio during period t, denoted pt, 
for a class of securities to which bond i belongs.  For example, if security i is a corporate 
bond with an investment grade rating, then pit could be compared to the overall buy ratio 
of all investment grade rated bonds.  The overall buy ratio is defined as follows: 
(2) pt = 
∑ #𝐵𝑖,𝑡𝑖
∑ #𝐵𝑖,𝑡𝑖 + ∑ #𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑖
   . 
The absolute difference, | pi,t – pt | , indicates whether the proportion of net buyers of 
security i differs from the proportion of net buyers in the class of securities.   
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     If insurers’ buy versus sell decisions were independent and modeled as a binomial 
random variable with probability pt, then the expected value of the absolute difference, | 
pi,t – pt |, would be positive.  Consequently, an adjustment factor is subtracted from the 
absolute difference to create the herding measure for security i during period t with an 
expected value of zero:  
(3) LSV_HMi,t = | pi,t – pt | -  AFi,t , 
where  
(4) AFi,t = ∑  | 
𝑗
𝑁𝑖,𝑡






j (1 − pt)
Ni,t−j , 
and Ni,t is the number of insurers transacting in security i during period t.
24   As Ni,t 
increases, the adjustment factor declines.  For example, if pt = 0.5 and Ni,t equals three, the 
adjustment factor is 0.25, but if Ni,t equals 25, the adjustment factor is 0.0806. 
     Intuitively, a positive value for the herding measure indicates that the group of insurers 
tend to trade a particular bond in the same direction more than would be expected if their 
buy versus sell decisions were independent and the probability of a buy equaled the overall 
buy ratio for insurers during the time period.  By averaging the herding measures over time 
and/or securities, we test whether insurers tend to trade in the same direction, i.e., herd.  In 
addition, we use panel regressions to examine variables that are associated with the herding 
measure. 
                                                          
24 To illustrate the calculation of the adjustment factor, suppose that there are three insurers transacting in a 
particular bond and that the probability of a buy transaction (pt) is ½.  Then there are four possible outcomes 
for the buy ratio: 0, 1/3, 2/3, and 1. The probabilities of these outcomes are 1/8, 3/8, 3/8, and 1/8, respectively.  
Consequently, the expected value of the absolute difference between the buy ratio and ½ equals 










































































 (1/16 + 1/16 + 1/16 +1/16) = ¼, which is the adjustment factor. 
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 Wermers (1999) introduced a buy and a sell herding measure, denoted LSV_BHM 
and LSV_SHM, by conditioning on whether the security had a higher (lower) buy ratio 
than the average buy ratio.  That is, 
 LSV_BHMit = LSV_HMit if pit > 𝑝𝑡 and undefined otherwise, 
  LSV_SHMit = LSV_HMit if pit < 𝑝𝑡 and undefined otherwise.   
Appendix A provides a simple example to illustrate the calculation of the LSV herding 
measures. 
3.3.2 Incorporating the Information on the Size of Trades 
     The LSV herding measures take into account the number of trades, but not the size of 
the trades.  Thus, a $50,000 buy transaction is treated the same as a $50 million buy 
transaction.  To incorporate the size of the transaction, we utilize a herding measure used 
by Oehler and Chao (2000), which takes into account the volume of buy trades and sell 
trades by insurers.  The herding measures based on volume for bond i in quarter t equals 
the absolute value of the difference between the amount purchased by insurers and the 
amount sold by insurers as a proportion of the total amount transacted by insurers: 
(5) VOL_HMit = | Amt Purchasedit – Amt Soldit | / [ Amt Purchasedit + Amt Soldit ]. 
     This measure is similar to the order imbalance measures used in a number of equity 
market studies (see e.g., Chordia et al. (2002)).  Analogous to the buy and sell LSV herding 
measures, we also calculate buy and sell herding measures based on volume and denote 
them by VOL_BHM and VOL_SHM, respectively.  VOL_BHM (VOL_SHM) is the value 
of the VOL_HM if buy volume of insurers is greater (less) than sell volume by insurers. 
     In addition to taking into account the amount transacted, the herding measure based on 
volume differs from the LSV herding measures in that it does not subtract a benchmark 
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measure of insurer buy versus sell volume in the bond market.  Stated differently, unlike 
the LSV measures, the volume based measure does not control for the general movement 
of insurers in or out of bonds.  Instead, the volume based measures incorporate aggregate 
shifts of insurers in and out of bonds.   
3.4 Data 
 We examine insurer transactions in individual bonds over quarterly time periods 
starting in the first quarter of 2003 and ending in the fourth quarter of 2011.25  The data are 
from Schedule D, Parts 3, 4, and 5 of insurers’ annual statements, which report information 
on bonds that the insurer purchased during the year (Part 3), sold during the year (Part 4), 
and bought and sold during the year (Part 5).  As reported in Row 2 of Table 3.1, after 
deleting non-market secondary transactions and those observations without a reported 
cusip or a transaction date, there are close to 2.3 million bond transactions reported by 
1,148 different life insurance companies in 315,961 different bonds issued by 48,864 
issuers. 26  For each transaction, the variables reported include cusip, transaction date, type 
of purchaser (including non-market counterparties such as matured, transferred, called, 
etc.), cost, par value, and market value. 
     The transaction data are merged with the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD), 
which provides bond characteristics, including issuance date, maturity date, amount 
outstanding, coupon rate, and rating history.  Following Cai et al. (2012), we restrict the 
sample to bonds that (a) have remaining maturity greater than two quarters (because bonds 
                                                          
25 The TRACE data are available starting in the third quarter of 2002, but there are relatively few bonds in 
TRACE for the 3rd quarter of 2002.  Since we require return data for the prior quarter, we begin the analysis 
in the first quarter of 2003. 
26 Non-market transactions are defined by the listed counterparty having one of the following titles: maturity, 
call, exchange, in-house, pay-down, tax write-off full redemption internal transfer, tender, merged, dividend, 
basis spinoff, mortgage, or corporate reorganization. 
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with remaining maturity less than two quarters will necessarily leave the insurer’s portfolio 
over the coming quarter), (b) were issued at least three quarters prior (to avoid potential 
new issue effects), (c) have a fixed coupon,27 (d) are corporate bonds denominated in U.S. 
dollars (because bond characteristics are missing for most of the other bonds).  The number 
of bonds in the sample drops to 17,316 as a result of this step.   
     The data are then merged with the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) 
data to obtain liquidity, volume, and return measures.  Following Bessembinder, et al. 
(2009) and Dick-Nielsen (2014), we exclude canceled trades, corrected trades, reversal 
trades, and commission trades.  We also follow Rossi (2014) and delete observations that 
most likely have errors in reported prices.28  These procedures reduce the number of bonds 
to 13,689. 
     The data are also merged with insurer annual statement data to obtain insurer 
characteristics, such as size and capitalization measures.  Insurers with missing or negative 
value for surplus, total assets, or net premiums written are excluded, which reduces the 
number of bonds to 12,875. Since most of our analysis will utilize prior quarter bond 
returns, we drop observations for which we cannot calculate the prior quarter return.  The 
resulting sample has 12,165 bonds traded by 908 life insurers.  Recall that the LSV herding 
measures are calculated using the percentage of buy transactions by insurers in a period 
(quarter).  To ensure that we estimate the buy ratio with some precision, we impose the 
restriction that each bond in the sample in a given quarter must have transactions from five 
                                                          
27 The data do not include information about the interest formula for variable coupon bonds. 
28 Specifically, we eliminate bond prices with a 50% return reversal (i.e., if the bond price is preceded or 
followed by a price change of more than 50%) and if the absolute difference between the price and the median 
price over the prior 10 transactions and subsequent 10 transactions is “large,” which is defined using the 
median of all of the price differences relative to the median of the 20 transactions (i.e., the median of the 
absolute deviations, denoted by MAD).  Specifically, we eliminate observations if the absolute difference 
between the price and the median price over the 20 transactions is greater than $1 + $5*MAD.    
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different insurers.  This gives us 176,541 bond transactions in 5,752 bonds by 904 life 
insurers.  The empirical analysis is conducted at the bond-quarter level; there are 20,760 
such observations (not tabulated) meeting the screens in Table 3.1. 
In Table 3.2, we present descriptive statistics for the bond-quarter observations that 
are used in the subsequent analysis.   On average, the bonds transacted are 4.1 years old 
and had an average maturity when issued of 13.9 years.  The average (median) face amount 
is $860.3 ($551.5) million.  Credit Rating takes a value between one and ten, where one 
indicates the lowest rating (in default) and 10 indicates the highest rating (AAA).  To 
calculate a bond’s credit rating, we use the average of three major credit rating agencies 
ratings and assign the bond to a rating category as described in the Table 3.3.29 The average 
(median) credit rating is 6.9 (7.0) and 67.0 percent of the bonds transacted have an 
investment grade rating (i.e., above BB).   
We calculate a bond’s quarterly abnormal return by taking the bond’s total return 
and subtracting the return on a benchmark bond portfolio that consists of bonds with similar 
ratings and maturity.  Our approach to calculating the abnormal return is similar to 
Bessimbinder et al. (2009). 30   More specifically, we construct matching portfolios 
(benchmark portfolios) using all of the bonds in TRACE that can be matched to FISD and 
that do not have a rating change during the quarter.  We classify bonds using the 10 rating 
categories (AAA, AA, … C, Default) described above and either three or four maturity 
categories depending on whether the bond is investment grade (rated BBB or higher) or 
                                                          
29 We also used the NAIC ratings and the regression results reported below are essentially the same. 








where 𝑃𝑖,𝑇−𝑥 is the bond price on day T-x (x days before the start of the quarter), AIi,T-x is accrued interest on 
day T-x, and C is the coupon payment(s) received.  𝐼𝑖,𝑇−𝑥 is the matching portfolio value x days before the 
start of the quarter.   
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not.  For investment grade bonds, the maturity categories are 1 to 3 years, 3 to 7 years, 7 to 
10 years, and 10 or more years.  For non-investment grade bonds, the categories are 1 to 7 
years, 7 to 10 years, and 10 or more years.31  This yields 34 benchmark portfolios.  We 
then subtract the return on the bond in each quarter from the return on the corresponding 
benchmark portfolio to find the abnormal return. If a bond’s rating category changes during 
a quarter, then we change the benchmark portfolio to be a weighted average of the 
benchmark corresponding to the different rating categories.  The average winsorized 
abnormal return (at the 1 and 99 percent levels) during the quarter prior to the quarter in 
which herding is measured is -0.4 percent.   
To measure the characteristics of the insurers transacting in the bonds in each 
quarter, we calculate the weighted average of each insurer’s characteristic (e.g., ROA), 
where an insurer’s weight is the proportion of total insurer volume in the bond during the 
quarter due to that insurer.  The average (median) number of insurers transacting in a given 
bond in a quarter is 7.8 (7.0).  The average (median) winsorized risk-based capital ratio 
(RBC) is 8.4 (8.1).  The distribution of insurer asset size is skewed with a mean of $43.8 
billion and a median of $32.3 billion.  The average and median return on assets (ROA) is 
0.9.  The average proportion of volume from insurers that are part of a group that has been 
designated as a systemically important financial institution (SIFI) is 0.2.  Using 75 percent 
of premiums written in one line of business as an indicator of product line focus, the 
average proportion of volume from insurers that focus in life insurance is 13 percent; the 
average proportion of volume from insurers that focus on annuity business is 39 percent; 
                                                          




and the average proportion of volume from insurers that focus in accident and health 
insurance is 9 percent. 
3.5 Descriptive Analysis of Herding  
     Table 3.4 reports the average herding measures for our sample.  The average LSV 
herding measure (LSV_HM) equals 10.2 percent, which indicates that life insurers’ tend 
to buy the same bond or sell the same bond more so than would be expected if their buy 
and sell decisions were independent.  The LSV buy herding measure for the overall sample 
is 11.1 percent and the LSV sell herding measure for the overall sample is 9.4 percent.  
These results indicate that the herding behavior of life insurers is not concentrated on the 
buy or sell side of the market.  Instead, both buy and sell decisions are correlated across 
life insurers.32 
     Also reported in Panel A of Table 3.4 are the herding measures based on insurer volume 
of buy and sell transactions.  On average, the overall volume herding measure, VOL_HM, 
is 60.5 percent, indicating that on average insurers are on one side of the market in bonds.  
The average buy volume herding measure is 56.5 percent, which indicates that when 
insurers’ buy volume exceeds sell volume, the average buy volume is about 3.6 times the 
sell volume.33  The average sell herding measure based on volume is 63.7 percent, which 
indicates that when insurers’ sell volume exceeds buy volume, the average sell volume is 
4.5 times the buy volume.  The correlation coefficient between the overall herding measure 
based on volume, VOL_HM, and the LSV herding measure, LSV_HM, is 0.54. 
                                                          
32 If all of the bonds in the initial sample with five transactions are used to calculate the herding measures 
(98,906),  as opposed to those that went through the various data screens outlined in Table 3.1, the herding 
measures are higher: LSV_HM = 14.4 percent, LSV_BHM = 11.1 percent, and LSV_SHM = 17.5 percent.  
If we require only three transactions each quarter instead of five transactions, then the herding measures are 
lower. 
33 If buy (sell) volume is denoted by B (S), then the volume-based buy herding measure is (B-S)/(B+S). If 
this measure equals k, then B = S(1+k)/(1-k).  If k=.565, then B=3.6 S. 
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     To put the herding measures in perspective, Panel B of Table 3.3 reports selected results 
from the prior literature on herding for other types of institutional investors, securities, and 
time periods.  Generally, the evidence indicates that institutional investors have relatively 
small herding measures for stock transactions (see e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1992 and 
Wermers, 1999).  However, the evidence on bond transactions by institutional investors by 
Cai et al. (2016) indicates much higher herding measures, consistent with our results. 
     To provide descriptive evidence on the herding measures, we present a series of graphs 
in which the LSV herding measures and the volume-based herding measures are plotted 
versus selected variables.  Figures 1 and 2 report herding measures for subsets of bonds 
based on bond size and bond ratings, respectively.  For these analyses, the expected buy 
ratio (pt) is the buy ratio for all of the bonds within the category of bonds being considered, 
as opposed to the buy ratio for all bonds, as was used in herding measures reported in Table 
3.  For example, in Figure 1, which reports the average herding measure for bonds in four 
size (amount outstanding) categories, the expected buy ratio for each size category uses 
only the bonds within that category.   
Figure 3.1 illustrates that the average LSV herding measures are highest for bonds 
with the lowest amount outstanding (between zero and $20 million) and that the average 
LSV herding measures decline as the amount outstanding increases.  Figure 3.2 presents 
the volume-based herding measures for the different bond size categories.  The volume-
based herding measures also decrease on average as the amount outstanding increases.  
These results are consistent with existing studies that institutional herding is significantly 
greater in small stocks. One explanation is that small bonds have less public information, 
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and therefore life insurers are more likely to make decisions based on other insurers’ 
behavior, consistent with informational cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992).  
Figure 3.3 and 3.4 illustrates that the average LSV herding measures are lower for 
investment grade compared to non-investment grade bonds.  The volume-based herding 
measures also indicate that herding is greater in non-investment grade bonds.  Several 
factors could explain this relationship.  First, if non-investment grade bonds have greater 
information asymmetry, which induce insurers to mimic trades of other insurers, then 
herding would be greater in non-investment grade bonds (Bikhchandani et al., 1992).  
Second, because of the higher risk-based capital requirements of non-investment grade 
bonds, insurers (especially those with lower capital) will have an incentive to sell bonds 
that are downgraded from investment grade to non-investment grade (see Ambrose et al., 
2008 and 2012, and Ellul et al., 2011 and 2012).  Third, buy herding could result from 
financially strong insurers purchasing bonds that have been downgraded and that are 
experiencing downward price pressure from other institutions that are selling these bonds.34 
 Figure 3.5 and 3.6 illustrates how the average herding measures vary over time.  
For this analysis, the expected buy ratio (pt) for the LSV herding measures is calculated 
using all of the bonds in the sample, as was done in Table 3.4.  Both the LSV and the 
volume-based average herding measures increase gradually from 2004 through 2009.  
After reaching a peak in 2009, the average herding measures decrease in 2010 and 2011.  
Thus, there is some evidence that herding by insurers increased during the financial crisis.   
  
                                                          
34 See Paulson and Rosen (2016) for analysis of whether life insurers bond transactions provide liquidity in 
general and during the financial crisis. 
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3.6 Panel Regressions of Herding Measures 
3.6.1 Explanatory Variables 
     To examine variables that are related to herding in a multivariate context, we present a 
panel regression analysis of the bond herding measures.  The dependent variable is either 
the overall herding measure (LSV_HMit), the sell herding measure (LSV_SHMit), or the 
buy herding measure (LSV_BHMit) for bond i during quarter t or the corresponding 
volume-based herding measures (VOL_HMit, VOL_SHMit, VOL_BHMit).  The list of 
explanatory variables, which includes bond and insurer characteristics, is given in Table 
3.2 with descriptive statistics.  We also include bond and quarter fixed effects to control 
for time-invariant unobservable bond characteristics and time effects that may affect the 
herding level. 
     We are particularly interested in the coefficient on PrRet, the bond’s abnormal return in 
the previous quarter.  A positive coefficient on PrRet in the buy herding regression would 
be consistent with greater buy herding following price increases and a negative coefficient 
on PrRet in the sell herding measure would be consistent with greater sell herding 
following price decreases.  Either of these results would be consistent momentum trading 
by insurers, which would raise concerns about insurers exacerbating price movements. 
Table 3.2 includes several variables that describe a bond’s rating and whether the 
rating has changed in the quarter.  As described earlier, the variable Rating ranges from 
one to 10; it has a mean value of 6.9.  The variable InvGr is a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether the bond is investment grade (BBB or higher) or not; 72.6 percent of 
the bonds are investment grade.  In the regression analysis, we include a linear spline of 
the rating level with a knot at the investment grade cutoff.  This allows the sensitivity of 
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herding measures to vary based on whether the bond is investment grade or not.  We also 
include upgrade and downgrade dummy variables to examine whether new information 
about the bond’s rating influences herding in the quarter of the rating change. 
Regarding insurer characteristics, it is useful to highlight two points.  First, the 
insurer financial characteristics are measured as of the prior year end.  Second, the insurer 
characteristics are a weighted average of the values for the insurers that transacted in the 
bond during the quarter, where an insurer’s weight is the proportion of volume in the bond 
during the quarter due to that insurer.  We examine whether the herding measures are 
related to average insurer size, return on assets, and risk-based capital ratios of the insurers 
transacting in the bond.  Instead of imposing a linear relationship between the herding 
measures and the average risk-based capital ratios, we include two dichotomous variables; 
one variable indicates whether the average risk-based capital is less than seven and the 
other indicates whether the average risk-based capital ratio is between seven and nine.  
These cutoff values roughly correspond to the 25th and 75th percentile values for the 
weighted average risk-based capital ratios.  We also control for the number of insurers 
transacting in the bond during the quarter.   
     In addition, we include a variable, SIFI, which measures the proportion of insurer 
transaction volume in the bond during the quarter from insurers that are part of a group that 
has been designated as a systemically important financial institution (i.e., AIG, MetLife, 
and Prudential).  There are on average 27 insurers across the sample quarters from these 
three groups.  The estimated coefficient on this variable indicates whether SIFIs tend to be 




3.6.2 Regression Results 
     The results of six panel regressions are reported in Table 3.4.  Regarding bond 
characteristics, the multivariate analysis reinforces some of the relationships found in the 
univariate descriptive analysis.  First, overall herding and sell herding is greater in smaller 
bonds, as the coefficient on AmtOutst is negative and statistically significant in each of the 
HM and SHM regressions.  Second, the coefficients on the Rating variables indicates that 
as the bond’s rating increases, the herding measures decline, on average.  The negative 
relation between herding and ratings is stronger, both economically and statistically, for 
sell herding than buy herding and for non-investment grade bonds than investment grade 
bonds.  We can reject that the coefficients on Rating1 and Rating2 are equal for in the 
overall herding regressions, but not in the sell or the buy herding regressions.  
     The coefficients on UpGr and DownGr give the estimated impact on herding of a change 
in the bond’s rating during the quarter.  We find a significant positive effect of upgrades 
on the overall and buy volume herding measures.  Downgrades are associated with a 
significant increase in sell herding and a decrease in buy herding.  On average, a downgrade 
is associated with a higher LSV (volume-based) sell herding measure of 2.7 (5.1) percent.  
These findings are consistent with the literature that indicates that insurers tend to sell 
downgraded bonds (Ambrose et al. (2008, 2011) and Ellul et al. (2011)).   
     We use a linear spline specification to examine the impact of prior abnormal returns on 
herding.  The knot on the spline is at zero, which allows the relationship between herding 
and prior abnormal returns to differ when abnormal returns are negative versus positive.  
For the buy herding and overall herding regressions, we do not find much evidence of a 
relationship between herding and prior abnormal returns.  For sell herding, however, we 
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find a negative relationship when abnormal returns are negative and a positive relation 
when returns are positive, which is statistically significant for the volume sell herding 
measure.  Thus, the more negative are abnormal returns, the stronger is sell herding.  And, 
the more positive are abnormal returns, the stronger is sell herding.   
     Regarding insurer characteristics, the coefficient on the SIFI indicator variable is 
positive and statistically significant in five of the six regressions, suggesting that herding 
is greater when insurers that are part of groups that are designated as a SIFI trade the bond, 
all else equal.  Also, there is some evidence that herding tends to be greater when insurers 
with relatively low RBC ratios trade the bond, all else equal. 
     Some of the insurer characteristics have a different relationship with the LSV versus the 
volume-based herding measures.  For example, insurer size is negatively associated with 
the LSV herding measures, but positively associated with the volume-based herding 
measures, holding other factors constant.  The positive association between insurer size 
and the volume based herding measure is not surprising given larger insurers will, all else 
equal, have greater trade volumes.  Also, the number of insurers transacting in the bond is 
positively associated with the LSV measures, but negatively associated with the volume-
based measures.  A likely explanation for these relationships is that the LSV herding 
measures tend to be larger when a larger number of smaller insurers transact in the bond 
and that the volume-based herding measures tend to be large even when a small number of 
large insurers trade a high volume of bonds.   Finally, the herding measures based on 
volume are positively associated with the annuity focus variable, suggesting annuity 
providers are associated with buy herding.   
3.6.3 Robustness Checks 
 
79 
     To examine the impact of the financial crisis on herding, we estimate the regression 
models for the financial crisis period (2008-2009) separately from the non-financial crisis 
period (2002-2007, 2010-2011) and use a Chow test to examine whether the coefficients 
are significantly different in the two periods.  To conserve space, we do not tabulate the 
results.  In general, we cannot reject that the coefficient estimates are the same during the 
financial crisis versus the non-financial crisis.  We do find in each of the regressions, a few 
variables with significantly different coefficient estimates during the financial crisis, but 
we do not find a consistent pattern that yields an economic interpretation.   
     We also investigate whether the impact of downgrades on the herding measures depends 
on whether the rating change crossed the investment grade threshold or not.  We find that 
the positive relationship between downgrades and sell herding as presented in the 
regressions in Table 3.4 is not attributable only to downgrades that cross the investment 
grade threshold.  That is, similar effects are observed for downgrades that cross the 
investment grade threshold and downgrades that do not.35   
     Finally, we examine whether herding measures are affected by whether we use company 
level or group level data.  For the measures used to this point, if two companies in the same 
group buy the same bond in the same quarter, they are considered as two separate buy 
transactions.  One might argue that if investment decisions are made at the group level then 
these two transactions should be consolidated and treated as one buy transaction, which 
would result in lower LSV herding measures.  If indeed investment decisions are made at 
                                                          
35 In addition, we investigate whether herding is greater when a bond rating change is not preceded in the 
prior quarter by a prior rating change in the same direction versus when a bond rating change follows a rating 
change in the same direction in the previous quarter.  We refer to the former rating changes as first mover 
rating changes.  We find that both first mover rating downgrades and non-first mover rating downgrades are 
positively associated with sell herding.  See Bewart et al. (2014) for an analysis of the timing of rating changes. 
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the group level, then herding measures based on the consolidated transactions of insurers 
in the same group might more accurately reflect the extent to which independent 
organizations herd.  
     Table 3.6 presents the average herding measures when the transactions of insurers in 
the same group are consolidated.  We refer to these as the consolidated herding measures.  
The average LSV consolidated herding measures are about half the magnitude of those 
reported in Table 3.4.  For example, the average overall herding measure reported earlier 
is 10.2 percent and the one reported in Table 3.6 is 5.7 percent.36  The volume-based 
herding measures are also lower than those reported in Table 3.4.  For example, the sell 
herding measure reported earlier is 63.7 percent and the one reported in Table 3.6 is 59.4 
percent.  We also estimated the regression models using the group herding measures and 
found that most of the relationships revealed by the regressions in Table 3.5 also hold if 
group herding measures are used.37   
3.7 Relation between Herding and Bond Abnormal Returns 
3.7.1 Overview 
     We further examine whether life insurer herding is related to past returns using a 
methodology similar to that employed by Barber et al. (2009) and Dorn et al. (2008) in 
their studies of equity market herding.  Cai et al. (2016) use a similar approach.  We place 
                                                          
36 The number of bonds used to calculate the average herding measures in Table 3.6 is substantially lower 
than the number of bonds used to calculate the average herding measures reported in Table 3.4.  The reason 
is that we require five transactions from different organizations in a quarter for a bond to be included in the 
sample and consolidation of transactions reduces the number of bonds meeting this requirement.  Thus, part 
of the difference in the average herding measures could be due to the sample of bonds used.  Indeed this is 
the case.  If we restrict the bonds to those used in Table 3.6 but do not consolidate transactions of insurers in 
the same group, then average herding measures are roughly midway between those reported in Table 3.6 and 
those reported in Table 3.4. 
37 One exception is that we find that the coefficients on the SIFI variable are statistically significant in only 




bonds into portfolios each quarter based on their herding measures and examine whether 
abnormal returns during the quarter prior to portfolio formation differ between portfolios 
with high herding measures versus low herding measures.   
     This methodology also allows us to examine abnormal bond returns during the quarter 
in which herding occurs (the portfolio formation quarter) and in the subsequent quarter 
market.  Regarding returns during and subsequent to the herding period, there are at least 
four possible findings and corresponding interpretations: 
1. Positive (negative) abnormal returns during the quarter in which buy (sell) herding 
occurs followed by zero abnormal returns in the subsequent quarter would be 
consistent with insurers having better information about the value of bonds and that 
their herding helps to incorporate that information into the price of the bonds. 
2. Positive (negative) abnormal returns during the quarter in which buy (sell) herding 
occurs followed by negative (positive) abnormal returns in the subsequent quarter 
would be consistent with insurer herding causing prices to move away from 
fundamental values during the herding quarter and then subsequently return to their 
fundamental values. 
3. Zero abnormal returns during the quarter in which buy (sell) herding occurs followed 
by positive (negative) abnormal returns in the subsequent quarter would be 
consistent with insurers having better information about the value of bonds, but that 
their herding does not impact pricesr. 
4. Zero abnormal returns during the quarter in which buy (sell) herding occurs followed 
zero abnormal returns in the subsequent quarter would be consistent with insurer 




     We place bonds in portfolios based on their buy and sell herding measures and we 
conduct separate analyses for the portfolios formed using LSV herding measures and the 
portfolios formed using the volume-based herding measures.  For each quarter, we divide 
all of the bonds in the sample in two categories: (1) those with a non-missing buy herding 
measure and (2) those with a non-missing sell herding measure.  The bonds in the first 
category are then divided into quintiles based on the magnitude of their buy-herding 
measures.  Portfolio B1_LSV (B1_VOL) consists of the bonds with the lowest buy herding 
measures in each quarter using the LSV (volume-based) buy herding measure.  Portfolio 
B5_LSV and B5_VOL consists of the bonds with the highest buy herding measures.  We 
repeat the same ranking procedure for bonds with non-missing sell-herding measures, 
creating portfolios S1_LSV (S1_VOL) to S5_LSV (S5_VOL), where portfolio S1_LSV 
(S1_VOL) consists of the bonds with lowest LSV (volume-based) sell herding measures 
in each quarter and S5_LSV (S5_VOL) consists of the bonds with the highest LSV 
(volume-based) sell herding measures each quarter.  
     Table 3.7 provides information about the portfolios formed using the LSV measures 
and Table 3.8 provides information about the portfolios formed using the volume-based 
measures.  The second and third columns of each Table provide descriptive information 
about the average number of bonds and the average herding measure in the portfolio over 
the sample period.38  The other three columns report the average abnormal returns on each 
portfolio in (1) the quarter prior to portfolio formation, (2) the quarter in which the portfolio 
                                                          
38 The average number of bonds in the various portfolios can vary slightly due to the way that ties (bonds 
with the same value of the herding measure) are treated and because the number of bonds with non-missing 
buy and sell herding measures varies by quarter. 
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is formed, and (3) the quarter after the portfolio is formed.  Our focus is on the difference 
in the abnormal returns between the portfolios with high buy (sell) herding, i.e., B5 and B4 
(S5 and S4) and the portfolio with the lowest buy (sell) herding, i.e., B1 (S1).  In other 
words, we are interested in the differential impact of high buy (sell) herding versus low 
buy (sell) herding on bond returns.  This approach also helps to control for common factors 
affecting bond returns during a quarter that are not captured by our benchmark portfolios. 
     Focusing first on Table 3.7, the average buy herding measure in B5_LSV is 36.2 percent 
and the average sell herding measure in S5_LSV is 29.8 percent, both of which suggest a 
substantial degree of herding in the bonds in these portfolios.  Portfolios B4_LSV and 
S4_LSV have average herding measures of 20.9 percent and 20.7 percent, respectively; 
these numbers also suggest a high degree of herding in the bonds in these portfolios.  In 
contrast, portfolios B1_LSV and S1_LSV have LSV herding measures that are negative, 
indicating little herding in the bonds in these portfolios.  Similarly, Table 3.8 indicates that 
B5_VOL and B4_VOL have high average buy herding measures based on volume and 
S5_VOL and S4_VOL have high average sell herding measures based on volume; whereas, 
B1_VOL and S1_VOL have low herding measures. 
     For each of these 10 portfolios and for each of the 36 quarters, we calculate the equally-
weighted abnormal returns for the quarter before, the quarter of, and the quarter after the 
portfolio formation quarter.  The abnormal returns are calculated using a matching portfolio 
methodology similar to that in Bessembinder, et al. (2009).39  This is repeated for each 
bond in the herding portfolio for each quarter and the resulting values are averaged to 
                                                          
39 As is well-known, the secondary corporate bond market in general exhibits thin trading, i.e., many bonds 
do not trade on a daily basis.  In addition, not all transactions are reported in TRACE (our source of bond 
price information). Consequently, when no transaction is reported in the TRACE data for one of the days of 
interest to us, we use the nearest prior transaction price in TRACE. 
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calculate the average abnormal return for the portfolio for that quarter. These quarterly 
average abnormal returns are then averaged over the 36 quarters to calculate the overall 
average abnormal return for each of the 10 portfolios.   To account for heteroscedasticity 
in the abnormal returns, we base statistical significance on standardized abnormal returns 
using a sign-rank test (Ederington et al. 2014).40 
3.7.3 Results 
     Table 3.7 reports the average abnormal returns for each of the 10 portfolios and the 
difference in abnormal returns for the portfolios with high herding and low herding.  For 
the high buy herding portfolios, B5_LSV and B4_LSV, the abnormal returns are not 
statistically different from the abnormal returns for the low buy herding portfolio 
(B1_LSV) in any of the time periods, except for subsequent quarter.   
     The high sell herding portfolios, S5_LSV and S4_LSV, however, have abnormal returns 
that are statistically different from the abnormal returns for the low sell herding portfolio 
(S1_LSV) in the quarter prior to portfolio formation.  For the quarter prior to portfolio 
formation, the difference in the abnormal return between S5_LSV and S1_LSV is -1.39 
percent, which is large economically and statistically significant at the one percent level.  
This finding indicates that bonds in which insurers exhibit strong sell herding behavior tend 
to have lower returns in the prior quarter than bonds in which insurers do not exhibit sell 
herding, which is consistent with sell herding occurring in bonds that have recently 
performed poorly. 
                                                          
40 We use the cross-sectional standard deviation to scale the abnormal returns.  Ederington et al. (2014) 
recommend using both cross-sectional and time series measures of standard deviation, but given that we use 
quarterly data over nine years, we do not have enough time series observations to incorporate a time series 
standard deviation for the first part of our sample period. 
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     For the herding period, the difference in abnormal returns between S5_LSV and 
S1_LSV and also between S4_LSV and S1_LSV are negative, large economically, but not 
statistically significant.  There is no evidence that there is a rebound in prices in the 
subsequent quarter relative to bonds with no herding.  Indeed, the S5_LSV – S1_LSV 
portfolio continues to have negative abnormal returns in the subsequent quarter (although 
not statistically different from zero).  Thus, the evidence does not suggest price pressure 
effects that are relieved in the subsequent quarter.   
     The results when herding is defined using volume are presented in Table 3.8.  Consistent 
with the previous results, this evidence indicates that buy herding is not associated with 
abnormal returns in the prior quarter.  However, we find positive abnormal returns in the 
herding quarter, but no subsequent reversal.  This is consistent with buy herding helping to 
incorporate information into prices. 
     The results using sell herding based on volume indicates negative abnormal returns in 
the quarter prior to portfolio formation, which again is consistent with sell herding by 
insurers following poor returns.  Our evidence also indicates large negative abnormal 
returns in the herding quarter, Again, we do not find abnormal performance in the 
subsequent quarter when herding is defined using volume.  Thus, the evidence is not 
consistent with sell herding pushing prices below fundamental values. 
     Our results differ from Cai et al. (2016) who find significant price reversals following 
sell side herding by mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies.  In light of Cai 
et al.’s results, we conduct a number of robustness checks: 
(1) We extended our post-herding period to two quarters and also to three quarters, but we 
still do not find evidence of reversals.   
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(2) The analysis above uses transaction prices to calculate abnormal returns; whereas, Cai 
et al. (2015) use Merrill Lynch quoted prices.  To explore whether transaction prices 
versus quoted prices explain the different results, we gather quoted prices from 
Bloomberg.  We are able to download historical Bloomberg quoted prices only for 
bonds that were still outstanding as of September 2016.  Consequently, this sample is 
smaller than our main sample and consists of longer maturity bonds than the main 
sample.  The results are summarized in Table 3.9.  Although the statistical significance 
of the results using quoted prices differ somewhat from our baseline results (presented 
in Table 3.7 and 3.8), the implications are similar, i.e., (a) sell side herding is preceded 
by negative abnormal returns, (b) during the herding period, there is evidence of 
positive abnormal returns for buy herding and negative abnormal returns for sell 
herding, (c) no evidence of price reversals in the post herding period.  Note that this 
analysis does not completely rule out the possibility that the explanation for the 
different results is the use of different price data, as our quoted prices are from a 
different source than Cai et al. (2016).   
(3) Our method of calculating abnormal returns differs from Cai et al. (2016).  We 
therefore redo our analysis using raw returns; a summary of the results is presented in 
Table 3.10.  The raw return results are similar to those using abnormal returns, except 
that we find large positive returns in the quarter following portfolio formation for the 
high sell herding portfolios relative to the low sell herding portfolios using both the 
LSV and the volume based herding measures.  In only one instance, however, is the 
difference between the high and low sell herding portfolios statistically significant at 
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the 10 percent level. 41  Given the statistical evidence is weak and conceptual arguments 
for using abnormal returns as opposed to raw returns are strong, we place relatively 
little weight on these results.   Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that a potential 
explanation for our results differing from Cai et al. (2016) is the different benchmarks 
used to calculate abnormal returns.  
3.7.4 Life Insurers Selling and then Buying the Same Bond 
     Another way of detecting evidence of bond prices moving away from fundamental 
values during strong herding periods is to examine whether insurers view that the bonds 
are mispriced, as indicated by their trading behavior.  Specifically, we examine whether 
insurers who sell bonds when there is strong sell side herding are more likely to buy the 
same bonds in the subsequent quarter than insurers who sell bonds during quarters with 
weak sell side herding.  For this analysis, for each quarter we place bonds into five 
portfolios based on their LSV sell herding measure (LSV_SHM), as we do in the abnormal 
return analysis.  We then calculate the percentage of bonds in each portfolio that are 
purchased in the subsequent quarter by the same insurers that sold the bonds during the 
portfolio formation quarter.  Finally, we calculate the mean percentage that were 
subsequently purchased across all of the quarters in the sample.   
     The results for the five portfolios, which are labeled as S1_LSV to S5_LSV (with 
S5_LSV being the portfolio with the highest LSV herding measure), are reported in Panel 
A of Table 3.11.  The corresponding results for the portfolios formed using the volume sell 
                                                          
41 Another possible explanation for the different results is that the method of testing for statistical significance 
differs between the two studies.  As noted earlier, we use the cross-sectional standard deviation to scale the 
abnormal returns when testing for statistical significance (see Ederington et al. (2014)).  Cai et al. (2016) do 
not report how they calculate statistical significance.  If we do not standardize abnormal returns, then the raw 




herding measure are presented in Panel B.  The results clearly indicate that the percentage 
of bonds that were sold and then subsequently purchased by the same insurer declines as 
we move from low sell-side herding (S1) to high sell-side herding (S5), contrary to what 
one would expect if insurers viewed prices moving away from fundamental values during 
periods of high sell-side herding.  Thus, insurers are not more likely to buy bonds that they 
previously sold during high herding periods. 
3.7.5 Impact of the Financial Crisis 
     One might argue that if insurer herding were to impact prices, it would be most likely 
to occur during periods when financial markets are in turmoil.  Therefore, we redo the bond 
price analysis for the period before, during, and after the financial crisis.  The use of 
quarterly data inhibits an in-depth analysis of this issue because of the few number of 
observations during the financial crisis and therefore the weak power of any statistical tests.  
Nevertheless, in Table 3.12 we report the results of the portfolio analysis for three separate 
time periods: 2002-2007, 2008-2009, and 2010-2011.  Given the relatively few 
observations in each period, we focus on economic magnitudes in our discussion.  The 
results are not substantively changed if we define the financial crisis as the third quarter of 
2007 to the end of 2009. 
     The striking feature is the large negative abnormal return during the financial crisis for 
the bonds with high sell herding (S5) relative to bonds with low sell herding (S1) during 
the quarter before herding.  The difference in these portfolios is -3.77 percent when the 
LSV measures of herding are used and -2.58 percent with the volume-based herding 
measure.  Thus, the evidence suggests that sell herding following poor bond performance 
was especially pronounced during the financial crisis.  The abnormal return results during 
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the financial crisis for the quarter after sell-side herding occurs are mixed.  For example, 
using the LSV herding measure, the differences between the abnormal returns for the high 
sell-side herding portfolios and the low sell-side herding portfolio, S5-S1 and S4-S1, are -
0.90 percent and 1.44 percent, respectively.  While neither difference is statistically 
significant, the -0.90 percent abnormal return suggests no price reversal, but the 1.44 
percent return suggests a price reversal.  
3.7.6 Abnormal Returns on Bonds in Which SIFIs Herded 
     We now examine whether the impact of herding on bond prices differs when the bonds 
are more heavily traded by SIFIs.  It is worth noting that the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC) has been criticized for designating some institutions as SIFIs without 
explaining the underlying process or factors that influence this designation (Wallison, 
2014).  If we find that SIFI insurers are associated with bond price impacts, then the 
evidence would lend credence to the argument that herding is one of the channels by which 
these insurers are systemically important.   
     We start by dividing the bond-quarter observations in two categories called SIFI and 
Non-SIFI, where the former includes all of the bonds for which insurers that are part of a 
group that is classified as a SIFI accounted for 15 percent or more of the total insurer 
trading volume in the bond during the quarter.  The Non-SIFI Traded group consists of all 
of the other bonds.  We also used a 25 percent cutoff to define the SIFI Traded group and 
found similar results. 
     We report results using the volume-based herding measure, but the results are similar if 
we use the LSV herding measure.  Within each group, the bonds with non-missing buy 
herding measures are evenly divided into three portfolios.  Portfolio BP3 consists of the 
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bonds with the highest one-third buy herding measures and portfolio BP1 consists of the 
bonds with the lowest one-third buy herding measures.  For both the SIFI and Non-SIFI 
groups, we examine the difference in the abnormal returns between BP3 and BP1.  
Similarly, the bonds with non-missing sell herding measures are evenly divided into three 
portfolios, with SP3 (SP1) being the portfolio with the highest (lowest) one-third sell 
herding measures.  For both the SIFI and Non-SIFI groups, we examine the difference 
between the abnormal returns of SP3 and SP1.42  
     Table 3.13 reports the abnormal bond returns for high buy herding versus low buy 
herding (BP3-BP1) and for high sell herding versus low sell herding (SP3-SP1) for bonds 
with heavy trading by SIFIs versus bonds without heavy trading by SIFIs.  The main result 
is that during the portfolio formation quarter, the high sell herding portfolio performs worse 
than the low sell herding portfolio when the bonds are heavily traded by SIFIs, as the 
difference in abnormal returns is -1.21 percent, which is statistically significant at the one 
percent level.  In contrast, when the bonds are not heavily traded by SIFIs, the difference 
in abnormal returns is -0.35 percent and not significantly different from zero.   
     Thus, our evidence indicates that the prices of bonds in which herding takes place fall 
on average during the herding period when SIFI insurers are heavily involved in herding, 
but prices do not fall on average when other insurers herd.  Stated differently, when herding 
impacts prices, SIFIs tend to be involved.  If one of the objectives in identifying certain 
insurers as SIFIs was to identify insurers that can impact security prices, then it appears 
that the objective was achieved.  Of course, impacting prices can be a good outcome if the 
                                                          
42 We use six as opposed to the ten portfolios as we did in the analysis reported above to ensure a sufficient 
number of bonds in each portfolio given we have already split the sample in two groups based on whether 
the bonds were traded heavily by SIFIs. 
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SIFIs are impounding information into the bond’s price.  Our evidence suggests that this is 
the case, as the alternative interpretation that SIFIs are pushing the bond price below 
fundamental values is inconsistent with our findings of no rebound in the price in the 
subsequent quarter. 
3.8 Summary and Implications for the Systemic Risk of Life Insurers 
     Using two different measures of investment herding (correlated trading) among 
institutions, we find that U.S. life insurers’ investment decisions in corporate bonds are 
consistent with herding behavior.  That is, on average life insurers tend to be on the same 
side of the market (either buying or selling) in individual corporate bonds than would be 
expected if their investment decisions were independent of each other.  Sell side herding 
among insurers is more pronounced in smaller bonds, lower rated bonds, and bonds that 
have been downgraded. Herding is also more pronounced when insurers that are part of 
groups that have been designated as systemically important (SIFIs) trade the bonds.  
     Correlated trading among life insurers is one of the channels that has been put forth for 
why life insurers could contribute to systemic risk (see e.g., FSOC (2013), Getmansky et 
al. (2016) Paulson and Rosen (2016), and Schwarcz and Schwarcz, 2014).  The evidence 
that insurers herd therefore lends credence to the argument that life insurers’ investment 
activities could be a source of systemic risk.  However, correlated trading does not imply 
that life insurers’ investment decisions have a negative impact on market prices.  Thus, we 
also examine the relationship between herding behavior and bond abnormal returns.  We 
find that sell herding follows poor bond performance, which would suggest that sell side 
herding could potentially exacerbate price declines.  However, based on abnormal returns 
during the quarter in which herding takes place and in the subsequent quarter, we find little 
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evidence that insurer herding caused prices to move away from fundamental values during 
our sample period. 
     What are the implications of the results for the issue of whether insurers are systemically 
important, i.e., whether life insurers could potentially exacerbate a financial crisis?   Before 
addressing this issue, it is important to highlight that our analysis and discussion only 
addresses one possible channel by which insurers could be systemically important – the 
investment herding channel.  We believe that the evidence in this paper is mixed as to 
whether insurers’ investment behavior has the potential to disrupt financial markets.  On 
the affirmative side, we do find evidence of investment herding and evidence that sell side 
herding by insurers follows bond price declines.  On the other hand, we find little evidence 




Table 3.1: Sample Selection Process 
 
Life Insurer bond transactions are from Schedule D, Parts 3, 4, and 5 of life insurer annual 
statements. Following Rossi (2014), we delete observations with a 50% return reversal and if the 
absolute difference between the price and the median price over the prior 10 transactions and 
subsequent 10 transactions is “large.”  See footnote 16 for more details. 
 
 









      
1 Life Insurer bond transactions from 
2003-2011 after deleting obs. with no 
cusip, no transaction date, and non-
secondary market trades 
3,958,818 389,883 53,011 1,152 
      
2 Delete non-secondary mkt trades 2,295,254 315,961 48,864 1,148 
      
3 Merged with FISD and     
   Keep corporate bonds 968,162 27,033 6,540 988 
   Delete foreign bonds  967,991 26,990 6,517 988 
   Keep fixed coupon bonds 941,925 23,984 6,208 987 
   Keep bonds w/ a credit rating 789,622 20,733 5,425 977 
   Keep bonds w/ age > 3 qtrs 494,104 17,521 5,023 967 
   Keep bonds w/ maturity > 2 qtrs 482,567 17,316 5,024 965 
      
4 Merged with TRACE & delete 
transactions with likely errors in 
reported prices* 
423,500 13,689 3,816 964 
      
5 Merged with Insurer data & delete 
obs. with non-positive surplus, total 
assets, or premiums written 
382,084 12,875 3,675 908 
      
6 Require return in previous quarter 347,632 12,165 3,556 904 
      
7 Require 5 transactions per quarter 176,541 5,752 2,088 904 






Table 3.2: Characteristics of Bonds and Insurers in the Sample 
 
Maturity is the number of years until the bond matures. Bond Age is the number of years 
that the bond has existed.  Face amount is the face amount of the bond ($millions). Credit 
Rating is the average of the S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch ratings and takes a value between 1 
and 10 with 10 being AAA, 9 above AA, etc.  Investment grade is equal to one if the bond 
is investment grade (rating above BB) and zero otherwise. Amihud Liquidity is the measure 
of liquidity in Amihud (2002) winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile values.  Prior quarter 
return is the abnormal return in the previous quarter winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile 
values. The insurer characteristics are for the prior year and are volume-weighted averages 
of the variable for the insurers transacting in the bond in the quarter. #InsTrans = the 
number of insurers transacting in the bond during the quarter, PctVol_SIFI is the proportion 
of insurer volume in the bond from companies that are part of a group that has been 
designated as a SIFI. RBC is the risk-based capital ratio, winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percentile values.  Assets is total assets ($billions).  LogAssets is the natural logarithm of 
total assets. I(Life Bus >75%) equals one if the percentage of premiums written from life 
insurance exceeds 75 percent and zero otherwise.  I(Ann Bus > 75%) equals one if the 
percentage of premiums written from annuities exceeds 75 percent and zero otherwise.  
I(A&H Bus > 75%) equals one if the percentage of premiums written from accident and 
health insurance exceeds 75 percent and zero otherwise. Values are based on 20,760 bond-
quarters.  
 
Bond Characteristics Var Name Mean Median Min Max Stdev 
Maturity when issued (yrs.)  13.9 10.0 2.0 100.0 9.1 
Bond Age (yrs) Age 4.1 3.3 1.0 24.3 2.7 
Face Amount ($mill)  860.3 551.5 0.1 7,362.8 830.7 
Ln(Face Amount) ($mill) AmtOutst 13.3 13.2 3.9 15.8 0.8 
Credit Rating Rating 6.9 7.0 1.0 10.0 1.2 
Investment Grade (%) InvGr 72.6 100.0 0.0 100.0 44.6 
Upgraded (in %) UpGr 2.7 0.0 0.0 100.0 16.3 
Downgraded (in %) DownGr 7.2 0.0 0.0 100.0 25.9 
Prior qtr Return (in %) PrRet -0.4 -0.2 -24.7 21.3 5.5 
Amihud Liq. measure Liquidity 0.7 0.4 0 5.0 0.8 
Insurer Characteristics 
 
     
# of Insurers transacting #InsTrans 7.8 7.0 5 72 3.8 
Avg Risk-Based Capital Ratio Avg RBC 8.4 8.1 5.2 20.0 2.2 
Avg Return on Assets (in %) Avg ROA 0.9 0.9 -33.3 28.0 2.1 
Avg value of Assets ($billions)  43.8 32.3 0.1 237.0 37.5 
Avg Log(Assets)  AvgLogAssets 23.5 23.6 17.7 26.2 1.0 
% of volume by SIFIs  PctVol_SIFI 21.3 2.9 0.0 1.0 29.2 
Avg I(Life Bus > 75%) Avg Life_Foc 0.13 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.19 
Avg I(Ann Bus > 75%) Avg Ann_Foc 0.39 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.29 
Avg I(A&H Bus > 75%) Avg AH_Foc 0.09 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.15 
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Table 3.3: Credit Rating Distribution 
 
Avg rating of 3 credit rating agencies Credit Rating % of Obs. 
AAA 10 0.9% 
Above AA 9 3.3% 
Above A 8 26.1% 
Above BBB 7 36.7% 
Above BB 6 15.1% 
Above B 5 11.6% 
Above CCC 4 3.7% 
Above CC 3 0.7% 
Above C 2 0.3% 
Default 1 0.2% 






Table 3.4 Herding Measures 
 
The overall herding measure, LSV_HM, is based on the absolute value of the difference 
between the proportion of insurers buying a particular bond relative to the proportion of 
insurers buying any bond during the quarter.  The buy (sell)) herding measure, LSV_BHM 
(LSV_SHM), is the value of LSV_HM if the difference between the proportion of insurers 
buying the bond is greater (less) than the proportion of insurers buying any bond during a 
given quarter, and missing otherwise.  The overall volume based herding measure, 
VOL_HM, is equal to the absolute value of the difference between insurers’ buy volume 
and sell volume, divided by insurers’ total volume.  The buy (sell) herding measures based 
on volume, VOL_BHM (VOL_SHM) equal the value of VOL_HM if the buy volume of 
insurers is greater (less) than the sell volume of insurers in the bond during the quarter, and 
missing otherwise. 
 
Panel A: Herding Measures for Sample of Insurers Transacting in Corporate Bonds 
                          from 2002 - 2011 
    
Variable N Mean StdDev 
LSV_HM 20,760 10.2% 15.8% 
LSV_BHM 10,204 11.1% 16.4% 
LSV_SHM 10,556 9.4% 15.3% 
    
VOL_HM 20,760 60.5% 33.6% 
VOL_BHM   9,029 56.5% 33.3% 
VOL_SHM 11,723 63.7% 33.5% 
 















       
Lakonishok et al. 
(1992) 
Pension funds Stocks ’85-‘89 2.7%    
Pension funds Small stocks ’85-‘89 6.1%   
Pension funds Large stocks ’85-‘89 1.6%   
       
Wermers (1999) Mutual funds Stocks ’75-‘95 3.4% 2.9% 3.7% 
Mutual funds Small stocks ’75-‘95 6.2% 3.7% 8.1% 
Mutual funds Large stocks ’75-‘95 2.7% 2.5% 2.8% 
       
Cai, et al. (2016) Insurers Corp bonds ’98-‘14 13.2% 13.3% 12.5% 
Mutual funds Corp bonds ’98-‘14 9.6% 8.4% 10.8% 





Table 3.5: Panel Regressions for Herding Measures 
 
Dependent variable is one of the six herding measures for bond i during quarter t described 
in Panel A of Table 3.4.  The explanatory variables include the following characteristics of 
bond i during quarter t: Age = age in years. AmtOutst = logarithm of average amount 
outstanding. Rating = average rating score (1=default, 10==AAA); Rating1 is the first 
segment of a linear spline of Rating and Rating2 is the second segment.  The knot for the 
spline is at seven, the threshold for an investment grade rating.  Upgr = 1 if bond is 
upgraded at least once during quarter, and 0 otherwise; Downgr = 1 if the bond is 
downgraded at least once during quarter, and 0 otherwise; Liquidity = average Amihud 
liquidity measure.  PrRet<0 is the first segment of a linear spline for the previous quarter’s 
winsorized abnormal return for the bond and PrRet>0 is the second segment of the spline, 
where the knot for the spline is equal zero.  
#InsTrans = the natural logarithm of the number of insurers transacting in the bond during 
the quarter, PctVol_SIFI =  the proportion of insurer volume in the bond from companies 
that are part of a group that has been designated as a SIFI.  The other insurer characteristics 
are weighted averages of the insurer characteristics, where the weight is the percentage of 
volume from the insurer.  Avg RBC = winsorized average risk-based capital ratio; 
AvgRBC<7 (7≤Avg RBC<9) is a dichotomous variables that equals zero unless the Avg 
RBC ratio is less than 7 (between 7 and 9), in which case the variable equals one; Avg 
ROA = average return on assets; and Avg LogAssets = average logarithm of inflation 
adjusted general account assets; Avg Life_Foc, Avg Ann_Foc, and Avg AH_Foc, give the 
average value of the dichotomous variable indicating whether an insurer has 75% of its 
premium revenue from life, annuities, or accident & health insurance, respectively.   
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Bond and quarter 
fixed effects are included in the regressions. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 





 LSV_HM VOL_HM LSV_BHM VOL_BHM LSV_SHM VOL_SHM 
       
Age -0.034 0.073 -0.062 -0.121 0.014 0.274*** 
 (0.030) (0.064) (0.056) (0.127) (0.046) (0.095) 
AmtOutst -0.045*** -0.096*** 0.016 -0.017 -0.044*** -0.086*** 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.031) (0.083) (0.010) (0.016) 
Liquidity 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.014 0.005 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) 
Rating1  -0.037*** -0.063*** -0.027* 0.027 -0.033*** -0.046*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.014) (0.029) (0.005) (0.009) 
Rating2  -0.020*** -0.047*** -0.008 -0.070** -0.011 -0.038*** 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.015) (0.036) (0.012) (0.023) 
UpGr 0.006 0.043** 0.015 0.070** -0.010 0.030 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.016) (0.034) (0.013) (0.027) 
DownGr 0.006 0.045*** -0.038** -0.049 0.027*** 0.051*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.016) (0.038) (0.008) (0.015) 
PrRet<0 -0.017 -0.190* -0.024 0.233 -0.136** -0.433*** 
 (0.049) (0.097) (0.115) (0.238) (0.064) (0.135) 
PctVol_SIFI 0.018*** 0.047*** 0.038*** 0.048* 0.013 0.039** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.011) (0.025) (0.010) (0.019) 
# InsTrans 0.044*** -0.109*** 0.038*** -0.144*** 0.052*** -0.094*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.007) (0.013) 
Avg RBC<7 0.015*** 0.026*** 0.016* 0.021 0.009 0.026* 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.007) (0.015) 
7≤Avg 
RBC<9 0.007* 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.010 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.006) (0.012) 
Avg ROA -0.092 -0.168 -0.199 -0.612* 0.075 -0.005 
 (0.091) (0.184) (0.167) (0.364) (0.141) (0.265) 
Avg 
LogAssets  -0.006*** 0.012*** -0.013*** -0.002 -0.001 0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) 
Avg 
Life_Foc  -0.000 0.026 0.004 0.055 0.002 0.029 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.016) (0.036) (0.014) (0.027) 
Avg 
Ann_Foc  0.001 0.039*** -0.007 0.053** 0.008 0.034* 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.011) (0.024) (0.010) (0.018) 
Avg 
AH_foc  0.013 0.013 0.019 0.009 0.013 0.012 
 (0.012) (0.026) (0.021) (0.051) (0.019) (0.037) 
Constant 0.975** 2.105*** 0.302 1.389 0.700*** 1.413*** 
 (0.123) (0.240) (0.428) (1.147) (0.152) (0.268) 
       
R2 0.38 0.38 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.52 







Table 3.6: Impact of Consolidating Transactions of Insurers in the Same Group on 
Average Herding Measures 
 
Transactions of insurers in the same group during the same quarter are consolidated 
to calculate the various herding measures.  The overall herding measure, LSV_HM, 
is based on the absolute value of the difference between the proportion of insurers 
buying a particular bond relative to the proportion of insurers buying any bond during 
the quarter.  The buy (sell)) herding measure, LSV_BHM (LSV_SHM), is the value 
of LSV_HM if the difference between the proportion of insurers buying the bond is 
greater (less) than the proportion of insurers buying any bond during a given quarter, 
and missing otherwise.  The overall volume based herding measure, VOL_HM, is 
equal to the absolute value of the difference between insurers’ buy volume and sell 
volume, divided by insurers’ total volume.  The buy (sell) herding measures based on 
volume, VOL_BHM (VOL_SHM) is the value of VOL_HM if the buy volume of 
insurers is greater (less) than the sell volume of insurers in the bond during the quarter, 
and missing otherwise. 
    
Variable N Mean StdDev 
LSV_HM 12,042 5.7% 14.6% 
LSV_BHM 6,039 6.0% 14.6% 
LSV_SHM 6,003 5.5% 14.5% 
    
VOL_HM 12,042 56.4% 32.3% 
VOL_BHM 5,2673 52.6% 31.4% 





Table 3.7: Abnormal Returns Based on Transaction Prices for Portfolios Formed 
Based on LSV Herding Measures 
 
Average abnormal returns for 10 portfolios formed in each of 36 quarters from the 1st 
quarter of 2003 through 2011.  B1_LSV (B5_LSV) consists of bonds with the lowest 
(highest) LSV buy herding measures during each quarter and S1_LSV (S5_LSV) consists 
of bonds with lowest (highest) LSV sell herding measures during each quarter.  Abnormal 
returns are calculated using 34 benchmark portfolios as described in the text and winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% values.  Statistical significance is based on a sign rank test of 
standardized abnormal returns. 
 








   Portfolio 
 Frmtn Qtr 
 
Qtr After 
B1_LSV 55 -9.7% 0.01% 0.03%     -0.40% ** 
B2_LSV 57 -0.1% -0.12%    -0.08%    -0.25% * 
B3_LSV 57 10.0%    -0.19% *    -0.08% -0.26% 
B4_LSV 56 20.9% -0.28% 0.13% -0.10% 
B5_LSV 55 36.2% -0.18%         0.17% -0.06% 








-0.29%  0.10%       0.30% ** 








   Portfolio 
 Frmtn Qtr 
 
Qtr After 
S1_LSV 57 -11.1% -0.03%  -0.34% *    -0.28% * 
S2_LSV 59 -1.1%        -0.32% ***  -0.46% **      -0.31% ** 
S3_LSV 57 8.9%        -0.68% *** -0.66% ** 
       -0.53% 
*** 
S4_LSV 56 20.7%         -0.61% ***    -1.12% *** -0.28% 
S5_LSV 52 29.8%         -1.41% *** -1.14% ***      -0.71% ** 












Table 3.8: Abnormal Returns Based on Transaction Prices for Portfolios formed 
using Herding Measures Based on Insurer Volume 
 
Average abnormal returns for 10 portfolios formed in each of 36 quarters from 2003 
through 2011.  B1_VOL (B5_VOL) consists of bonds with the lowest (highest) volume 
based buy herding measures during each quarter and S1_VOL (S5_VOL) consists of bonds 
with lowest (highest) volume based sell herding measures during each quarter.  Abnormal 
returns are calculated using 34 benchmark portfolios as described in the text and winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% values.  Statistical significance is based on a sign rank test of 
standardized abnormal returns. 
 
   Average Abnormal Returns 




BHM Qtr Prior 
Portfolio 
 Frmtn Qtr 
 
Qtr After 
B1_VOL 49 10.7%    -0.13%       -0.20% ** -0.28% 
B2_VOL 50 32.9%      -0.28% * 0.16% -0.20% 
B3_VOL 50 57.5%    -0.21% 0.01%    -0.17% * 
B4_VOL 48 83.0%       -0.28% * 0.15% -0.17% 
B5_VOL 51 99.1%    -0.12% 0.13% -0.05% 
      
B5_VOL – B1_VOL   0.01% 0.33% ** 0.22% 
B4_VOL – B1_VOL   -0.14% 0.35% * 0.11% 
      
   Average Abnormal Returns 




SHM Qtr Prior 
   Portfolio 
 Frmtn Qtr 
 
Qtr After 
S1_VOL 64 13.7% -0.05% -0.20% ** -0.42% *** 
S2_VOL 64 42.4% -0.15% ** -0.59% *** -0.16% 
S3_VOL 64 70.5%       -0.43% *** -0.71% *** -0.39% * 
S4_VOL 52 91.7% -0.70% *** -0.64% *** -0.48% *** 
S5_VOL 69 99.8% -1.09% *** -1.03% *** -0.62% *** 
      
S5_VOL – S1_VOL   -1.05% ** -0.83% * -0.19% 
S4_VOL – S1_VOL   -0.65% *** -0.44% -0.06% 





Table 3.9: Abnormal Returns Based on Quoted Prices  
 
Average abnormal returns for 10 portfolios formed in each of 36 quarters from 2003 
through 2011.  B1_LSV (B5_LSV) consists of bonds with the lowest (highest) LSV buy 
herding measures during each quarter and S1_LSV (S5_LSV)) consists of bonds with 
lowest (highest) LSV sell herding measures during each quarter.  Portfolios based on the 
volume based herding measures are defined similarly. Abnormal returns are calculated 
using the Citi US Broad Investment Grade Bond Index and Citi High Yield Market Index. 
This approach allows us to classify bonds into five major rating categories (AAA, AA, A, 
BBB, BB,B, CCC), and then segment these categories into intermediate and long-term 
indices based upon time to maturity, resulting in 28 matching portfolios.  For investment 
grade bonds, the time to maturity categories are 1 to 3 years, 3 to 7 years, 7 to 10 years, 
and 10 or more years. For non-investment grade bonds, the categories are 1 to 7 years, 7 to 
10 years, and 10 or more years.  The abnormal returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
values.  Statistical significance is based on a sign rank test of standardized abnormal returns. 
 





 Frmtn Qtr 
 
Qtr After 
B5_LSV – B1_LSV    0.15% 0.66% ** -0.01% 
B4_LSV – B1_LSV   -0.16% 0.51% **  0.13% 
      
 





 Frmtn Qtr 
 
Qtr After 
S5_LSV - S1_LSV   -0.64% ** -0.45%  0.21% 
S4_LSV - S1_LSV    -0.38% *** -0.11% -0.12% 
      
 





 Frmtn Qtr 
 
Qtr After 
B5_VOL – B1_VOL    0.09% 0.38%  -0.12% 
B4_VOL – B1_VOL   -0.19% 0.31%   0.10% 
      
 





 Frmtn Qtr 
 
Qtr After 
S5_VOL - S1_VOL   -0.66% * -0.42% * 0.09% 
S4_VOL - S1_VOL    -0.19%  -0.42% * 0.04% 





Table 3.10: Abnormal Returns Based on Raw Returns 
 
Average returns for 10 portfolios formed in each of 36 quarters from 2003 through 2011.  
B1_VOL (B5_VOL) consists of bonds with the lowest (highest) volume based buy herding 
measures during each quarter and S1_VOL (S5_VOL) consists of bonds with lowest 
(highest) volume based sell herding measures during each quarter.  Returns are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% values.  Statistical significance is based on a sign rank test of 
standardized returns. 
 
Panel A: LSV Buy Herding Average Returns 




 Frmtn Qtr 
 
Qtr After 
B5_LSV – B1_LSV   -0.20% 0.01% * 0.37% 
B4_LSV – B1_LSV   -0.12%      0.03%      0.32% 
      
 
Panel B: LSV Sell Herding Average Returns 




 Frmtn Qtr 
 
Qtr After 
S5_LSV - S1_LSV       -0.80% *** 0.08% ** 0.92% 
S4_LSV - S1_LSV   -0.40% *     -0.25% ***   0.54%* 
      
 
Panel C: VOL Buy Herding Average Returns 




 Frmtn Qtr 
 
Qtr After 
B5_VOL – B1_VOL    0.19% 0.36% ** 0.35% 
B4_VOL – B1_VOL   -0.12% 0.19% **          0.29 
      
 
Panel D: VOL Sell Herding Average Returns 




 Frmtn Qtr 
 
Qtr After 
S5_VOL - S1_VOL        -0.51% ** 0.07% ** 1.06% 
S4_VOL - S1_VOL           -0.33%  0.15% 0.61% 





Table 3.11: Insurer Bond Purchases following Sales in the Prior Quarter 
 
Portfolios S1 through S5 are formed based on either the LSV sell herding measures (Panel 
A) or the Volume based sell herding measures (Panel B) with S1 having the lowest sell 
herding and S5 the highest sell herding.  The percentage of bonds in the portfolio that are 
sold in the portfolio formation quarter and then purchased in the subsequent quarter is 
calculated for each of the 36 quarters from 2003-2011.  The second column reports the 
average across the quarters. 
 
  




Average % of Bonds in the Portfolio that are purchased 
in the subsequent quarter by the same insurers that sold 











Average % of Bonds in the Portfolio that are purchased 
in the subsequent quarter by the same insurers that sold 














Table 3.12: Abnormal Returns on Portfolios formed Based on Herding Measures for Different Time Periods  
 
Average abnormal returns for the difference between portfolios formed in each of 36 quarters from 2003 through 2011.  B1 (B5) consists 
of bonds with the highest (lowest) buy herding measures during each quarter and S5 (S1) consists of bonds with highest (lowest) sell 
herding measures during each quarter.  Panel A use the LSV herding measures and Panel B uses the Volume based herding measures. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using 34 benchmark portfolios as described in the text.  Statistical significance is based on a sign rank 
test of standardized abnormal returns. 
 
Panel A:                                 Average Abnormal Returns on Portfolios formed using LSV Herding  Measures 
 Prior to the Fin Crisis (’03-’07) During the Fin Crisis (’08-’09) After the Fin Crisis (’10-’11)  
          
 Qtr Prior Herding Qtr Qtr After Qtr Prior Herding Qtr Qtr After Qtr Prior Herding Qtr Qtr After 
Buy Portf          
B5 – P1 -0.05% 0.23%  0.06% -0.47% 0.51% 0.66% -0.27% -0.39% 0.69% 
B4 – P1 0.03% 0.18% 0.09% -1.13% -0.16% 0.72% -0.41% 0.21% 0.67% 
          
Sell Portf          
S5 – S1 -0.81%* -0.98%** -0.41% -3.77%** 1.24%  -0.90% -1.04% -0.63% -0.04% 
S4 – S1 -0.30% -0.36%  -0.19% -1.84% -0.93% 1.44% -0.53%  -1.12% -0.21% 
          
Panel B:                            Average Abnormal Returns on Portfolios formed using Volume Based Herding  Measures 
 Prior to the Fin Crisis (’03-’07) During the Fin Crisis (’08-’09) After the Fin Crisis (’10-’11)  
          
 Qtr Prior Herding Qtr Qtr After Qtr Prior Herding Qtr Qtr After Qtr Prior Herding Qtr Qtr After 
Buy Portf          
B5 – B1 0.02% 0.19%  0.07% 0.17%  0.98% 0.03% -0.02% 0.22% 0.75% 
B4 – B1 0.03% 0.11% 0.02% -0.60% 1.22% 0.00% -0.13%  0.30% 0.45% 
          
Sell Portf          
S5 – S1 -0.54% -0.86%** -0.17% -2.58% -0.29%  -0.02% -1.31% ** -0.22%  0.07% 
S4 – S1 -0.32% -0.22% -0.12% -1.28% -0.25% 0.34% -1.16% ** -1.15% 0.04% 




Table 3.13: Abnormal Returns on Bonds in Which SIFIs Herded 
 
Bonds in the SIFI Group consist of bonds in which at least 15% of the trading volume in 
the bond during quarter was from insurers that were part of a group that is now classified 
as a SIFI.  All other bonds are in the Non-SIFI Group.  Within the SIFI and Non-SIFI 
Groups, bonds with non-missing buy herding measures based on volume are placed into 
three portfolios based on their buy herding measures, with BP3 (BP1) being the portfolio 
with the largest (smallest) buy herding measures based on volume, and SP3 (SP1) is the 





Group Qtr Prior 
   Portfolio 
 Frmtn Qtr 
 
Qtr After 
Buy Portf     
BP3 – BP1 SIFI -0.17% 0.18% 0.13%* 
BP3 – BP1 Non-SIFI 0.01% 0.14% 0.11% 
     
Sell Portf     
SP3 – SP1 SIFI -0.77% -1.21%*** -0.67% 
















































Figure 3.4 Volume-based Herding Measures for Investment Grade versus Non-





























































EFFECTS OF RELATIONSHIPS ON EXECUTION COSTS IN THE 
U.S. CORPORATE BOND MARKET43 
4.1 Introduction 
From a conceptual point of view, a relationship transaction can be distinguished 
from a pure spot market transaction by whether the terms of trade are influenced by either 
previous or anticipated future transactions between the parties.44  Financial research has 
examined the role of relationships in a variety of settings, including between borrowers 
and lenders (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1992, Barath et al., 2009, and Bolton et al., 2016)), 
venture capital providers and subsequent borrowers (Hellman et al., 2008), and more 
recently between bond dealers and their customers (see cites below).  This paper 
contributes to our understanding of the role of relationships between bond dealers and their 
customers by examining the interaction effects between relationships and the customer’s 
market power in the relationship, which is measured by the size of the customer’s dealer 
network, its expected future trading activity, and whether it has outsourced investment 
management services to an affiliate of the dealer.   
Three recent papers examine execution costs in the corporate bond market and 
provide evidence on the role of relationships in this market.  Di Maggio et al. (2017) 
                                                          
43 Chia-Chun Chiang and Greg Niehaus. To be submitted to Journal of Risk and Insurance. 
44 There is an extensive literature in on how incomplete contracts, information problems, and transaction 
costs influence the governance of transactions, including the role of relationships.  Seminal contributions 




document that corporate bond market dealers charge lower spreads to those with whom the 
dealer has a stronger previous trading relationship and that the impact of a previous trading 
relationship on execution costs is greater in turbulent markets.  Hendershott et al. (2015), 
who examine execution costs incurred by insurers, summarize their findings with “trading 
relations are the most important determinant of good execution terms.”  Their evidence is 
consistent with insurers developing a network (a Rolodex) of dealers, with the size of the 
network determined by the costs of initiating and maintaining a trading relationship and 
the benefits of having more potential competition.  O’Hara et al. (2016) show that 
execution costs are on average greater for insurers with smaller bond portfolios, but that 
the greater execution costs paid by insurers with smaller bond portfolios is reduced on 
average when those insurers concentrate their trades with a relatively small set of dealers, 
presumably dealers with whom they had a prior trading relationship.  
We build on these contributions by examining two related issues.  First, does the 
impact of a previous trading relationships (shown to be important by De Maggio et al.) 
interact with the size of the insurer’s dealer network (shown to be important by Hendershott 
et al.) and/or with the size of the insurer’s bond portfolio (shown to be important by O’Hara 
et al.)?  The interaction effects are motivated, in part, by the theoretical model of Bernhardt 
et al. (2005), in which the impact of a relationship on execution costs depends on the 
customer’s bargaining power (network size is our proxy) and the customer’s expected 
future order flow (bond portfolio size is our proxy).  We hypothesize that an insurer with 
either a larger dealer network or a larger bond portfolio has greater market power in their 
dealer relationships.  The interaction effects are therefore also motivated by the possibility 




the same dealer) could indicate that the dealer has monopoly power (see Sharpe, 1990), 
unless it is offset by the customer’s market power, i.e., unless the customer has a large 
dealer network and/or a large bond portfolio. 
The second question addressed is: does the impact of relationships on execution 
costs depend on whether the customer has other business with entities that are affiliated 
with the dealer?  The specific type of other business that we examine is the outsourcing of 
investment management services to an affiliate of the dealer.  As an example of this 
situation, an insurer could outsource some of its asset management to Merrill Lynch and 
trade bonds with Bank of America.  Since Merrill Lynch and Bank of America are part of 
the same organization after 2008, we classify such an insurer as having a cross-relationship 
with Bank of America. While the banking literature contains a number of studies 
examining whether transactions with one part of a financial institution influence 
transactions terms with another part of the institution (Yasuda, 2005; Drucker and Puri, 
2005; Hellmann et al., 2008), this issue has not to our knowledge been examined in the 
dealer market for corporate bonds.  We hypothesize that outsourcing of investment 
management services with an affiliate of a dealer strengthens a customer’s market power 
in its bond trading relationship with the dealer. 
We use NAIC life insurer transaction data from 2003 to 2011. Consistent with De 
Maggio et al. (2017), we define a relationship trade at a given point in time by whether the 
customer and counterparty involved in the trade transacted in the past quarter. We measure 
the strength of the relationship between an insurer and the counterparty by the proportion 
of the insurer’s bond trading in the previous quarter that was with the same counterparty.  




as having a relationship with each of those dealers.  If one-half of the insurer’s volume of 
trading in the prior quarter was with one dealer and the other half split between the other 
two dealers, then the insurer has a stronger relationship with the former than with the latter 
dealers.   
Our analysis controls for a number of factors that theoretically are related to 
transacting costs in securities markets, including the dealers’ inventory costs, information 
asymmetry about the underlying security being traded, and search-and-bargaining costs 
(see e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1980, Glosten and Milgrom, 1985, Kyle, 1985, Duffie 
et al., 2005; Rhodes‐Kropf, 2005; Bernhardt et al., 2005). Consistent with the theory, 
existing empirical evidence finds that trade size, bond liquidity, dealer size, and 
transparency influence bond execution costs (see e.g., Schultz, 2001; Bessembinder et al., 
2006; Edwards et al., 2007). 
Our evidence confirms that trading relationships influence bond execution costs.  
While Di Maggio et al. (2017) find a negative association between execution costs and 
stronger trading relationships on average, we find a positive association on average for our 
entire sample.  However, we also find that the association between prior trading 
relationships and execution costs is conditional on the size of the insurer’s dealer network 
and on the size of the insurer’s bond portfolio.  More specifically, holding the strength of 
the relationship constant, insurers with smaller dealer networks and smaller bond portfolios 
suffer higher execution costs than insurers with larger networks and larger bond portfolios, 
all else equal.   This evidence suggests that when insurers with a limited dealer network 
and/or relatively small bond portfolios have a strong trading relationship with particular 




does not imply that insurers are not optimizing, as the higher execution costs that they pay 
may be lower than the costs of establishing and maintaining additional relationships.  In 
addition, we find that outsourcing of investment services to an affiliate of a dealer lowers 
bond execution costs for customers that otherwise would have weak market power when 
they trade with a relationship dealer. Thus, our paper augments the Di Maggio et al. 
(2017)’s paper and those by Hendershott et al. (2015) and O’Hara et al. (2016) by 
presenting evidence that the impact of relationships on execution costs varies with the size 
of the insurer’s dealer network, the size of the insurer’s bond portfolio, and whether the 
insurer outsources some of its asset management services to an affiliate of the counterparty, 
i.e, whether a cross-relationship exists.  
In most of our analysis, we treat the existence of a relationship as exogenous, which 
is clearly not the case.  Customers choose which dealers to trade with and how many to 
trade with.  In an effort to address the endogeneity issues, we conduct a propensity score 
matching analysis.  The results are consistent with the regression analysis, i.e., the impact 
of relationship trades on execution costs depends on whether the customer has strong or 
weak market power.  Customers with strong market power enjoy lower execution costs in 
relationship trades compared to those with weak market power.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 4.2, we present the hypotheses to be 
tested.  The data are described in section 4.3.  The methodology and a descriptive analysis 
of the data are presented in section 4.4, followed by the results.  The final section 





4.2 Existing Literature and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 The Setting 
Our hypotheses are about how relationships between participants in the secondary 
corporate bond market influence execution costs.  In our case, a life insurer is on one side 
of the transaction.  Typically, a dealer is the counterparty, but not always.  Our analysis is 
at the level of individual bond transactions, which are defined by the insurance company 
(indexed by i) and the counterparty (indexed by d) involved in the transaction, the bond 
that is being traded (indexed by b), and the date of the transaction (indexed by t).  We have 
data on insurer characteristics and bond characteristics, but not counterparty 
characteristics.45  Therefore, our hypotheses regarding relationships relate execution costs 
to insurer characteristics, controlling for bond characteristics. 
4.2.2 Prior Literature 
There are several theoretical models in the literature that highlight different factors 
that are likely to influence bond execution costs.  Dealers have costs of holding inventory, 
which imply that bonds that trade infrequently and transactions that would cause an 
inventory imbalance (e.g., large trades) will have higher execution costs, all else equal (see 
e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Bernhardt et al., 2005, Also, if customers are better 
informed about the value of the underlying bonds, then the counterparty will charge higher 
execution costs, all else equal (see e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985 and Kyle, 1985).  
Assuming asymmetric information is more prevalent with smaller and lower rated bonds, 
execution costs would be higher for such bonds (Edwards, et al, 2007).  
                                                          
45 Hendershott et al. (2016) provide extensive analysis of dealer – insurer relations, including the influence 




Duffie et al. (2005) highlight the importance of customer search and bilateral 
bargaining between the customer and dealer in over-the-counter markets like the corporate 
bond market.  They show that the execution cost on a given transaction depends on the 
customer’s cost of finding an alternative dealer and the relative bargaining power of the 
customer versus the dealer.  In essence, contemporaneous competition determines 
execution costs.  Thus, the size of the customer’s dealer network, defined as the number of 
dealers used in the prior quarter, is expected to be inversely related to execution costs. 
Hendershott et al. (2015) and O’Hara et al. (2016) provide evidence consistent with this 
prediction.  Schultz (2001) presents evidence that execution costs in the corporate bond 
market are larger when smaller institutional investors trade and Hendershott et al. (2015) 
and O’Hara et al. (2016) show that smaller insurers on average pay higher execution costs.  
Assuming customer size is inversely related to search costs and directly related to 
bargaining power, these findings are consistent with Duffie et al.’s model.  O’Hara et al. 
(2016) also show that the dealer’s market share in a given bond has a large influence on 
average execution costs, consistent with a dealer’s market power/bargaining power playing 
a role in determining execution costs (Duffie et al.,2005). 
4.2.3 Hypotheses Regarding Relationships 
In developing our hypotheses, we rely heavily on Bernhardt et al.’s (2005) model 
of relationships between a customer and a dealer.  In their model, the customer would like 
to trade, over its lifetime, at the best prices possible.  The customer continues to use a 
particular dealer – one with which it has a relationship – until either (1) a random 
exogenous event with a known probability of occurrence causes the customer to switch to 
another dealer or (2) the customer switches because the endogenous execution costs 




given transaction to maximize its value, which trades off the additional profits from 
charging higher execution costs on the current transaction with the increased probability of 
losing future profits on the customers’ future order flow.  The competitive force that 
disciplines the dealer from charging high execution costs is the loss of future business, 
which Bernhardt et al. (2005) refer to as intertemporal competition.  Thus, one prediction 
is that dealers charge lower execution costs to customers that have a higher expected future 
order flow, all else equal.  Note, however, fixing the value of a particular relationship, the 
larger the current order, the greater is the incentive to charge higher execution costs on the 
current trade, because the dealer would receive a higher mark-up on the current trade. 
 From an empirical perspective, we define a transaction as a “relationship trade” if 
the insurer and counterparty involved in the transaction traded with each other in the prior 
calendar quarter.46  In addition, we measure the strength of a relationship between an 
insurer and a counterparty for a particular transaction by the proportion of the insurer’s 
trades (or the proportion of the insurer’s volume of trading) in the prior quarter that was 
with the same counterparty.  Di Maggio et al. (2017) use similar measures.   
The first question is how do execution costs change as the strength of the 
relationship between an insurer and a counterparty increases?  Assuming that a strong prior 
trading relationship is a reflection of the dealer providing low cost execution in the past, 
then one would expect that a strong prior trading relationship would be associated with low 
cost execution.  Consistent with this logic, Di Maggio et al. (2017) present evidence that 
the stronger the relationship, the lower are execution costs, all else equal.  It is also 
plausible, however, that a strong prior relationship could have the opposite effect on 
                                                          




execution costs.  The relationship strength measures are essentially the counterparty’s 
market share of the insurer’s prior bond trading business.  A high market share could 
indicate that the insurer is “locked in” to the counterparty for some reason, which could be 
due to the costs of finding other counterparties, or a lack of incentive to search for other 
counterparties due to agency costs, or an information advantage that the relationship 
counterparty has obtained by trading with the insurer over time.47  In essence, a strong 
relationship (i.e., high market share) could indicate that the counterparty does not need to 
be concerned with losing the customer’s future business and therefore the counterparty 
exercises this monopoly power by increasing execution costs.  Given the competing 
arguments for the impact of a strong relationship on execution costs, we have the following 
two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.a:  On average, prior trading relationships between the dealer 
and the customer decrease current execution costs.   
Hypothesis 1.b:  On average, prior trading relationships between the dealer 
and the customer increase current execution costs.   
Our main hypotheses are based on Bernhardt et al.’s (2005) prediction that a prior 
trading relationship lowers execution costs more as the insurer’s expected future order flow 
increases and as the insurer’s bargaining power increases.  We use the size of the insurer’s 
bond portfolio as a proxy for expected future order flow and the size of the insurer’s dealer 
network as a proxy for its bargaining power.48  In our subsequent discussion, we sometimes 
                                                          
47 Sharpe (1990) uses the information advantage that arises from lending to a customer over time in 
analyzing the market power of banks in relationship lending.  If a dealer obtains an information advantage 
by trading with an insurer over time, then in equilibrium, the pricing of trades at the beginning of the 
relationship would be lower.  See Sharpe (1990).   
48 We present empirical results using the size of the insurer’s bond portfolio.  However, we have also used 




group these two effects together as one, and refer to them as the customer’s market power.  
This leads to hypotheses two and three: 
Hypothesis 2: All else equal, for a given level of trading relationship strength, 
execution costs decline as the size of the customer’s bond portfolio increases.   
Hypothesis 3: All else equal, for a given level of trading relationship strength, 
execution costs decline with the size of the insurer’s counterparty network.   
As mentioned above, Hendershott et al. (2015) show that an insurer’s asset size is 
negatively related to execution costs, but they do not interact asset size with a measure of 
the strength of the prior trading relationship. Similarly, Hendershott et al. (2015) and 
O’Hara et al. (2016) present evidence that execution costs decline as the insurer’s network 
increases, but they do not interact newwork size with a measure of the strength of the prior 
trading relationship. 
 We also contribute to the literature by examining an issue that has received 
considerable attention in the banking literature, i.e., whether transactions with one part of 
a financial institution influence the terms of transactions with another part of the institution 
(Yasuda, 2005; Drucker and Puri, 2005; Hellmann et al., 2008). Thus, we examine whether 
execution costs in the bond market depend on whether the customer has relationships with 
another entity that is part of the same financial institution as the counterparty in the bond 
transaction. More specifically, if an insurer outsources some of its investment management 
to an entity that is affiliated with a counterparty with which the insurer transacts, then we 
say that the insurer has a cross-relationship with the counterparty. We investigate whether 





 Hypothesis 4: Outsourcing of investment management services to an affiliate 
of the dealer lowers execution costs, all else equal. 
Hypothesis 5: All else equal, for a given level of trading relationship strength, 
execution costs decline when the insurer outsources investment management 
services to an affiliate of the counterparty.  
4.3 Data  
We collect the data from multiple sources from 2003 to 2011.  Life insurer 
transaction data are from Schedule D, Parts 3, 4, and 5 of insurers’ annual statements, 
which report information on bonds that the insurer purchased during the year (Part 3), sold 
during the year (Part 4), and bought and sold during the year (Part 5).  After deleting those 
observations without a reported cusip, a par value or a transaction date, there are close to 
3.5 million bond transactions reported by 1,147 different life insurance companies in 
368,140 different bonds. 
After merging with the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD), which 
provides bond characteristics, issuer characteristics, and rating history, we have a sample 
of 1.04 million trades. We only consider corporate bonds. In addition, to avoid the newly 
issued and maturing bonds issues, we keep bonds that have a remaining maturity greater 
than two-quarters and were issued at least three quarters prior. The number of bonds in the 
sample drops to 0.53 million as a result of this step.  We only consider corporate US dollar 
bonds and bonds with a face value equal to $1,000, so that the bonds in the sample are 
comparable (O’Hara et al., 2016). We also drop non-secondary market trades, e.g., those 
categorized as exchange, call, or mature. Trades with multiple dealers or without dealers’ 




mentioned criteria. Finally, we only consider trades by life insurers with normal status 
indicated by NAIC, which reduces the sample to 0.33 million trades. 
Life insurers report their transaction amount (Consideration) and par value for each 
trade in Schedule D. The traded price is defined as the Consideration divided by par value. 
However, some life insurers have different units for Consideration and Par Value. To make 
sure the reasonability of the prices, we compare the prices reported in the Trade Reporting 
and Compliance Engine (TRACE). We follow Bessembinder, et al. (2009) and Dick-
Nielsen (2014) to exclude canceled trades, corrected trades, reversal trades, and 
commission trades.  We also follow Rossi (2014) deleting price errors. In addition, we only 
include securities that are traded at least two times in the same direction in the same day. 
If the ratio of trade price to Trace price is not between 0.75 and 1.25, we delete the 
transaction from our sample. We also eliminate trades with unrecognized dealers' names 
(vague abbreviation). Dealers that are part of the same group are considered as one entity. 
We have about 0.10 million trades in the end. Table 4.1 illustrates the details for 
constructing our sample.  In the following analysis, we use these trades to examine the 
impacts of relationships on execution costs.  When fixed effects are used, we delete 
singleton observations. 
4.4 Analysis 
4.4.1 Measuring Execution Costs 
 Our level of analysis is a trade made by an insurer i with a dealer d for bond b on 
day t.   We measure execution costs on a given trade by comparing the trade price with the 
volume weighted average TRACE price for that bond on that day:  
Execution costi,d,b,t =
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐶𝐸 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑏,𝑡 −𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑,𝑏,𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐶𝐸 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑏,𝑡




where 1𝑏𝑢𝑦 is an indicator of whether the trade is a buy or sell trade.   
Our measurement of the execution costs is similar to those used in other studies, 
but not identical.  Hendershott et al. (2016) compare the trade price to the Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch sell quotes at the time of the transaction for the same bond.  Di Maggio et 
al. (2017) use two execution cost measures.  For the one cost measure, they limit their 
analysis to bonds for which the dealer purchased and sold the bond in the same hour.  For 
these bonds, the execution cost is the difference between the buy and the sell price.  To 
increase the size of the sample and avoid limiting their sample to bonds with high liquidity, 
they expand the sample and use the difference between the transaction price and the 
average transaction price for that bond during the week.  O’Hara et al. (2016) focus on the 
difference in transaction prices for the same bond traded on the same day in the same size 
category for insurers with large bond portfolios versus insurers with small bond portfolios. 
4.4.2 Methodology and Baseline Model 
We begin the analysis by examining the impact of relationships on execution 
costs for our sample.  Recall, Di Maggio et al. (2017) find that execution costs are lower 
when the dealer and customer have a stronger prior trading relationship.  Our first step 
therefore is to examine whether similar results hold in our sample.  As we show shortly, 
we find different results on average.  This could be explained, in part, by the different 
samples:  We consider the execution costs of insurers; whereas, Di Maggio et al. (2017) 
use a broader set of transactions, including dealer to dealer trades.  In the subsequent 
analysis, we interact the relationship variables with other factors to help explain why on 





Execution cost𝑖,𝑑,𝑏,𝑡= f( RELi,d,t , Trans_Chari,d,b,t , Insurer_Chari,t , Bond_Charb,t)  
                                                            +𝛼𝑡 + 𝜋𝑏 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑑,𝑏,𝑡 ,                     (2) 
where the variables are described below and α and π are time and bond fixed effects 
respectively.  When estimating the standard errors, we follow Di Maggio, et al. (2017) and 
double cluster the errors at the bond and week level. 
 One focus of this analysis is the estimated sensitivity of execution costs with the 
variables measuring the relationship between insurer i and dealer d at date t, REL.  We 
consider three relationship measures. The first variable, REL_Dum, is a binary measure of 
relationship that equals one if life insurer i traded with the dealer d in the previous quarter, 
and 0 otherwise. The other two relationship measures are based on transaction amount 
(REL_AmtTr) and number of trades (REL_NumTr), defined as  
REL_AmtTr = 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 by life insurer i to dealer d in the previous calendar qrtr ($)
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑏𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟 𝑞𝑟𝑡𝑟 ($)
 
REL_NumTr = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 of bonds traded by life insurer i to dealer d in the previous calendar qrtr 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟 𝑞𝑟𝑡𝑟 
 
Di Maggio et al. (2017) define relationships similarly. 
 The other focus of the analysis is whether execution costs are influenced by the size 
of insurer’s dealer network and the size of the insurer’s bond portfolio, which proxy for the 
competition for the insurer’s business and the value of maintaining a share of the insurer’s 
trading business.  We measure the size of the insurer’s dealer network in two ways: (1) the 
number of dealers used in the past calendar quarter (Num_Dealers), and (2) a dichotomous 
variable equal to one if the insurer has fewer than five dealers in its network, and zero 




natural logarithm of the insurer’s bond portfolio in million (Log_BondHldgs) and a 
dichotomous variable (BondHldgs_LTMed) equal to one if the insurer’s bond portfolio is 
below the median value of whole sample of insurers, and zero otherwise. 
We include a number of control variables in the regression model, many of which 
have been shown to be related to bond execution costs in previous studies. The first set of 
control variables includes Transaction Characteristics. We use a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether the trade was a buy or a sell trade (Sell_Dum) and the natural logarithm 
of the trade size in millions (Log_TradeSize).  
The Bond Characteristic control variables are as follows: the natural logarithm of 
the number of months until maturity (Bond_Maturity), the natural logarithm of the number 
of months since bond was issued (Bond_Age), the Amihud liquidity measure for the bond 
(Bond_Liq),49 the bond’s average credit rating during the quarter, with 10 indicating AAA 
and 1 indicating default (Bond_Rating), a dichotomous variable indicating whether the 
bond was upgraded (Bond_Upgrade) or downgraded (Bond_Downgrade) in the quarter. 
The third set of control variables includes Insurer Characteristics: the natural 
logarithm of the insurer’s bond holdings (Log_BondHldgs), the natural logarithm of the 
insurer’s risk-based capital ratio (Log_RBC) ratio, a dichotomous variable equal to one if 
the RBC ratio is less than five and zero otherwise (RBC_LT5), the insurer’s ratio of cash 
to total assets (Cash_Assets), a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the insurer is a mutual 
company and zero otherwise (Mutual), the insurer’s return on assets (ROA), a dichotomous 
                                                          
49 We use a slight variant of the traditional Amihud liquidity measure.  In particular, we calculate the 
median rate of return divided by volume of all of the trades in a quarter.  We use the median as opposed to 
the mean to reduce the impact of outliers. If the value of the liquidity measure is high, then it implies that a 





variable indicating whether the insurer is part of a group that has been designated as a 
systemically important financial institution (SIFI), dichotomous variables indicating 
whether the insurer has at least 75 percent of its business from annuities (Annuity_Focus), 
or 75 percent from life insurance (Life_Focus), or 75 percent from accident and health 
insurance (A&H_Focus).   The dichotomous variable OutsRel is equal to one if the insurer 
outsourced some of its investment management to an affiliate of the dealer and zero 
otherwise.50 
 We present descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis in Table 4.2. 
Variable descriptions are collected in the Appendix. The mean and standard deviation of 
execution costs equal 0.50 and 1.40, respectively, which correspond to 50 and 140 basis 
points.  The mean of the variable REL_Dum indicates that 50.8 percent of the transactions 
are between an insurer and dealer who traded with each other in the previous quarter.  The 
descriptive statistics for REL_AmtTR and REL_NumTr indicate that across all of the 
transactions, on average, 12.8 percent of an insurer’s trading volume and 12.7 percent of 
an insurer’s trades in the previous quarter went through the same dealer.  Note, however, 
that about half of the transactions are not with a dealer that the insurer used in the previous 
quarter and thus roughly half of the values for REL_AmtTr and REL_NumTr are equal to 
zero.  For transactions with a previous transaction relationship (i.e., REL_Dum equals one), 
the mean values of REL_AmtTr and REL_NumTr are both equal to 25.1 percent.  The 
                                                          
50 The outsourcing data is hand collected from “GENERAL INTERROGATORIES” in insurers’ annual 
statements.  Life insurers report each advisor’s name and address. We then match the name of the 
outsourcing institutions with the vendor’s name in the transaction data.  In addition, we use the name and 
address data to see whether these two advisors are in the same group. We also use SEC affiliated company 





OutsRel variable indicates that about three percent of trades are made with dealers that also 
have an affiliate that has an outsourcing relationship with the life insurer.  
The average trade size is about $3 million, but the median trade size is about $1.2 million. 
Bond average maturity is about 8.9 years, and average bond age is 3.9 years. Average bond 
rating is BBB. In our sample, about 2.5 percent of trades are made in the same quarter as 
when an upgrade event occurs, and about 9.1 percent of trades are made when a downgrade 
event happens.  From Panel A and Panel B, we can see that the average life insurer size is 
$18.9 billion when using all trades and $16.5 billion when using insurer-year observations. 
The difference indicates that life insurers with greater assets make more trades during the 
same period. Similarly, the average number of dealers based on transactions is 15, but the 
average number of dealers based on insurer-year observations is five, which indicates that 
life insurers with a broader dealer network trade more often.  Overall, summary statistics 
show that life insurers with greater bargaining power, as measured by dealer network size 
and the size of insurer bond holdings, trade more.  
4.4.3 Results for the Baseline Model 
The results of estimating the baseline model are reported in Table 4.3 for all 
transactions and separately for buy and sale transactions. To quantify the relationship 
strength, the models in Table 4.3 use either the variable based on the volume of trading in 
the prior quarter (REL_AmtTr), based on the number of trades in the prior quarter 
(REL_NumTr), or the dichotomous variable indicating a relationship trade 
(REL_Dummy). The correlations between REL_AmtTr, REL_NumTr, and REL_Dummy 
are 0.94, 0.53 and 0.56. The high correlation suggests that all of our primary relationship 




strength of a relationship because it gives the proportion of the insurer’s prior quarter 
trading volume that went to the dealer.  
Regardless of which relationship measure is used, the coefficient on the relationship 
variable is positive and significant at the 1 percent or 5 percent level, except for the 
coefficient on REL_Dum in the equation for sales.  Thus, a stronger prior trading 
relationship is associated with higher execution costs, on average. However, the positive 
estimated relation between execution costs and the relationship variables contrasts with the 
finding of Di Maggio et al. (2017), who show that stronger relationships in dealer to dealer 
trades, all else equal, lower execution costs. In Di Maggio et al. (2017), they divide the 
relationship variable into “Fraction Selling to Counterparty” (Fraction Sales/Total Sales) 
and “Fraction Buying to Counterparty” (Fraction Purchases/Total Purchases). If we follow 
their definition and re-estimate the table 4.3, the coefficient on “Fraction Buying to 
Counterparty” is 0.16 and significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficients on “Fraction 
Selling to Counterparty” is -0.02 but not significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, our results 
indicate that a stronger prior trading relationship increases execution costs on average.  
Sharpe (1990) reports an analogous result in banking, i.e., banks charge higher prices to 
customers with whom they have stronger relationships.   
One possible explanation for the different results is that our samples differ.  In our 
insurer transaction data, junk bonds account for about 29 percent and the average 
transaction volume per trade is about $3.03 million. In Di Maggio et al. (2017), the 
proportion of junk bonds is less than 10 percent and the average transaction volume per 
trade is about $4.75 million. Although the different samples could explain the different 




the explanation. In other words, we show below that relationships decrease execution costs 
in our sample for some transactions, but not others.  Our contribution is the identification 
of the characteristics of transactions that interact with relationships to determine execution 
costs.    
The results in Table 4.3 indicate that the coefficient on Num_Dealers is -0.01 and 
is statistically significant, indicating that insurers that use more dealers in the past year 
have lower execution costs on average, all else equal.  This is consistent with insurers that 
possess a more legitimate threat to move their trading business to another dealer obtaining 
lower execution costs, all else equal.  The coefficient estimate suggests that each additional 
dealer in the network lowers execution costs on average by one basis point, all else equal.  
A similar result is reported by Hendershott et al. (2015) and O’Hara et al. (2016). 
The coefficient on the variable measuring the size of the insurer’s bond holdings 
(Log_BondHldgs) is negative and statistically significant for buy transactions and overall, 
but not statistically significant for sale transactions.  This finding is consistent with 
execution costs varying based on the value of the relationship to the dealer (Bernhardt et 
al., 2005).  O’Hara et al. (2016) also find that insurers with larger bond portfolios (which 
they refer to as “more active”) have lower execution costs on average. 
We now briefly mention some of the results for the control variables, most of which 
are consistent with other papers.  One exception is that we find that execution costs are on 
average higher for sale trades, in contrast to Hendershott et al. (2015).  Table 4.3 indicates 
that larger orders are associated with lower transaction costs.  Bonds that are older, with 
longer maturity, worse credit rating, or have a downgrade event in the quarter are related 




higher bond execution costs.  Finally, mutual insurers on average have higher execution 
costs, all else equal, although the effect is not statistically significant for sale transactions.  
One explanation is that mutual insurers could have greater agency problems (see Mayers 
and Smith, 1981, 1986, 1988) and consequently mutual insurer managers have less 
incentive to seek better execution costs.  
 In an unreported table, as robustness checks, we estimate the models presented in 
Table 4.3, but replace the variable measuring the number of dealers with a dichotomous 
variable, NetWork_LT5, that takes a value of one if the number of dealers is less than five, 
and zero otherwise (the median number of dealers is four).  In addition, we use an 
alternative measure of the insurer’s bond holdings, a dichotomous variable 
BondHldgs_LTMed, which equals one if the insurer’s bond holdings are less than the 
median for the sample, and zero otherwise. We do not report these results because the 
results are consistent with those in Table 4.3 for each variable.  The coefficient on the 
NetWork_LT5 indicates that on average execution costs are higher by between 21 and 28 
basis points for insurers with dealer networks consisting of less than five dealers relative 
to insurers with larger networks. Finally, the coefficient on the BondHldgs_LTMed 
indicates that on average execution costs are higher by between 8 and 22 basis points for 
insurers with bond holdings less than median. 
 In sum, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that relationships are important 
for explaining the bond execution costs. In addition, life insurers with a broader network 
and greater bond holdings enjoy lower bond execution costs, all else equal. 




We now examine whether the impact of relationships depends on the customer’s 
market power, where life insurers with strong market power obtain better prices because 
the cost to the dealer of losing the insurer’s current and future business is higher (Bernhardt 
et al., 2005, Rhodes‐Kropf, 2005). In contrast, if life insurers have weak market power and 
strong trading relationships (i.e., concentrate their trades with a small set of counterparties), 
they are likely to pay higher bond execution costs (Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992). We use two 
variables to proxy for a life insurer’s market power -  the number of dealers used by the 
insurer in the prior year (Num_Dealers) and the value of the insurer’s bond holdings 
(Log_BondHldgs) (Hendershott et al, 2015; O’Hara et al, 2016).  
4.4.4.1 Number of Dealers Interacted with Prior Trading Relationship Strength 
Hendershott et al. (2015) document the large variation across insurers in the extent 
to which they trade and with the number of dealers used.  For example, they state that 50 
percent of insurers trade with only one dealer all of the time.  Insurers that only use a few 
dealers are unlikely to obtain the best execution costs.  However, these insurers are also 
likely to have high relationship strength measures with at least one of their dealers.  Thus, 
the positive relationship between execution costs and strong dealer relationships could be 
explained by a large number of insurers that only deal with a few dealers.  To test whether 
the impact of relationships on execution costs depends on the number of dealers used by 
an insurer, we include an interaction term between REL_AmtTr and either the number of 
dealers (Num_Dealers).  This explanation would be supported by the data if the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction term is negative; indicating that the benefit (lower execution 




The results, which are reported in Column 1 of Table 4.4, indicate that the 
coefficient on the REL_AmtTr variable is positive and statistically significant, as it is in 
Table 4.3.  However, the coefficient on the interaction variable is negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that the sensitivity of execution costs to the relationship strength 
variable declines as the number of dealers increases.  Given the coefficient estimates, the 
slope turns from positive to negative when the number of dealers equals 20.   
Our interpretation is as follows: On average, when an insurer does not have a large 
network of dealers, a higher value for relationship strength increases execution costs, but 
when an insurer does have a large network of dealers, a higher value of relationship strength 
decreases execution costs.  The predicted impact of relationship strength on execution costs 
for different values for the Num_Dealers is illustrated in Figure 1.  As relationship strength 
increases, predicted execution costs increase as relationship strength increases when the 
number of dealers is less than 20, but execution costs decrease as relationship strength 
increases when the number of dealers is greater than 20.  
We also estimate the model interacting the dichotomous variable Network_LT5 
with REL_AmtTr, but do not tabulate the results. Consistent with the previous discussion, 
the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant, indicating 
that the estimated slope of the function relating execution costs to REL_AmtTr is greater 
when the insurer has fewer dealers in its network.  
4.4.4.2 Bond Portfolio Size Interacted with Prior Trading Relationship Strength 
The model in column 2 of Table 4.4 interacts REL_AmtTr with the size of the 
insurer’s bond holdings.  The coefficient on the REL_AmtTr is positive and statistically 
significant and the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically 




switches from positive to negative when Log_BondHldgs equals 10, which is a little lower 
than the mean for the sample.  Figure 2 illustrates the predicted impact on execution costs 
for different values of Log_BondHldgs. Similar results are found if we use the dichotomous 
variable Bondhldgs_LTMed, instead of Log_BondHldgs. 
Columns (3) – (6) in Table 4.4 repeat the estimations present in Columns 1 and 2, 
except with different fixed effects.  They illustrate that the results are robust to including 
counterparty fixed effects (columns 3 and 4) and including counterparty by month fixed 
effects (columns 5 and 6).  Taken together, the results reported in Table 4.4 provide support 
for the hypothesis that repeated transactions from the same dealer is associated with a larger 
reduction in bond execution costs for life insurers with higher market power.  
4.5 Effect of Cross Relationships on Execution Costs 
We now examine whether execution costs depend on whether the insurer has 
outsourced some of its asset management to an affiliate of the counterparty.  To do this, we 
include the variable OutsRel, which equals one if the insurer has outsourced some of its 
investment management with an affiliate of the dealer, and zero otherwise.   
We also examine whether outsourcing can enhance an insurer’s market power that 
otherwise would have low market power.  From the results in the previous section, we 
know that greater trading relationship strength increases execution costs for insurers with 
low market power.  To examine whether outsourcing counteracts this effect, we add the 
triple interaction term: OutsRel ×  REL_AmtTr ×  WeakMarketPower. The estimated 
coefficient on this variable gives the marginal effect of outsourcing on the slope of the 




market power. Consistent with the previous section, we use two measures of weak market 
power of life insurer in our tests: NetWork_LT5 and BondHldgs_LTMed.   
The results are reported in Table 4.5. The specifications in Columns 1 and 3 
include OutsRel only as a dummy variable (not interacted with any other variable).  In both 
cases, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  This 
suggests that on average outsourcing investment management services to an affiliate of the 
counterparty is associated with lower execution costs.   
In columns 2 and 4, we interact OutsRel with the prior trading relationship strength 
variable, REL_AmtTr, as well as with the interaction of REL_AmtTr with a dichotomous 
variable indicating low market power: NetWork_LT5 in column 2 and BondHldgs_LTMed 
in column 4 (giving a triple interaction variable).    In columns 2 and 4, the coefficients on 
OutsRel are again negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  The 
coefficient on OutsRel× REL_AmtTr is positive and significant at the 10% level in column 
2, but not statistically significant in column 4.  Finally, the coefficient on the triple 
interaction terms are negative, statistically significant and economically significant.  More 
specifically, the coefficient for OutsRel ×  REL_AmtTr ×  NetWork_LT5 is -1.00, 
indicating that for insurers with a smaller dealer network (weak market power) execution 
costs increase at a lower rate with the strength of the prior trading relationship if the insurer 
has an outsourcing relationship with an affiliate of the dealer.  The coefficient for OutsRel× 
REL_AmtTr × BondHldgs_LTMed is -0.69 and significant at 1 percent level. This result 
also provides evidence that an outsourcing relationship with an affiliate of the dealer helps 




power).  Thus, the evidence indicates that the benefit of outsourcing is more significant for 
life insurers with weak market power.   
We illustrate the impact of outsourcing on the sensitivity of execution costs to the 
relationship strength variable in Figure 3 (based on dealer network) and Figure 4 (based on 
bond holdings).  A comparison of the dashed and dotted lines gives the impact of having 
an outsourcing relation when the insurer has relatively small market power. Execution costs 
are lower on average and execution costs decrease with increases in REL_AmtTr when the 
insurer has an outsourcing relation.  This suggests that outsourcing of investment services 
augments the value of a relationship for insurers that otherwise would have little market 
power in bond trading relationship. 
4.6 Endogeneity of Relationship Trades 
Life insurer characteristics (such as bond portfolio size) and transaction 
characteristics (such as the bond being traded and trade size) may influence the decision to 
use a relationship dealer. Ideally, we would like to run an experiment with pairs of matched 
firms that are identical in all aspects except the dealer they use to buy or sell bonds. One 
firm in each pair would trade a bond with a relationship dealer while the other would trade 
the same bond at the same time with a non-relationship dealer. However, such an 
experiment is not practical.  Instead, we employ the propensity score matching technique 
used by Drucker and Puri (2005) and Bharath et al.  (2011). In our models, the propensity 
score for using a relationship dealer is a function of the transaction characteristics, bond 
characteristics, insurer characteristics, and time (quarter) fixed effect. The transaction 
characteristics include Sell_Dum and Log_TradeSize. Bond characteristic variables include 




and Log_offering amount. Insurer Characteristics include bond holding amount, Log_RBC, 
cash ratio, mutual dummy, ROA, SIFI dummy, business focus dummy and numbers of 
dealer. 
For each trade we estimate a predicted probability of the trade being a relationship 
trade. We then match each relationship trade with a set of non-relationship trades that have 
propensity scores similar to that of the relationship trade. We use one-to-one matching 
without replacement and set the caliper distance equal to 0.01, similar to Bharath et al. 
(2011).  We report our results in Table 4.6 for the mean bond execution cost difference 
between the relationship trade and the non-relationship trade by using propensity score 
estimators to match them.  
As illustrated in the first two rows of Table 4.6, the results show that the bond 
execution costs are higher for relationship trades when we examine matches for all 
transactions and matches for buy transactions.  These are consistent with the regression 
results presented earlier. Row three indicates that relationship trades are not statistically 
worse than non-relationship trades for sale trades.  
We also split our sample to allow for a comparison of trades made by life insurers 
with weak market power with matched trades by life insurers with stronger market power, 
where weak market power is measured by whether the insurer’s dealer network is less than 
five and separately by whether the insurer’s bond holdings are less than the median.  For 
both measures, the weaker life insurers suffer higher bond execution costs in relationship 
trades; however, the difference in execution costs is statistically significant only when we 




Finally, we examine the impact of outsourcing investment management to an 
affiliate of the dealer on execution costs.  The number of these cross relationship trades is 
relatively small and so we report results for those observations that meet are original caliber 
constraint and when the caliber constraint is removed.  In both cases, we find that the 
average execution costs are lower for weaker life insurers if they outsource their assets and 
trade with the same dealer, they enjoy lower bond execution costs. 
4.7 Summary  
The role of trading relationships between customers and dealers has drawn research 
attention in recent years. Recent empirical evidence indicates that trading relationship 
decreases bond execution costs.  In contrast, we find that trading relationships increases 
bond execution costs in life insurer transactions, on average. Consistent with the theoretical 
model of Bernhardt et al. 2005), we hypothesize that the impact of previous trading 
relationship depends on other factors, most importantly the customer’s market power in the 
relationship. Our evidence indicates that previous trading relationship decreases bond 
execution costs for life insurers with greater market power, as measured by the number of 
dealers in the insurer’s dealer network and the larger is the size of the insurer’s bond 
portfolio.  In addition, the outsourcing activities decreases the bond execution costs for life 
insurers with weaker market power. Our results therefore add to our understanding of the 









Table 4.1: Sample Selection 
 
This table describes the procedures we use to select our sample. Our data of corporate bond transaction and outsourcing status are from 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). Bond transaction data include detailed information of all corporate bond 
trades by insurance companies from 2003 to 2011, including the date and transaction amounts, par valued traded, identity of the insurer 
and the dealer (or counterparty) of the trade, and the direction of the trade (whether the insurance company is buying from the dealer or 
selling to the dealer). Characteristics of the issue and the issuer of the traded bond are obtained from the Fixed Income Security Database 
(FISD).  
 
Data Filiters Nobs 
All NAIC dealer-client bond trades for 2003 to 2011 3,611,435 
Drop cusip=missing or transaction date= missing or par=0 or missing 3,540,079 
After merging with FISD data for bond issue characteristic 1,269,404 
After merging with credit rating 1,041,406 
Keep corporate bond 857,438 
Drop life<=0.5 or age<0.75 528,897 
Drop Foreign Currency, par value not equal to 1000, transaction value=0, no maturity date, no amount outstanding 523,968 
Drop non-secondary market trade 434,519 
Drop no dealer (blank,0, Various…) 341,008 
After merging with valid insurer (normal status) 323,041 
Merge with TRACE, delete odd prices, at least two trades on the same side per day 100,416 
Merge with outsourcing data, drop unrecognized dealers 98,636 




Table 4.2: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: 
The statistics are based on 92,952 bond transactions between a life insurer and a dealer 
from 2003-2011.  Variable definitions are in the Appendix B. 
 
 MEAN STD P10 P50 P90 
Execution_Cost (basis pts) 0.5 1.4 -0.1 0.3 1.6 
Sell_Dum 0.581 0.493 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Trade_Size (million) 3.031 4.777 0.101 1.233 7.747 
      
REL_Dum 0.508 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
REL_AmtTr 0.128 0.237 0.000 0.004 0.387 
REL_NumTr 0.127 0.225 0.000 0.030 0.333 
OutsRel 0.031 0.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
Bond Maturity (Month) 106.754 96.185 26.867 79.233 299.533 
Bond Age (Month) 46.683 33.872 13.633 37.567 92.233 
Bond Liq (Qtr) 0.096 0.160 0.001 0.032 0.269 
Bond_Rating 7.127 1.321 5.000 7.000 8.667 
Bond_Upgrade 0.025 0.156 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Bond_Downgrade 0.091 0.287 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
RBC 10.568 24.099 5.015 7.769 13.515 
BondHldgs(Billion) 14.473 25.296 0.122 3.739 42.752 
BondHldgs_LTMed 0.090 0.285 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Num_Dealers 15.615 7.807 4.000 16.000 26.000 
NetWork_LT5 0.128 0.334 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Cash_Assets 0.044 0.066 0.004 0.024 0.098 
ROA 0.023 0.060 -0.007 0.012 0.067 
Mutual 0.108 0.311 0.000 0.000 1.000 
A&H_Focus 0.164 0.370 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Life_Focus 0.157 0.364 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Annuity_Focus 0.295 0.456 0.000 0.000 1.000 






Panel B: By Life Insurer 
The statistics are based on 4,832 life insurers from 2003-2011.   
 MEAN STD P10 P50 P90 
Assets (Billion) 5.697 18.686 0.022 0.525 12.043 
BondHldgs(million) 3.889 12.357 0.013 0.369 8.142 
BondHldgs_LTMed 0.315 0.464 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Num_Dealers 6.963 6.471 1.000 4.000 17.000 
NetWork_LT5 0.553 0.497 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Cash_Asset 0.065 0.094 0.005 0.032 0.166 
ROA 0.027 0.074 -0.016 0.015 0.083 
RBC 16.066 53.558 4.472 8.592 25.035 
Mutual 0.091 0.288 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A&H_Focus 0.228 0.420 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Life_Focus 0.283 0.451 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Annuity_Focus 0.172 0.378 0.000 0.000 1.000 










Table 4.3: Execution Cost and Previous Transaction Relationship 
 
This table reports the regression coefficient estimates where the dependent variable is execution costs and the explanatory variables are 
REL_Dum = 1 if there is a transaction relationship with the dealer in the previous quarter and 0 otherwise, REL_AmtTr = ratio of the 
dollar value of transactions with the dealer to the total dollar value of transactions  in the previous quarter, REL_NumTr =  ratio of 
number of deals with the dealer t in Appendix B.  We also add week and bond fixed effects. Robust standard errors, double clustered at 
both the bond and the week levels, are reported in parenthesis. The sample includes bond transactions by life insurers for the period 
2003-2011.  The dependent variable measured as a percentage of the benchmark price (0.01 is equivalent to 1 basis point; 1.00 is 
equivalent to 100 basis points). T-values are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%) 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 REL_AmtTr REL_NumTr REL_Dum REL_AmtTr REL_NumTr REL_Dum REL_AmtTr REL_NumTr REL_Dum 
Observation All All All Buys Buys Buys Sales Sales Sales 
REL 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0004*** 0.0015*** 0.0014*** 0.0005*** 0.0010** 0.0012*** 0.0003 
 (4.5328) (4.3439) (3.3207) (3.8594) (3.0207) (2.6424) (2.2715) (2.6467) (1.5744) 
Num_Dealers -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
-
0.0001*** 
 (-7.7311) (-7.5966) (-8.2723) (-4.3482) (-4.2604) (-5.0672) (-6.5356) (-6.4273) (-6.5983) 
Log_BondHld
gs -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (-1.8845) (-1.9533) (-2.1158) (-3.7061) (-3.7570) (-3.9116) (1.3457) (1.3142) (1.2420) 
Sell_Dum 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0016***       
 (8.6542) (8.6516) (8.6356)       
Log_TradeSize -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
-
0.0003*** 
 (-4.1578) (-4.0617) (-4.1595) (-1.2693) (-1.2084) (-1.3108) (-4.6586) (-4.5815) (-4.6541) 
Bond_Maturity 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0013** 0.0013** 0.0013** 
 (2.7727) (2.7690) (2.8005) (0.6709) (0.6731) (0.6754) (2.2413) (2.2371) (2.2559) 
Bond_Age 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0010** 0.0010** 0.0010** 0.0008* 0.0008* 0.0008* 








  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 REL_AmtTr REL_NumTr REL_Dum REL_AmtTr REL_NumTr REL_Dum REL_AmtTr REL_NumTr REL_Dum 
Observation All All All Buys Buys Buys Sales Sales Sales 
Bond_Liq 0.0080*** 0.0080*** 0.0080*** 0.0064*** 0.0064*** 0.0064*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 
 (7.0573) (7.0624) (7.0596) (4.3247) (4.3295) (4.3176) (6.6905) (6.6876) (6.6930) 
Bond_Ratimg -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** 
-
0.0011*** 
 (-3.9052) (-3.9029) (-3.8741) (-4.1093) (-4.1096) (-4.0807) (-2.7828) (-2.7830) (-2.7682) 
Bond_Upgrade 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.6205) (0.6257) (0.5936) (0.7770) (0.7836) (0.7712) (0.7796) (0.7855) (0.7577) 
Bond_Downgr
ade 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 
 (3.8588) (3.8624) (3.8620) (3.7022) (3.7149) (3.7161) (1.7435) (1.7436) (1.7418) 
Log_RBC -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0003** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
-
0.0006*** 
 (-2.4270) (-2.3970) (-2.5529) (0.4423) (0.4375) (0.3906) (-3.1689) (-3.1285) (-3.2440) 
Cash_Asset -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0019 0.0014 0.0013 0.0014 
 (-0.1517) (-0.1707) (-0.1451) (-1.3015) (-1.3113) (-1.3633) (0.8789) (0.8541) (0.9083) 
ROA -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0013 0.0007 0.0006 0.0008 
 (-0.7022) (-0.7177) (-0.5525) (-1.3141) (-1.2909) (-1.0977) (0.3672) (0.3549) (0.4182) 
Mutual 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (2.4667) (2.4904) (2.4508) (2.6159) (2.6204) (2.5714) (0.6934) (0.7093) (0.6915) 
A&H_Focus -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (-2.2555) (-2.2327) (-2.2802) (-1.8686) (-1.8692) (-1.8865) (-1.2834) (-1.2611) (-1.2901) 
Life_Focus -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
 (-0.5227) (-0.4787) (-0.6158) (-0.8180) (-0.8183) (-0.9286) (0.2449) (0.2759) (0.2140) 
Annuity_Focus 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 
 (1.2527) (1.3061) (1.2354) (-0.0318) (0.0013) (-0.0719) (2.0778) (2.0989) (2.0759) 
SIFI 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 (0.1724) (0.1861) (0.1825) (2.7719) (2.7710) (2.7507) (-1.5320) (-1.5180) (-1.5232) 








  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 REL_AmtTr REL_NumTr REL_Dum REL_AmtTr REL_NumTr REL_Dum REL_AmtTr REL_NumTr REL_Dum 
Observation All All All Buys Buys Buys Sales Sales Sales 





Table 4.4: Execution Cost and The Interaction of a Previous Transaction 
Relationship with Customer Market Power 
 
This table reports the regression coefficient estimates where the dependent variable is 
execution costs and the explanatory variables are AmtTr = ratio of the dollar value of 
transactions with the dealer to the total dollar value of transactions  in the previous quarter 
and various measures of Customer Market Power and interactions of Rel_Amt Tr with the 
customer market power variables.  Bond and insurer control variable included in the 
models reported in Table 3 are also included in these models, but the coefficients are not 
reported.  We also add week and bond fixed effects. Robust standard errors, double 
clustered at both the bond and the week levels, are reported in parenthesis. The sample 
includes bond transactions by life insurers for the period 2003-2011.  The dependent 
variable measured as a percentage of the benchmark price (0.01 is equivalent to 1 basis 
point; 1.00 is equivalent to 100 basis points).  T-values are in parentheses. Asterisks denote 
significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%). 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES markup markup markup markup markup markup 
              
Rel_Amt_Tr 0.20*** 0.30*** 0.20*** 0.27*** 0.22*** 0.29*** 
 (4.16) (4.07) (3.55) (3.85) (4.01) (4.14) 
Num_Dealers -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (-6.53) (-7.60) (-6.89) (-7.40) (-7.01) (-7.71) 
Log_BondHldgs -0.01* -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (-1.84) (-1.17) (0.12) (0.68) (-0.05) (0.63) 
Rel_Amt_Tr X Num_Dealers -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01***  
 (-2.26)  (-2.17)  (-2.76)  
Rel_Amt_Tr X Log_BondHldgs  -0.03**  -0.02**  -0.03*** 
  (-2.49)  (-2.42)  (-2.88) 
       
Observations 91,261 91,261 91,130 91,130 90,408 90,408 
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.29 
Fixed Effects       
Week and cusip Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Counterparty No No Yes Yes No No 
Counterparty X month No No No No Yes Yes 






Table 4.5 Execution Cost and Cross Relationships 
This table reports the regression coefficient estimates where the dependent variable is 
execution costs and the explanatory variables are AmtTr = ratio of the dollar value of 
transactions with the dealer to the total dollar value of transactions in the previous quarter 
and outsourcing activity and interactions of Rel_Amt Tr with the customer market power 
variables.  Bond and insurer control variable included in the models reported in Table 4.3 
are also included in these models, but the coefficients are not reported.  We also add week 
and bond fixed effects. Robust standard errors, double clustered at both the bond and the 
week levels, are reported in parenthesis. The sample includes bond transactions by life 












(1) (2) (3) (4) 
REL_AmtTr 0.04 0.01 0.08** 0.06* 
 (1.29) (0.48) (2.56) (1.86) 
NewWork_LT5 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
 
(7.46) (6.83) (9.08) (8.88) 
BondHldgs_LTMed 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 
(5.84) (5.90) (4.46) (4.07) 
REL_AmtTr * NetWork_LT5 0.15** 0.22***   
 (2.43) (3.30)   
REL_AmtTr * Bondhldgs_LTMed   0.11* 0.20*** 
   (1.71) (2.86) 
OutsRel -0.13** -0.21** -0.13** -0.18** 
 (-2.43) (-2.22) (-2.37) (-2.32) 
REL_AmtTr * OutsRel  0.73*  0.28 
  (1.83)  (1.50) 
NetWork_LT5*OutsRel  0.20   
  (1.56)   
REL_AmtTr * Network_LT5 *OutsRel   -1.00**   
  (-2.36)   
Bondhldgs_LTMed*OutsRel    0.23* 
    (1.74) 
REL_AmtTr * Bondhldgs_LTMed*OutsRel    -0.69*** 
    (-2.84) 
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cusip Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 91,261 91,261 91,261 91,296 




Table 4.6 Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
This table provides estimates of the mean difference between the execution costs of 
matched relationship trades and non-relationship trades. For the estimation of the 
propensity score, we use Probit regressions in which the dependent variable is REL, which 
takes the value of 1 if the insurer has previous trading relationship with the dealer, 0 
otherwise. The propensity score for using a relationship dealer is a function of the 
transaction characteristics, bond characteristics, insurer characteristics, and time (quarter) 
fixed effect. The dependent variable measured as a percentage of the benchmark price (0.01 
is equivalent to 1 basis point; 1.00 is equivalent to 100 basis points).  T-values in brackets. 






Mean Difference in 







Full Sample 31,990 0.0002** -2.13  
Buys 
18,391 0.0005*** -3.11  
Sales 
13,373 -0.0000 -0.32  
NetWork_LST=1 3,016 0.0008* -1.79  
NetWork_LT5=0 27,862 0.0001 -0.91 0.0007* 
BondHldgs_LTMed=1 2,395 0.0006 -1.25  
BondHldgs_LTMed=0 29,025 0.0001 -0.68 0.0005 
NetWork_LT5=1 & OutsRel=1 304 -0.0031** 2.05  
NetWork_LT5=1 & OutsRel=0 2,473 0.0017*** 3.59 -0.0048*** 
BondHldgs_LTMed =1 & 
OutsRel=1 
120 -0.0014 0.64  
BondHldgs_LTMed =1 & 
OutsRel=0 
2,100 0.0011** 2.23 -0.0025 
NetWork_LS5=1 & OutsRel=1 
(Release caliper distance constraint) 
452 -0.0025** -1.98  
NetWork_LS5=1 & OutsRel=0 
(Release caliper distance constraint) 
2,892 0.0018*** 4.05 -0.0043*** 
BondHldgsLsMed =1& OutsRel=1 
(Release caliper distance constraint) 
229 -0.0022* -1.66  
BondHldgsLsMed =1& OutsRel=0 
(Release caliper distance constraint) 








Figure 4.1 Predicted Execution Costs (in basis points) as a function of REL_AmtTr 
when the Num_Dealers equals 2, 10, and 30 relative to the predicted execution costs  




















    Figure 4.2 : Predicted Execution Costs (in basis points) as a function of 
REL_AmtTr when the Log_BondHldgs equals 1 and 30 relative to the predicted 
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Figure 4.3: Predicted Execution Costs (in basis points) as a function of REL_AmtTr 
for different values of dealer network size (Network_LT5) and outsourcing 
(OutsRel). 
  
The predicted execution costs are relative to the predicted execution costs when 
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     The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) allowed U.S. financial conglomerates 
to engage in both banking and insurance under one roof, similar to universal banks in 
Europe (Carow, 2000; Morrison, 2015). However, regulators have remained concerned 
about the potential negative effects involved in combining banking and insurance, and 
about the connections between financial institutions more generally. The 2008 financial 
crisis heighted these concerns,  My dissertation contributes to our understanding of how 
the relationships among financial institutions influence the behavior and performance of 
individual financial institutions, as well as market level outcomes. 
     In the first essay, I find that life insurers with bank affiliates experienced higher 
premium growth than life insurers without bank affiliates, mainly from annuity products. 
This result is consistent with banks internally transferring deposit customers to the annuity 
products provided by an affiliated life insurer, which supports the benefits of combining 
banks and life insurers “under one roof.”  However, the group performance of organizations 
with banks and life insurers was worse than what stand-alone banks and life insurers during 
the same period. Overall, the benefits of transferring customers to affiliated insurers were 
not large enough to increase the group’s performance. 
     In the second essay, we find that life insurers tend to be on the same side of the market 




be a possible source of systematic risk (see e.g., FSOC (2013), Getmansky et al. (2016) 
Paulson and Rosen (2016), and Schwarcz and Schwarcz, 2014), we find little evidence that 
insurer herding caused prices to move away from fundamental values during our sample 
period. The implications of the results therefore do not support the hypothesis that life 
insurers are systemically important through their investment behavior. 
     In the third essay, we find that previous trading relationship decreases bond execution 
costs for life insurers with greater market power, as measured by the number of dealers in 
the insurer’s dealer network and the larger is the size of the insurer’s bond portfolio.  In 
addition, outsourcing of investment management services to an affiliate of a bond dealer 
decreases the bond execution costs for life insurers with weaker market power. Our results, 
therefore, add to our understanding of the role of relationships in financial markets. 
       The findings show that the relationships among financial institutions are complicated. 
First, affiliations in the same groups may help each other during the financial crisis, but the 
cross-selling effects were not enough to improve the performance during the crisis.  Second, 
although life insurers’ investment decisions are correlated, the correlated trading does not 
appear to disrupt the bond markets. Finally, the impacts of previous trading relationships 
are not monotonic. The interaction effects between customer market power and previous 
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LSV MEASURE ILLUSTRATION 
 
To illustrate the LSV measure, suppose that five bonds are in the sample and the 
deviations of each bond’s buy ratio from the overall average buy ratio (pit – pt) equal -0.3, 
-0.1, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3.  For simplicity, assume the adjustment factor for each security is 
zero, then the following table would give the herding measures for each of the five bonds 
and the average herding measures. 
     The average overall herding measure (LSV_HM) for the sample would be 0.2, the 
average of the absolute values of the five individual deviations.  The average sell herding 
measure would be 0.2, the average of the absolute values of the two negative deviations; 
and the average buy herding measure would be 0.2, the average of the three positive 
deviations.  
 






Bond pit - pt LSV_HM LSV_SHM LSV_BHM 
1 -0.3 0.3 0.3  
2 -0.1 0.1 0.1  
3 0.1 0.1  0.1 
4 0.2 0.2  0.2 
5 0.3 0.3  0.3 









Execution_Costs is the percentage difference between the price paid on 
a transaction and the volume weighted average TRACE price for that 
bond on the same day 
REL_Dum 
REL_Dum is a measure of relationship strength. REL_Dum equals 1 if 
there is a transaction relationship with the dealer in the previous quarter 
and 0 otherwise. 
REL_AmtTr 
REL_AmtTr is a measure of relationship strength. It is the ratio of the 
dollar value of transactions with the dealer to the total dollar value of 
transactions  made by the life insurer in the previous quarter 
REL_NumTr 
REL_NumTr is a measure of relationship strength. It is the ratio of 
number of deals with the dealer to total number of transactions made by 
the life insurer  in the previous quarter 
OutsRel 
OutsRel equals one if the insurer has outsourced some of its investment 
management with an affiliate of the dealer, and zero otherwise 
 
Transaction Characteristics 
Sell_Dum A dummy variable equal to one if the life insurer is selling 




Maturity is the natural log of the length in months between transaction 
date and maturity date. 
Bond _Age The natural logarithm of the number of months since bond was issued 
Bond_Liq The Amihud liquidity measure for the bond 
Bond_Rating 
Bond i’s average rating score during quarter t (1 = AAA,  … 10 
=default) 
Bond_Upgrade 






A dummy variable equals 1  if Ratingit increases during quarter t, and 0 
otherwise 
 
Life Insurer Characteristics 
Log_RBC The natural logarithm of the insurer’s risk-based capital ratios 
RBC_LT5 Equal to one if the insurer’s RBC ratio is less than 5, and zero otherwise. 
Log_BondHldgs 
(in millions) 
The natural log of general account asset in million in real year 2003 
dollars. 
BondHldgs_LTMed  
A dichotomous variable, which equals one if the insurer’s bond 
holdings are less than the median for the sample, and zero otherwise. 
Num_Dealers The number of dealers that traded with the life insurer in year t. 
NetWork_LT5  
A dichotomous variable, which equals one if the number of dealers 
traded with the life insurer in year t is less than 5, and zero otherwise. 
Cash_Assets  The ratio of cash to total asset. 
ROA 
Average return on assets of insurers transacting in bond i during quarter 
t, 
Mutual 
A dummy variable equals 1 if the life insurer is a mutual company, and 
0 otherwise. 
A&H_Focus 
A dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the average percentage of 
premiums written in accident & health insurance exceeds 75 percent, 
and zero otherwise. 
Life_Focus 
A dichotomous variable that equals 1 if an insurer’s percentage of 
premiums written in life insurance exceeds 75 percent, and zero 
otherwise. 
Annuity_Focus 
A dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the average percentage of 
premiums written in annuity exceeds 75 percent, and zero otherwise. 
SIFI 
Dummy variable equals one if the life insurer belongs to a SIFI during 
quarter t, and 0 otherwise 
 
